

News from behind the IRON CURTAIN

March 1954

\$3.00 per year

JOURNALISM LIBRARY
122 Gregory Hall Vol. 3, No. 3



FEATURES

- Black Bottleneck
- Agriculture (II)
- Apostles of Discord
- Satellite Bookshelf (II)
- The Big Loudspeaker
- The Party Is Work



News from behind the IRON CURTAIN

National Committee for a Free Europe

March 1954 — Vol. 3 — No. 3

OFFICERS

JOSEPH C. GREW
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
ARTHUR W. PAGE
CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
WHITNEY H. SHEPARDSON
PRESIDENT
SPENCER PHENIX
VICE PRESIDENT AND TREASURER
FREDERIC R. DOLBEARE
ROBERT E. LANG
LEVERING TYSON
SAMUEL S. WALKER, JR.
BERNARD YARROW
VICE PRESIDENTS
THEODORE C. AUGUSTINE
SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT TREASURER
J. CLAYTON MILLER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MEMBERS

Clarence L. Adcock
Raymond Pace Alexander
Frank Altschul
Laird Bell
A. A. Berle, Jr.*
Francis Biddle
Robert Woods Bliss
Robert F. Bradford
Harry A. Bullis
James B. Carey
Harry Woodburn Chase
Lucius D. Clay
William L. Clayton
Clark M. Clifford
Cecil B. DeMille
Frank R. Denton
Frederic R. Dolbeare*
William J. Donovan
Mark F. Ethridge
James A. Farley
Julius Fleischmann*
Henry Ford II
Virginia C. Gildersleeve
Joseph C. Grew*
Charles R. Hook
Palmer Hoyt
Paul Kesten*
Henry R. Luce
Joseph V. McKee
Web Maddox
H. B. Miller*
Irving S. Olds*
Frederick Osborn
Arthur W. Page*
Spencer Phenix*
Whitney H. Shepardson*
George N. Shuster*
John A. Sibley
Spyros Skouras
Charles M. Spofford*
Charles P. Taft
H. Gregory Thomas*
Levering Tyson
DeWitt Wallace
W. W. Waymack
Walter H. Wheeler, Jr.
Charles E. Wilson
Mrs. Quincy Wright
Darryl Zanuck

* Board of Directors

• CONTENTS •

	Page
BLACK BOTTLENECK	3
<i>Hard-fuel shortages are crippling the "New Course" program in Czechoslovakia by blocking the manufacture of consumer goods.</i>	
ECONOMIC REPORT: AGRICULTURE (III)	8
<i>Romania and Bulgaria: part two of a documentary report on recent changes in the East European agricultural situation, covering such essentials as yield, collectivization and animal husbandry.</i>	
APOSTLES OF DISCORD	21
<i>Throughout the Soviet orbit, Communist regimes are attempting to usurp the prerogatives of parental authority. What makes a juvenile "delinquent" in Satellite countries?</i>	
SATELLITE BOOKSHELF (III)	27
<i>Analyses of two recent and widely read Satellite novels — one Czech, the other Hungarian.</i>	
THE BIG LOUDSPEAKER	33
<i>The most recent facts and figures on Communist propaganda broadcasts. Target: the free world.</i>	
This Month in Review	1
This is Radio Free Europe	36
The Party is Work	32
Current Developments	41

ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION . . .

NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, published monthly by the Free Europe Press of the National Committee for a Free Europe, is distributed to those with a specific interest in events and developments in Communist-dominated Europe. This bulletin is made available to representatives of the press and other media, to universities, churches, libraries, and research centers, and to other groups of citizens who want to know more about "Communism in practice." The magazine is not an organ of editorial policy: wherever possible direct quotation is used to provide source material and to document commentary. The Committee believes that accurate information contributes to an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist system, and hence to the ability of the free nations to combat this system.

NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN is published monthly, copyright 1954 by the Free Europe Press, National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., 110 West 57 Street, New York 19, N. Y. Material contained herein may be quoted without permission, provided reference is made to this publication. Subscriptions \$3.00 per year. Subscriptions and communications should be sent to the above address.

The Month in Review



ONCE more, at Berlin, Communism revealed that its domestic and foreign policies are closely intertwined. As Communist leadership recognized that it must meet the problems of **domestic resistance and disorganization**, so it came to understand that it had to face the problems of **foreign resistance and free world organization**. In both cases, however, the Communists were unable to meet their problems adequately because in the nature of their totalitarianism, they refused to take the genuine and far-reaching measures necessary to solve them. Internally, they were unwilling to abandon collectivization, insure personal freedom, and create positive and guaranteed incentives for the people. Externally, they were unwilling to release the captive peoples or give positive guarantees for free elections in a unified Germany.

This partial political paralysis produced some **reluctant concessions to necessity**. Internally, the Communists attempted to realign their terror-wracked, inefficiency-ridden, doctrine-dogged economy with the New Course. Externally, **they wanted detente** to deal with their domestic dilemmas and made minor concessions in the form of "normalization" of relations, trade invitations, and acceptance of a Foreign Ministers' Conference at Berlin. They were **not under sufficient external pressure** to make them give ground for detente, nor under enough internal pressure to make sweeping domestic reforms. They were like small boys with a hot potato in their hands. They could neither let it go, because they were greedy, nor could they swallow it because it was hot and difficult to digest. Therefore they were forced to continue a sort of perpetual juggling, both at home and on the question of Germany at the Berlin Conference.

In Poland, particular emphasis was placed on **Germany**, and reports on speeches made at the Conference usually filled the first two pages of the four-page Party dailies. It now seems clear that the Party Congress, originally scheduled for January 16, was postponed to March 10 so that a maximum of attention could be focussed on the Berlin events. Probably timed to coincide with the Conference was a trial in Opole in which "West German spies" were sentenced to death and long-term imprisonment, providing the Polish regime with greater opportunity to point out the "**dangers**" of Western policy.

Satellite domestic propaganda was devoted primarily to publicizing the New Course. With great fanfare the Hungarian regime announced that the 1954 economic plan provided for "improving the national welfare." The plan calls for a moderate **increase in consumer goods** and an equally moderate **decrease in heavy industrialization**. Twenty-four percent of the total investment funds will be allocated to agriculture—approximately twice as much as last year—and farm production is to be raised by eight percent. The total investment is set at 14 billion *forints*—that is, three billion less than last year. If the plan is actually carried out, living standards may be raised slightly by the end of the year.

Production, however, still remained unsatisfactory, and although the Hungarian regime had been somewhat more lenient since last July it openly expressed the need for workers to **increase productivity**. At the Third Plenary Session of the National Trade

Union Council Matyas Rakosi stressed the importance of plan fulfillment and, quoting Lenin, pointed out that "Trade Unions are the Party's driving force." Rakosi admitted that in the first five weeks of 1954 industrial production had already fallen behind schedule.

Area-wide election campaigns designed to convince the masses of the Communists' "deep interest in their well-being" are prominent features of the New Course; the aim is to gain their cooperation in carrying out the new program. In Hungary, propaganda was focussed on **elections to basic Party organizations**. Since the last elections in the fall of 1951, a mass turnover of local Party leaders has been effected by liquidations, arrests and arbitrary removals. The current elections are intended to restore order and discipline in the ranks and to reactivate the inefficient Party apparatus. Secret elections were promised as a bait to the rank and file membership but this has in no way weakened top Communist control: nominating and supervisory committees were chosen by "open vote" and Party authorities are to decide the posts elected candidates will fill.

A nation-wide **election campaign** was also underway in Czechoslovakia where, for the first time since the war, elections for administrative officials in the **national committees** will be held. Radical improvements are needed in national committee work and the regime hopes by the elections to get competent functionaries to carry out its program on the local levels, and to make the committees popular with the people. Two bills were drafted reorganizing the committees; they are intended to "strengthen the committees' union with the people and to create conditions for broad mass participation in the State administration." Although the bills are supposed to ensure "collective leadership" and to provide for removal of incompetent officials, they contain no essential measures guaranteeing better administration or more democratic popular control.

The New Course in Czechoslovakia continued to be severely hampered by **low coal production**. Difficulties in the mines had been rife for some time and conditions finally became so critical that the regime was forced to call a special Party Central Committee session to decide on urgent measures for ensuring future coal output. The crisis was further complicated by the severe cold wave which gripped Europe; in addition to already existing problems, passenger traffic, with the exception of worker trains, was suspended, and hydroelectric power fell to a new low. The Government and Central Trade Union Council were forced to make a joint appeal to railway employees, miners, national committees and the people in general to cooperate in efforts to overcome mining and transport deficiencies.

The Bulgarian regime passed New Course measures to raise consumer goods production. A recent decree gives **aid to both private and kolkhoz handicraftsmen**. To encourage private craftsmen, the regime has slowed down forcible collectivization, but at the same time, top Communists have pointed out that collectives should be expanded as quickly as possible.

In line with New Course propaganda, **farm and food supply problems** were dealt with extensively at meetings of the Romanian People's Councils. Complaints were registered about the **insufficient quantity** of available **vegetables**, and the Councils were told to set up local supply centers, extend the area used for growing vegetables and pay more attention to cattle breeding. It is doubtful that these exhortations will succeed in being more than propaganda unless the regime provides more extensive financial and technical aid for these purposes.

Behind the scenes the unpublicized **reorganization of the Romanian government** continued. In the past month new assistant ministers were appointed in Construction, Culture, Education, Telecommunications, the Food Industry, and Light Industry. It also appears that the Ministry of State Security was merged with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a move modelled on the USSR merger, and which may have been aimed at Beria's followers.

Black Bottleneck

Fuel and power have been two of the Communist regimes' most pressing problems. Bureaucratic mismanagement, worker absenteeism and low per capita output have combined to frustrate Party economic planning. The following article is a survey of the coal crisis in Czechoslovakia.



The various workers on the line say to the coal miner: "Hey you, get moving! We're waiting for you. It's you who have the keys." The door with the 1954 handle [the new year] is marked "Elimination of [economic] disproportions."

Dikobraz (Prague), January 24, 1954

INSUFFICIENT coal production in Czechoslovakia is crippling the recently-launched New Course program and is fast threatening to undermine the country's top-heavy industrial superstructure. The magnitude of the crisis was fully revealed in a statement made by Josef Jonas, Minister of Fuel and Power, before a plenary session of the Communist Party's Central Committee specially convened on January 11, 1954, to discuss "Urgent measures to develop the coal industry and to secure the 1954 coal output." According to *Rude Pravo* (Prague) of January 13, 1954, the Minister admitted that "while industrial production more than doubled in the course of the Five Year Plan [1949-53], hard-coal output increased by only 13.8 percent and brown coal by 45.5 percent."

It is clear that this dangerous unbalance has long been known to the Communist bosses. In the past, however, coal production was made to support heavy industrialization—no matter how precariously—mainly at the expense of the consumer. Now the consumer is supposedly being wooed with a "new deal" purporting to raise the people's standard of living. Logically speaking, therefore, the dangerous disproportion so candidly described by Jonas could only be rectified by a sharp and immediate downturn in heavy industry investment. That, however, is the one step the government has not undertaken. According to Premier Viliam Siroky (as reported in *Rude Pravo* of September 16, 1953) heavy industrial output, far from being decreased, will be maintained in the current year and, in fact, the 1954 target calls for a six percent increase over the 1953 level. Hence the present regime dilemma: a coal production that in the past could barely provide the thinnest basis for rapid extension of an armament-directed industrial program is now to be stretched to support the newly superimposed consumer-oriented New Course policy.

No wonder, then, that the country's overlords found it

necessary to issue a stream of warnings, pleas and proclamations starting in August of last year—that is, almost simultaneously with the inception of the new program. Since then, these regime appeals have become ever more strident and progressively more revealing. The whole problem was succinctly stated by Jonas; according to *Rude Pravo* of January 13, 1954, he depicted the present economic impasse in the following terms: "Fulfillment of the tasks set forth in the government [New Course] declaration last September depends on how fast we manage to eliminate disproportions caused by the lagging in basic sectors of our national economy, particularly in raw materials. At this moment, the most important link . . . is coal production."

Production Figures

What Jonas was pleading for entailed a drastic reversal in the present trend of an ever widening gap between industrial production and coal output, particularly in the output of the industrially all-important hard coal. This trend is illustrated in the following table:

INDUSTRIAL AND COAL OUTPUT INDICES*

	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
industrial production (gross value in 1948 prices)	103	127	147	166	196	204
hard coal output	105	101	110	110	119	120
brown coal output	132	148	153	167	182	191

* Government Five Year Plan Memorandum, Ministry of Information and Public Culture, Prague, July, 1949. 1937 equals 100.

State Statistical Office, Plan Fulfillment Report for 1950; *Rude Pravo*, Jan. 4, 1951, State Statistical Office, Plan Fulfillment Re-

The vital significance of these figures can be gauged from a January 13, 1954 *Rude Pravo* assertion that 85 percent of all power consumed in Czechoslovakia is derived from coal. What makes the situation even grimmer for the regime is the fact that by far the larger part of this power comes from hard coal, 80 percent of which (according to an estimate of the then-Minister of Fuel and Energy, Václav Pokorný, as reported in *Rude Pravo* on January 13, 1952) is obtained from the Ostrava basin, a center of the violent anti-government June demonstrations.

When originally worked out in 1948, the Five Year Plan foresaw a production target of 20.8 million tons of hard coal by 1953; then, under the impact of the Korean war and in accordance with a government ordinance—No. 33 of April 10, 1951, reported in the government publication *Collection of Laws*, No. 20, April 24, 1951—the goal was raised to 24.752 million tons. The above table shows that the latest figures issued by the authorities do not meet even the more modest first target. The full extent of this production failure was revealed by Zapotocký in a speech delivered to the Karvina miners on September 13, 1953. The following day *Rude Pravo* quoted him as having conceded that production in the vital Ostrava mines was still below the record set in 1943 under Nazi occupation. This relative stagnation in hard coal production is detailed in the table below:

HARD COAL OUTPUT*

1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
17,600	17,000	18,456	18,473	20,060	20,195

With regard to brown coal, used by the chemical industry and for heating homes, the situation has been somewhat less alarming. This is explainable in terms of the easier accessibility of these mineral reserves. Thus, in his January 1952 statement, Pokorný pointed out that three quarters of all Czechoslovak brown coal is dug in the Most area. The surface mines of this region can be expanded and mechanized much more conveniently than the deep hard coal mines of Ostrava. Even so, while the 32.2 million ton quota at first envisaged in the Five Year Plan was surpassed, fulfillment fell short of the revised target of 38.318 million tons:

BROWN COAL OUTPUT**

1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
23,600	26,527	27,506	29,885	32,600	34,322

port for 1951; *Rude Pravo*, Jan. 27, 1952, State Statistical Office, Plan Fulfillment Report for 1952; *Rude Pravo*, Jan. 30, 1953. Josef Pucik, Minister-Chairman of the State Planning Office; *Rude Pravo*, Jan. 23, 1954.

* In thousand metric tons p.a. Sources: *Zpravy Živnostenské banky*, April 1949, p. 6-7; *Rude Pravo*, January 4, 1951; Václav Pokorný, *Rude Pravo*, Jan. 13, 1952; K. Gottwald, *Rude Pravo*, Dec. 17, 1952; Josef Jonas, Minister of Fuel and Energy, *Rude Pravo*, Jan. 13, 1954.

** In thousand metric tons p.a. Sources same as those for hard coal.

The Neck of the Bottle

The reasons for the continued bottleneck in coal are explicit in official statements. Pieced together, the self-criticism reveals the following main shortcomings:

1. Short-sightedness and over-rapid exploitation

In the speech referred to above, Zapotocký made the following statement: "Since 1912, a period of more than 40 years, not a single [new] pit has been opened in the Ostrava area. . . ." What Zapotocký refrained from explaining was that before the war, production was more than adequate to cover all internal needs and still comfortably afford to export sizeable quantities of coal. According to the 1948 edition of the *Foreign Commerce Yearbook* (Department of Commerce), Czechoslovak coal exports amounted to 2,189,000 long tons in 1937. Zapotocký's declaration must therefore be interpreted as an indictment of Communist planning which launched its ambitious industrial build-up without laying the foundations for it.

On January 14, *Rude Pravo* stated that the regime had come to the conclusion that geological research was lagging behind schedule by from three to five years. The same article mentioned that reserves available for exploitation decreased by 25 percent between 1949 and 1952. Here again the picture that emerges is one of ruthless, frenzied exploitation in complete disregard of the costs involved. But hard economic facts are now stopping the regime in its tracks.

2. Mismanagement, lack of coordination and waste

In his report to the Central Committee, Jonas conceded that the 1951 reorganization had been a failure, that it had resulted in "overcentralization and bureaucratism." These handicaps are of course inherent in the system and not restricted to coal alone; how this is reflected on the practical level was the object of the following lecture in *Rude Pravo* of January 14:

"In order to increase coal output, miners require timely deliveries of machinery and equipment. . . . The mines are short of coal cars. . . . The iron works in Liskovec, however, have failed to deliver 2,355 coal cars. . . . Failure to carry out orders last year caused the loss of 400,000 tons of hard coal and 600,000 tons of brown coal. If we had this quantity of coal, we would be able to supply every family in the Republic with an additional three hundredweight of coal. . . . If railway cars are not available in the mining areas, losses of coal are unavoidable. . . . During the last quarter of the year, the country's economy was deprived of 129,403 tons of coal in the Sokolov coal fields because of a failure on the part of the railroad staff to provide a sufficient number of railway freight cars. This quantity of coal equals the monthly allocation for inhabitants of the Pilsen Region."

The article also points out that even when the coal is dug and delivered to its destination, it is then wasted "not only in factories, but everywhere." An example is cited: though only 55,000 kilowatt-hours of electric power was planned for the winter stadium in Kladno as its November quota, the actual consumption reached the 74,000 kilowatt-hour mark.

3. Workers' unwillingness to become miners

Apart from the fact that mining is at best far from a desirable profession, conditions in Czechoslovak mines have become so intolerable (through the perpetual raising of norms and periodic decreases in the general standard of living) that the turnover in mining personnel continues to be abnormally high in spite of all Communist efforts to remedy the situation. Thus, according to a Pokorny statement in *Rude Pravo* of September 11, 1953, more than 845,000 workers had been employed in the mines in the preceding five years. The Minister added that the number of miners had never exceeded the 150,000 mark in any one year. On January 13, *Rude Pravo* disclosed that, as of October 1, 1953, the proportion of temporary mine workers amounted to as much as 25.4 percent of the total mining force. The same article then gave one obvious reason why mining has become so unattractive to the average worker. It explains that out of 10,000 housing units planned for miners in 1952-53, only 5,761 were actually completed. The paper also blames the disproportion between wages paid to underground workers and the salaries paid to auxiliary personnel as having caused labor shortages in such functions as mine transportation and handling hewn coal.

Continuing in this critical vein, *Rude Pravo* refers to disorganized speed-ups which often result in a neglect of and disregard for mine safety regulations. A dramatic illustration of this practice has been given by a former worker of the Jan Sverma mine near Zacler, who escaped from Czechoslovakia in June of last year. The worker mentions the fate of one Walter Faehnrich, an enthusiastic Red, who constantly tried to exceed the norm. When working on the coal face, he undermined about 30 meters without stopping to have it shored up. "The wall suddenly collapsed, killing Faehnrich immediately." The miner then explains that, although the casualty was a devout Communist, the investigating commission blamed him rather than admit that high norms are ultimately responsible for such accidents. It is not surprising therefore that workers persist in disregarding government pleas and fail to flock to the mines despite the comparatively high salaries.

4. Absenteeism and improper personnel


Absence—frequent, inexcused and prolonged—have long been plaguing the regime. On January 25, 1953, *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague) admitted that, as a result of such absences, more than one million tons of coal had been lost in 1952. On June 9, 1953, *Rude Pravo* once again referred to the same topic and disclosed that in the first four months of the year 55,000 shifts had been skipped. By the time of

Pokorny's September speech, miner absenteeism was as high as 18.4 percent in hard coal and 15.3 percent in brown coal mines, while in some individual mines the average reached a level of 41 percent. Four months later, on January 13, 1954, *Rude Pravo* had to admit that "loyalty bonuses," paid to miners who faithfully stayed at their job, did not reduce the rate of absenteeism and labor turnover.

One reason for this is the fact that persons who are either unfit or unwilling to work in coal mines are forcefully drafted for such work in order to appease higher authorities. Once in their new occupation, however, these recruits play truant or attempt to leave the scene in a hurry. Hence the continual turnover aggravated by persistent absenteeism.

5. Low per capita output

Ever since the Communists assumed power, the most immovable obstacle they have had to face has been the low worker productivity. No matter how ingenious the devices introduced to check on individual performance have been, the worker has refused to cooperate. His answer to speed-up decrees has been determined slow-down. "The principal reason why the hard coal output is not being fulfilled," pontificated Pokorny in his September speech, "is that per capita planned output is not being reached,



The mining engineer and the two miners are about to work on the rocks marked: insufficient use of mechanization, violation of work discipline, bypassing of progressive techniques, falling short of the coal mining plan, and absenteeism. The mining engineer says: "It would be too bad if with our united effort we could not cut through these obstacles."

Dikobraz (Prague), January 17, 1954

and does not even equal that of 1952." What the Minister omitted was that this output is a direct function of living standards, rising when conditions improve and dropping when they deteriorate. This relationship is shown in the following table:

PRODUCTIVITY IN HARD COAL MINING AND REAL WAGES*						
	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
metric tons per head p.a.	296	292	310	300	341	(less than 341)
industrial real wage (1937 = 100)	...	76	95	87	95	(89)

Low productivity is of course reflected in production costs. In his January report, Jonas revealed that "production costs of hard coal mining rose by 39.4 percent (per unit) over the Five Year Plan." One of the reasons for the recent drop in production no doubt it attributable to the severe losses in real wages incurred by the workers following the harsh June 1 currency reform. The climax of this continuous passive resistance on the part of the miners came with the switch from the habitual slow-downs to the violent strikes which occurred at that time.

Results of the Coal Shortage

In an article which appeared in *Rude Pravo* of November 29, 1953, Jaromir Dolansky, the senior Czechoslovak Deputy Prime Minister, declared that the whole economy of the country would stand or fall on the production of coal. He said that there was not enough coal to meet the demands of householders, and that if this situation continued there would be serious trouble in supplying some branches of the consumer goods and food industries. He admitted that frequent power cuts have caused difficulties, especially for bakeries. On August 8 of last year, *Rude Pravo* had already sounded the alarm by complaining in a leading article of the harm being done to industry and transport by the scarcity in coal. On August 15, *Pravda* (Bratislava) reported that twenty commuter trains leaving Bratislava had been cancelled because of the coal shortage. Finally, on November 18, 1953, *Nova Svoboda* (Ostrava) stated that even heavy industrial plants had been ordered to cut their power consumption by 22 to 24 percent. As the winter set in, the situation grew steadily worse. This time the whole railroad network is being affected. On January 29, 1954, *Rude Pravo* printed the following emergency announcement by the Ministry of Transportation: "Effective immediately, temporary restrictions will be imposed on all railway passenger traffic. These restrictions will not affect trains servicing workers. . . . Details will be furnished by railroad stations." On February 3, 1954, in a broadcast over Prague Radio, the Ministry of Fuel and Power issued the following appeal:

"A serious situation has arisen in the sphere of elec-

* Vaclav Pokorny, Minister of Fuel and Energy, *Rude Pravo*, Jan. 13; Sept. 13, 1952 and Sept. 11, 1953; *Workers' Living Standards*, Free Europe Press, February 1953 and supplements.

tricity supply as a consequence of unfavorable weather conditions. The long spell of dry weather has caused a great decline of water levels, reducing the output of water power stations. This state of affairs has now deteriorated owing to the great frost, and the thermal power stations therefore have to carry the whole burden of electricity production. However, the capacity of these power stations is not great enough to replace the great loss in the output of electric current; thus, breakdowns and difficulties arise not only in industry, but also in households.

"The Ministry of Fuel and Power, therefore, urgently appeals to all consumers of electricity scrupulously to respect all economy measures concerning consumption of electric current. . . . The temporary and extraordinary situation will be mastered and the *most urgently needed* supply of electric current . . . can be secured only with the assistance of all consumers." (Italics added)

That this situation is neither "temporary" nor "extraordinary" must be perfectly evident to the average Czechoslovak consumer. According to *Prace* (Prague) of August 3, 1953, a whole family is allotted 1.6 to 1.8 metric tons of brown coal per year. This compares with 2.34 metric tons of brown coal and .78 metric tons of hard coal consumed by the average family back in 1929.*

It is relevant to note that coal and electricity are the only consumer items still rationed. At first sight this restriction might seem incongruous since—as the tables above indicate—the production of coal, particularly of brown coal, has increased since the pre-war period. Part of the answer has to do with the stepped-up use made of coal in coke production needed in the accelerated industrial program. Another reason is that great quantities of brown coal are siphoned off into the Stalin Works (near Most) for synthetic fuel production. The product is used as a motor vehicle fuel, and although sizable savings in precious dollar expenditures are thus effected, the production cost is several times greater than that of gasoline refined from natural petroleum. Gasoline, only recently derationed, therefore costs approximately 15 *koruny* a gallon (the average industrial worker earns roughly 40 *koruny* per day).

The Regime Program

Faced with a cancerous growth eating out the whole economic body, the regime issued a number of orders, most of them palliatives that can do little more than temporarily check the course of the disease. The one measure that could have helped—lightening the burden of heavy industrialization—is conspicuously missing in the list of remedial methods reported in the January 13, 1954 *Rude Pravo*. The main point of the program consists in an increased wage rate for both miners and auxiliary personnel. As in the past, it can be expected that the wage boost will spur production. Increased costs, on the other hand, are bound to have unfavorable repercussions on every derivative form of production (actually representing practically the entire economy) and, ultimately, on the general stand-

* Central Statistical Office (Prague), 1941, Supplement to Vol. 141 XVIII-2, 3.

Black Tape

THE FOLLOWING epic story of a mining project was published in *Nova Svoboda* (Ostrava) of January 8, 1954. The highlights of the lengthy article (with enumerated episodes according to the original) are as follows:

1. The story begins at the Mining Project Bureau where the plan was worked out in pencil and sent for budget approval to:
2. The area Development Office. The approval was given and the plan was then sent back to:
3. The Mining Project Bureau, where it was recopied in ink and once again forwarded to:
4. The Area Development Office whence, once the signature has been affixed, it found its way to:
5. The Mining Projects Bureau which, in turn, made five copies and then forwarded them to:
6. The Office of Area-Investor, who submitted them to:
7. The Office of Local Investor, who duly gave his approval and sent the project back to:
8. The Area Investor, who passed the plan on to:
9. The Area Head Office, which transmitted it to:
10. The Area Head Office Investment sub-division, which sent it to:
11. Prague, where the papers found their way to:
12. The Ministry of Fuel and Power, which, working with dignity and precision, stamped its O.K. on the

- plan and, after many months, sent it to:
13. The Area Head Office in Ostrava, whence it went once more to:
14. The Area Development Office.
15. In the meantime, the Area Investor had already ordered machinery required by the plan and,
16. order sheets with technical data were submitted to the Area Development Office to enable them to work out an actual plan;
17. the actual plan was worked out in accordance with the Ministry's instructions which
18. were first given to the State Institute for Mining Projects in Prague, and from there
19. passed to the Mining Project Bureau in Ostrava.
20. When the actual plan was ready, five copies were given to the Office of the Area Investor; from there, all copies were sent to
21. The Area Development Office.
22. The Area Development Office kept one copy, delivered four to the Mine Director;
23. the latter, without any further delay, assigned the project to his Technological Department.
24. This department filed one copy, sent three to the Pit-Production Manager.
25. That is where the story ended.

ard of living. It appears that the regime finds it cannot raise the standard of living unless coal production improves, and it cannot increase coal production without raising real wages.

To escape this vicious circle, the Communists are resorting to other devices, all of which have proved unsuccessful in the past. They have decreed a decentralization in mining administration, entailing the transfer of authority from Prague to head offices in Ostrava and Most, and to a third administrative center which will include all other mining areas. Orders have been issued to step up mechanization. By the end of 1954, six percent of hard coal digging will supposedly be mechanized, while in brown coal mining, the hoped-for percentage will be a mere 2.9. Endeavors will also be made to raise mechanization of mine transportation to 89 percent, and that of surface mines to 53.9 percent. Since the present basis of these future improvements has not been described, the value of the planned effort cannot yet be judged. In any case, the process is bound to be slow—even if the usual amount of bungling that goes with Soviet-style "planning" is discounted.

The regime further promises to improve mine safety through an increase in safety inspection. Since, as has been shown, mine safety is intimately related to work tempo governed by norms, and since norms, if changed, are likely to be increased, this particular pledge will probably be totally ineffectual. The regime also speaks of alleviating the housing shortage by completing 8,231 housing units

for miners this year. Past experience has shown that, whenever sectors of the economy were neglected and plans unfilled, housing figured high on the list of casualties. In that respect, too, miners have little to hope for. Perhaps the most absurd of all these emergency measures and resolutions is the cryptic allusion to the fact that in the future, "instruction of newcomers will be extended to 10 days." If this reference is typical of the whole training program awaiting mine recruits, low per capita productivity is unlikely to show spectacular upward changes.

Because of the first priority now allotted to mining, Josef Pucik, Minister-Chairman of the State Planning Office, hopes that in the current year (according to *Rude Pravo* of January 23, 1954) the output of hard coal will rise by 8.5 percent and that of brown coal by 7.9 percent. The regime, however, is not counting on the efficacy of the new measures. The rosy prognostications are, as always, based on the assurance that, if necessary, force can be used. If miners will not do the job, others will—under compulsion. Typical of this attitude and its dire effects on the enslaved people was President Zapotocky's Miner's Day address, delivered on September 13 in Ostrava. The speech was addressed, on the whole, not to miners, but to soldiers. "Comrades, soldiers," the President intoned, "I greet you on the occasion of the Miner's Day celebrations, in which you are rightly taking full part because you, yourselves, are now working as efficient workers producing coal. Your work and help in coal production is of great importance."

Economic Report: Agriculture

This is the second of three articles on current agricultural conditions in the Satellite area. The first report was concerned with Czechoslovakia and Poland; the present one deals with Romania and Bulgaria.

ALTHOUGH NEW COURSE programs have been introduced in all the Soviet bloc countries, the differences in approach, implementation and extent of concession varies with the country. Nowhere is the program flexibility more apparent than in Romania and Bulgaria, traditionally agricultural countries. In both of them, despite differences in methods, the goal is the same: a re-emphasis on and a reorganization of agriculture.

Romania

Analysis of Romania's new agricultural program indicates that the regime is particularly concerned about: (a) improving the livestock situation, (b) increasing agricultural production (both yield and acreage), and (c) furthering cultivation of industrial plants (cotton, beetroot hemp, flax tobacco etc.) To do these things, the Romanian leadership is willing temporarily to compromise its overall collectivization program, and use the independent farmers' productive facilities as well as the collectivized sector. This is especially significant in Romania where less than 25 percent of the arable land is "Socialized." These conditions necessitate further concessions to the independent farmer, as well as to the kolkhoz and its members.

Everything points to a successful 1953 harvest, with weak links in livestock, fodder, vegetable and industrial plant production. According to the State Plan report for the third quarter of 1953, as reported by Agerpress (Bucharest) October 24, 1953, good crops were reported on both collective and individually owned farms.

The communique on the 1953 Plan fulfillment, reported over Radio Bucharest on February 11, indicated that "as compared with 1952, an increase in production of the principal crops was achieved in 1953." The area under corn cultivation* should have been increased "but barely stayed near the figure for area cultivated in 1952." Although the average per hectare corn yield, and the total

corn production, were greater than in 1952 (a relatively poor year), the yield per hectare was still unsatisfactory. The 1953-1954 sowing plan indicates that this situation has not yet been remedied (see chart p. 14). The only other farm crop reported on was sugar beets where a "12 percent increase in area cultivated" and an "increased per hectare yield" were supposed to have taken place. Sugar beet yields were still pronounced "unsatisfactory." Further, although the fall sowing was "fulfilled 98.4 percent" the fall plowing plan was "not fulfilled and there was not enough deep plowing."

The Livestock Problem

Livestock remains the weakest link in Romanian agriculture. *Scanteia* (Bucharest) January 5, 1954, reported the number of livestock at the beginning of 1953 as exceeding the prewar level. However, the article pointed out, the needs of the people have risen at an even greater rate:

"Considering the sharp increase of peasant consumption, as well as the increased urban consumption of animal products, and owing to a rise in urban population, production of meat per head of animal, and its quality, have not increased proportionately. This has led to a discrepancy between the people's needs and existing stocks of meat, milk, eggs, wool, etc. These unsatisfactory results may be attributed to inadequate methods of livestock husbandry, fodder shortages, failure to cultivate sown grass on a large scale, low grass output per hectare and retarded hay harvesting, which has caused substantial losses in forage and diminution of its nutritive value. . . . There are also serious shortcomings in construction of shelters for animals and in training and employment of agricultural specialists and cadres. . . ."

* The report stated that the "square cluster seeding of corn had been started for the first time in 1953." This planting method is common practice in developed agricultural countries. It allows for the mechanized cultivation of plants throughout their period of vegetation.

To deal with these problems, the Romanian Communists recently announced a new livestock program for 1954-1956. *Scanteia*, December 31, gives the following livestock targets for 1956*:

horned cattle ..	4,930,000	horses	1,240,000
sheep	13,800,000	rabbits	1,000,000
pigs	4,600,000	bee hives	1,100,000

"To achieve these targets," *Scanteia* reported, "it is necessary to increase the area cultivated with forage plants to 1.3 million hectares, and to insure a higher yield per hectare." This amount exceeds the hectareage originally allocated to the forage crop in the 1953-1954 sowing plan (announced in the September 13 *Scanteia*) by 400,000 hectares. This pronouncement also emphasized that "in the future, no pasture and grass lands will be made into tillable land, and the annual practice of redistributing the pasture lands to the villages will come to an end." In addition, production and supply of pressed fodder is to be encouraged. These and food processing residues will be used increasingly in feeding livestock. The State will sell 10 kilograms of pressed fodder at the official price for each 100 kilograms of sunflower seed delivered above the compulsory delivery quota for kolkhozes and private farmers. This provision is intended to increase fodder supplies, thereby increasing livestock production, and encourage production of the industrial crop of sunflower seeds.

The new program will attempt to increase 1956 production over 1953 by 140 thousand tons of meat and fats, 1.1 million hectoliters of cows' milk, 200 million eggs, and 4 thousand tons of wool. The overall production goals for these products in 1956 are proposed as: 300 thousand tons of meat and fats, 300 million liters of milk, 300 million eggs and 25.4 thousand tons of wool. This also calls for a minimum annual per capita production (by 1956) of 1,300 quarts of milk from cows milked mechanically and 800 quarts from those milked manually, 2.5 kilograms of wool (fine and semi-fine) or 1.8 kilograms (for coarse wool) from sheep, and 80 to 90 eggs per hen.

Incentives

To encourage livestock production, the Romanian regime has introduced a number of incentives. Among the most important of these are the following:

1. New kolkhozes are exempted from meat and wool deliveries for their first two agricultural years;
2. Kolkhozes are exempted from milk deliveries for newly-purchased cows, or from cows which have just begun to yield in the current year;
3. Independent farms of less than one-half hectares are exempt from meat deliveries and they are exempt from

* Using the figures given in this same article for amount of cattle increase between 1948 and the beginning of 1953, and adding them to the 1948 livestock census as given in *Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1949* (US Dept. of Commerce), the present livestock population in Romania is: 4,767,000 cattle, 3,523,000 pigs, and 1,080,000 horses. Apart from the proposed increase in pigs, therefore, this new livestock program seems less ambitious and far-reaching than one would normally be led to believe.

milk deliveries for the first cow or buffalo, or the first five ewes and three goats;

4. Meat deliveries for independent farmers (with a maximum of three hectares of arable land) are to be reduced 50 percent if the farmer is older than 60, serving in the armed forces, disabled, has more than four dependent children, etc. They will also be exempt from milk delivery quotas if they do not exceed the minimum livestock quota as outlined in item 3;

5. Holdings which conclude State contracts for breeding calves, bull calves and breed cattle are exempt from milk deliveries with respect to milking cows. Reductions in milk deliveries will also be granted to holdings which conclude State contracts for rearing and fattening calves and the producers who conclude State contracts for cattle purchase;

6. Kolkhozes containing at least three "zootechnical" stations*, and who have fulfilled all compulsory quotas for animal products and have met their contractual obligations, will receive a ten percent reduction in delivery quotas for the following year.

7. Kolkhoz members are to be granted credits to enable them to purchase a milk cow for their private household plot. This plot is to be exempt from compulsory meat and milk delivery quotas during 1954-1956. Their wool delivery quotas will be 20 percent less than those fixed for independent farmers owning from zero to two hectares and from one to five sheep.

8. Premiums are to be granted to kolkhozes which overfulfill the targets set for animal breeding and production of meat, milk, eggs, etc. and who also meet compulsory delivery quotas.

The above provisions follow close on the heels of the October 27 announcement (see December issue, p. 45), designed to encourage contractual rearing and fattening of livestock (voluntary deliveries supplementary to prescribed quotas).

Collectivization

After Poland, Romania is the least collectivized of the Satellites. Owing to the extreme difficulties encountered in collectivizing the countryside, Romanian Communists were forced to establish a unique type of intermediate collectivized unit called an agricultural association. Although all the Satellites have various grades of collectives, Romania is the only one that gives three distinct rates in decrees. In other words, agricultural associations receive an intermediate rate between the advantageous kolkhoz rate and that for independent farmers. A fourth rate was recently established for independent farmers who group their holdings together and was published in the new contract delivery regulations for raising industrial plants. This rate is more advantageous than the independent farm rate and less than that for agricultural associations.

* The October 1953 *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Moscow) claimed that every kolkhoz in Romania contained at least four to five zootechnical stations or livestock farms. If this is true—and it is unlikely that it is—then every kolkhoz fulfilling quota and contractual obligations for animal products during the current year will be entitled to a ten percent reduction in its compulsory quota for the following year.



The kolkhoz at Tizsasas received posters instead of the expected improved variety seeds. The poster reads: Sow in time. Use improved variety seeds. One farmer says to the other: "We have the posters but how will they grow into wheat?"

Ludas Matyi (Budapest) October 8, 1953

The regime's attitude toward collectivization and the independent peasantry has been clearly outlined in recent speeches and articles in the press, the more important of these by Prime Minister Gheorghiu-Dej and *Scanteia* editor Sorin Toma. The statements indicate that the State intends to:

- (a) Continue collectivization by pushing formation of new agricultural associations. Present policy calls for voluntary peasant participation.
- (b) Kolkhozes and agricultural associations will be encouraged and will receive special privileges.
- (c) Independent farmers will continue to receive some privileges, although less than those extended to collectives. This is clearly dictated by regime reliance on the independent peasant for the major portion of farm production.
- (d) Kulaks will be tolerated as long as the regime finds it expedient to do so—another indication of regime dependence on the independent sector.

Kolkhoz "Progress"

How far has collectivization progressed in Romania? According to Gheorghiu-Dej, in the November 6 *For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy* (official Cominform journal published in Bucharest), the collectivized sector comprised 280,000 former peasant farms forming 4,000 producer cooperatives comprising nearly one million hectares of land (including agricultural associations as well as kolkhozes). According to *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Moscow) October 1953, 218 agricultural associations were reorganized into collectives between May 1952 and May 1953. In his August 22 speech, Gheorghiu-Dej indicated that at that time there were nearly 2,000 agricultural associations comprising 250,000 hectares. The 1953 communique on plan fulfillment (Radio Bucharest, February

11) announced that 192 agricultural associations had been formed during 1953, making a total of 2,026 as of the end of 1953, an increase of 26 since Gheorghiu-Dej's August 22 speech. The report also stated that the farm land of agricultural associations was increased more than 25 percent over 1952. The following table indicates the growth of advanced types of producer collectives (kolkhozes) in Romania.

Land in Producer Cooperatives*

	Number of Kolkhozes	Household Units in Kolkhozes	Arable Land Collectivized (in hectares)
1949	56	4,058	—
1950	1,027	67,719	—
March 1, 1951	1,029	65,974	268,640
1951	1,069	75,065	—
Sept. 19, 1951	1,083	73,438	297,000
1952	1,796	165,411	—
Aug. 22, 1953	1,980	**178,000	732,000

The table above indicates that there has been little collectivization advance in the past year. The 1953 report on plan fulfillment announced that 202 new kolkhozes had been formed in 1953, making a total of 1,998 as of December 31, 1953, or an increase of only 18 since Gheorghiu-Dej's August 22 speech. The period of greatest collectivization was between September 1951 and some time in 1952. The Communists were forced to slacken the collectivization pace sometime in 1952 (probably because of the disastrous harvest of that year, brought on mainly by drought, as well as by shortage of tractors and agricultural equipment). By slackening the tempo, the regime hoped to insure a good 1953 harvest. At the same time, it evidently felt that further collectivization would only disrupt farm production even more. But the change in pace does not indicate that the goal of collectivization has been abandoned. This was clearly spelled out in Gheorghiu-Dej's November 6 article in the Cominform journal:

"The Party and government pay constant attention to organizational and economic strengthening of collectives. The results achieved by these farms testify to the fact that when Party and state organs give efficient leadership and pay close attention to them, they begin to attract the working peasantry and prompt increasingly larger sections of the working peasants [to] voluntarily take the path of socialist farming."

"Voluntary collectivization" was also stressed in a November 6 speech (reported over Radio Bucharest) by *Scanteia's* chief editor, Toma. He said: "Let us thoroughly enlighten the masses of working peasants on individual farms about the advantages of freely agreed union into associations and collective farms."

* Source: *Probleme Economice*, No. 5-6 (Bucharest) May-June 1953; *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 10 (Moscow) October 1953; *Scanteia* (Bucharest) September 19, 1951, March 1, 1951, August 23, 1953. The figures given for 1949, 1950, 1951 and 1952 were taken from *Probleme Economice*, with the exact date not given. This accounts for the slight discrepancy between the 1953 figure given here and those taken from *Scanteia* of that year. The figures do not include agricultural associations.

** As of June 1953.

Agricultural Associations

The chief Romanian emphasis has been on their intermediate collective form: the agricultural association. An editorial in the January 15 *Scanteia* (as reported over Radio Bucharest) is typical:

"The Party expects its organizations to combine their political work aimed at encouraging peasants to form new agricultural associations with their work toward consolidating existing agricultural associations. The more effectively agricultural associations are helped to increase their production and, therefore, the peasant's earnings, the greater will be their power of attraction. . . . It is obvious that the agricultural association is the form of cooperation open to the broad masses of the working peasantry. . . . Our Party strongly rejects the pernicious idea of disinterestedness in the socialist transformation of agriculture and expects Party organs and members to unfold broadly the political enlightenment work to attract peasants to agricultural associations and collective farms."

The Independent Peasant

The regime attitude toward the independent peasantry is best illustrated in the January 21 *Scanteia* (as reported over Radio Bucharest) in an article commemorating the anniversary of Lenin's death.

"On the basis of the policy of our Party in the matter of the alliance with the peasantry, Lenin's triple slogan remains: 'Let us be supported by the poor peasantry; let us strengthen the alliance with the middle peasantry; and let us relentlessly fight the kulaks.'"

The importance of the independent peasantry to overall farm production was emphasized in Gheorghiu-Dej's November 6 article. The Premier declared that "the small and middle peasantry would continue for a long time to be the main producers of market grain. . . . The individual peasant household still possesses great means and possibilities for increasing labor productivity, for raising farm production, developing animal husbandry and other branches of farming." The aim of the program, as outlined by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' (Communist) Party and as stated by Gheorghiu-Dej, is to create "favorable conditions for stimulating increased farm production by working peasants [which is] essential for feeding the working population and for providing light and food industries with necessary raw materials."

The Kulak

In his November 6 article Gheorghiu-Dej also outlined the new policy toward the kulak.

"... it is necessary in the interests of the national economy to insure that kulak farms turn out a considerable proportion of farm production. . . . While pursuing the consistent policy of restricting kulaks and defending the working peasantry's interests against kulak exploitation, it is necessary at the same time to enable the kulaks to take part in farm production and commodity exchange under the conditions envisaged by the law."

Both Gheorghiu-Dej and Toma condemned extremist elements of the Party for the policy of "dislodging the kulak." Gheorghiu-Dej declared that at this stage the only correct Party policy was "restricting the kulak." Sorin Toma said: "It must be understood that the interests of the national economy demand measures for limiting kulak exploitation be applied to the letter, but at the same time they must be given the possibility of carrying out their productive activities under the conditions stipulated by law."

Agricultural Concessions

During the past six months the Romanian regime has instituted a series of concessions designed to spur agricultural production. Among the more important concessions were cancellation of 1952 delivery arrears, reduction in farm taxes (see October 1953 issue, p. 16), and implementation of a new livestock contract purchase system (see December 1953 issue, pp. 45-46). Another significant group of concessions was announced on January 14 and given in detail in the January 15 *Munca* (Bucharest). These consisted of formulating a new contract purchase system for technical, aromatic and medical plants and silk cocoons. *Scanteia*, January 19, commented on the new decree as follows:

"Contract purchasing is one of the most important means of intensifying exchanges between town and country—of linking industry and farming—by extending and improving the contract system, the supply basis of agricultural raw materials for light and food industry will be enlarged."

The salient features of the new decree are:

1. Producers who have concluded contracts for cultivating technical, medical or aromatic plants will be exempt from vegetable delivery quotas on the surfaces sown with these plants.

2. If contract deliveries are fulfilled by 80 percent (for rice and tobacco), 70 percent (for sugar beets, silk cocoons and cotton) and 50 percent (for flax, flax seeds, hemp and soya), the following privileges will be granted:

(a) Seed will be given free of charge. Rice seed, however, will only be on loan.

(b) Bonuses will be given to contractors who overfulfill these prescribed quotas. These will be based on a graduated scale of up to 10 percent, from 10 to 20 percent and more than 20 percent overfulfillment.

Bonus Scale*

Commodity	Amount Over Minimum Prescribed Quota		
	up to 10%	10%-20%	over 20%
rice	100	150	200
cotton	50	100	200
sugar beets	50	100	200
flax	50	100	200
flax seeds	100	200	300
soya	100	200	300
hemp	50	100	200
tobacco	100	(varies according to grade delivered)	

* Basic contract price equals 100.

3. Taxes on income from these crops will be reduced up to 30 percent.

4. Producers will be given the use of sowing machines without charge. The State will pay 50 percent of the cost of obtaining chemical fertilizer and in the case of insect attacks will gratuitously provide insecticides.

5. Special purchase privileges at official State prices (below market price) will be granted to contract producers on the following conditions:

(a) for every hundred kilos of cotton delivered, farmers will be able to purchase quantities of thread, textiles, maize and caustic soda;

(b) for each ton of sugar beet delivered, they will be able to purchase 2 kilos of sugar and 3 meters of cotton textiles;

(c) for each ton of flax stalks with seeds delivered, they will be able to buy quantities of cotton thread, textiles and maize;

(d) for each ton of unhusked rice delivered, purchase privileges for 10 kilos of unhusked rice will be granted;

(e) similar purchase privileges will be granted contractors of other industrial, aromatic and medical plants.

6. Special interest-free, short-term credits will be granted contractors. These credits may not exceed 30 percent of the contracted production except for rice where credits up to 40 percent will be granted on areas already sown with rice and up to 50 percent for areas newly sown with this crop. At delivery, these credits will be deducted from the sum owed the contractor.

7. Rice contractors who use mechanical irrigation equipment requiring motor fuel will be sold the necessary gasoline, motor and lubrication oils on credit at the official State prices.

8. Kolkhozes concluding contracts will receive bonuses 50 percent higher than those granted independent peasants. Further, the quantity of industrial products they will be permitted to purchase at reduced prices will be 20 percent greater. Agricultural associations will receive a 20 percent bonus increment while their quota for purchase of industrial goods will exceed the independent peasant's by 10 percent. Independent peasant contractors who group their workings together will receive a 10 percent bonus increase.

9. The same type of bonuses and privileges will be granted contractors of fodder, poppy seeds, rape, ricin, mustard, caraway seeds, anise seeds, mint, medicinal plants, etc.

This new contract purchasing system, if carried out, would have a double-barreled effect. It would encourage production of industrial raw materials vitally needed in light industry and for foreign trade; and it would increase the supply of consumer goods to the countryside by the purchase system granted contractors. Noteworthy is the fact that regime policy of granting greater concessions to kolkhozes and agricultural associations has not wavered. Further, this new decree ushers in a new category of collective grouping, even lower than the agricultural association, composed of independent farmers who agree to group

and work their holdings together.

"More" Fruits and Vegetables

Increasing fruit and vegetable production remains a prime regime farm target. Plans for expansion of vegetable and fruit cultivation was apparent both from the new expanded sowing plan and the emphasis laid on the January 9 conference of "fruit and vegetable gardeners." On that occasion, Assistant Minister of Agriculture Stefan said (*Scanteia*, January 10) that in 1953, 160 new vegetable areas had been organized and 17.6 thousand hectares* of additional irrigated land had been adapted to vegetable farming. On February 2, Radio Bucharest announced a decree with the most significant part of the new vegetable farming program. It stated that production of fruit and vegetables had to be stimulated to "supply the urban workers and to insure the food industry with farm raw materials." Special bonuses will also be granted to contractors who deliver fruits and vegetables "suitable for export," another indication of Soviet bloc efforts to encourage production of export crops.

Among the more important provisions of the new decree were:

1. Producers who conclude vegetable and vegetable seed contracts with the State will be exempted from compulsory quotas for these products on the area contracted for.

2. The State will gratuitously supply chemical fertilizers and insecticides in case crops are attacked by pests. Seed for vegetable and vegetable seed cultivation will be granted on credit with a 75 percent price reduction except for beans, peas, potatoes and seed onions.

3. Taxes on income derived from cultivation of these crops are reduced as follows, on condition that the entire production contracted for is delivered:

(a) 65 percent in the first year for newly irrigated areas sown with vegetables;

(b) 50 percent for other areas under vegetable cultivation;

(c) 30 percent for areas planted with fruit trees.

4. Contractors will receive interest-free short term credits (deductible from payment due on delivery) of up to 40 percent of the value of production contracted for, as follows:

(a) for vegetable and vegetable seed contractors up to 30 percent;

(b) for fruit—30 percent (40 percent payable when contract is made and 60 percent when fruit starts to develop);

(c) for table grapes—40 percent (60 percent payable when contract is made and 40 percent between June 1 and 15);

(d) for hothouse crops—8 lei per square meter (hothouse contractors will also be granted construction materials such as nails, timber, glass, etc.).

5. Contractors using motors and irrigation pumps will be sold necessary lubricants and fuel at the prices fixed for State farms.

* The 1953-1954 sowing plan called for a total area of 70 thousand hectares of irrigated land for vegetable cultivation.

In the village of Rachitoasa, Zeletin province, the President, Secretary and Agricultural Agent of the People's Council transmitted falsified reports on the spring agricultural work. Their information comes from the heads of other areas who estimate the work done by looking down from a treetop.



They sit in their offices and wonder
Why the Plan proceeds so poorly;
According to reports, the Plan
Will be implemented . . . but next year.



The reason is simple: the heads
Of the areas check the work from treetops!
Why shouldn't they?
There is no one to supervise them!

Albania (Bucharest) May 13, 1953

6. Bonuses of 30 percent of the contracted price are to be granted for overfulfilling vegetable seed deliveries in either quantity or quality. For vegetables, fruits and table grapes suitable for export, a bonus of 20 to 35 percent will be paid for quantities exported fresh. For strawberries, the bonus will be 50 percent. For those varieties of grapes which can be kept fresh during the winter and delivered at the times stipulated by contract, a 30 percent bonus over the fixed price will be granted.

7. Special purchase privileges for industrial products at State prices (below market prices) are to be granted as follows:

(a) for every 50 kilos of cabbage seeds delivered, one cubic meter of timber, two kilos of caustic soda and 20 meters of linen cloth may be purchased;

(b) for every one thousand kilos of seed onions delivered, one cubic meter of timber, two kilos of caustic soda and ten meters of linen cloth may be purchased;

(c) similar purchase privileges will be granted to contractors who deliver early and summer potatoes, beans and peas for seed, etc.

8. If contracted production is delivered on the stipulated date, the following bonuses will be granted:

(a) for kolkhozes, a bonus of 30 percent over prices paid independent peasants and a 20 percent additional quota in purchase privileges for industrial products;

(b) for agricultural associations, the bonus will amount to 20 percent and additional purchase privileges will be 10 percent.

The fruit and vegetable purchase-contract program has many of the same features as the industrial plant purchase-contract system. This is particularly significant in the vegetable program since vegetable and vegetable seed producers are now relieved of their compulsory quota deliveries. This means that the Communists are publicly admitting a failure of the compulsory quota delivery system. Prices under this system were unreasonably low and incentives to increase production or improve quality were limited. Frequently quotas were unfulfilled and substitute crops delivered instead.

The new program is designed to be a substitute "incentive" program for the forced delivery quota system. At first glance it would seem as if only the producer gains under the new program but in fact the regime gains by greater production (because of increased prices and incentives) and by furthering its control of farming. The text of the decree has several illuminating statements on this score: producers will be *required* to seed or to plant the entire area contracted for; they *must* utilize short-term credits for increasing production, etc. Without doubt, this new system puts the producers' holdings in partnership with the State and gives the State greater opportunity for

closer supervision. Further, by substituting the contract system for the compulsory delivery program, the Communists are requiring greater quantities of commodities to be delivered. Under the compulsory quota system, the farmer could sell his excess production on the free market. Under the contract system, he will be left with little in excess of his delivery quotas. The State is even further assuring itself of monopolistic crop control by paying extremely high bonuses for excess quota deliveries (prices in many cases exceed those on the free market) thus virtually eliminating the free market.

Present and Current

The original 1953-54 sowing plan was outlined in the September 13 *Scanteia*. Under the plan 9.5 million hectares are to be sown. *Universul* (Bucharest) December 27, 1951, gave the total arable land surface as 9.57 million hectares. If the 448 thousand hectares of State reserve lands, ostensibly transferred to farm production on October (see December 1953 edition, p. 45), are added to the above, then the total arable land area should approximate 10 million hectares at the present time. The difference between these two amounts—or 500 thousand hectares—was later allotted under a subsequent announcement and by a revision of the original program.

Supplementary information on sowing under the Five Year Plan was given on December 19 over Radio Bucharest, which stated that the total tillable land area covered under the plan would amount to more than 10 million hectares. The principal differences noted between this announcement and the one of September 13 was that the area allotted to forage was increased 400 thousand hectares; the area allocated to grain cultivation was increased from 6.73 million to 6.85 million hectares; the area earmarked for textile plant cultivation has no doubt been increased inasmuch as 300 thousand hectares are now allocated to cotton cultivation while previously a total of 282 thousand hectares was allotted to all textile plants together.

The following is a chart of the area to be sown (in thousands of hectares) during 1953-54 as compared to previous years.*

Commodity	1947	1948	1950	Original Revised	
				1953/54	1953/54
wheat	2,327	2,716	2,652	2,815	—
corn	4,290	3,707	3,200	2,960	—
oats and barley	1,119	1,019	1,350	953	—
unspecified					
cereals	**101	**111	—	235	—
potatoes	202	178	146	†460	270
dried beans	—	—	—	200	—
sugar beets	56	68	91	115	—
sunflowers	††57	—	496	430	380
cotton	—	52	65	†††282	300
tobacco	24	12	34	—	—
unspecified					
plants	—	—	—	152	—
forage	—	—	—	900	1,300

* Sources: *United States Foreign Commerce Yearbook 1949*; *Agricultural Statistics 1951* (published by US Department of Agriculture); *Viata Sindicala* (Bucharest) Aug. 1951; *Romania Libera* (Bucharest) Aug. 10, 1951, Aug. 15, 1951; *Scanteia* Sept. 13,

Bulgaria

Bulgarian agricultural reforms during recent months have been relatively mild and seem to be directed almost exclusively to the collectivized sector. This may be attributed to several factors:

1. Bulgaria is further ahead of the other Satellites in collectivization and instead of marking time seems determined to continue its collectivization drive.
2. Unlike the other Satellites, the principal portion of Bulgarian farm production comes from the "Socialist sector" not from private farming.
3. The 1953 crop proved to be a good crop.
4. Bulgaria does not have a "kulak" class (those who might have come under this category were eliminated in the 1946 land reform) and further very few of the peasants can be classified as middle peasants.†

Recent speeches by Prime Minister Chervenkov and Minister of Agriculture Stanko Todorov at the Third National Conference of TKZS's (collective farms) on December 1-3, as well as articles and editorials in the Bulgarian Communist press indicate that the regime still has a number of farm problems which seriously concern it: (a) increasing yield per hectare; (b) further collectivization; (c) improving livestock production; and (d) encouraging the production of export crops.

Yields

As reported in the December 2 *Zemledelsko Zname* (Sofia), Minister Todorov gave the following percentages for the higher yields achieved in the TKZS as compared with those of independent farmers:‡

Commodity	1952	1953
wheat	12.6	21.7
corn	35.8	18.5
sunflowers	19.8	30.2
sugar beets	22.3	27.7
cotton	20.7	32.0
barley	12.8	not available
oats	17.1	not available
rice	22.1	not available
tomatoes	12.8	not available

That the corn crop was poor is apparent from recent press reports. *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), October 11, stated that the Pleven district had fulfilled the State corn

1953; *Rumunska Republica Ludova* (Warsaw) 1953; Radio Bucharest, Dec. 19, 1953; *FAO Year Book of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1951* (Rome) 1952.

** Includes rye only. In 1950, 17,000 hectares were under rice cultivation.

† Includes fresh vegetables as well as potatoes.

†† This is the 1935-37 average. No later figures are available.

††† For all textile plants. The 1951 *FAO Year Book* reported that in 1948, 15,000 hectares were under flax fiber cultivation, and 56,000 under hemp fiber.

‡ The average independent peasant holding is slightly over 4.5 hectares.

‡ Source: 1952 figures from *Bulgaria Today* (Sofia) May 16, 1953.

delivery plan only 16 percent. The article also cited several TKZS where corn deliveries amounted to less than one percent of prescribed quotas. The article further pointed out that "in many localities there is the tendency to substitute other products for corn deliveries. . . . This substitution is only permitted in exceptional cases, when the producer is unable to deliver the required quantities owing to conditions beyond his control." Because corn is important as a fodder base for livestock, the Communists are particularly concerned with its production. In addition, Bulgaria is committed to supply corn for export under recently negotiated trade agreements.

The local press is also concerned about cotton and tobacco production, industrial crops of great importance to the Communists, externally in international trade and internally for implementation of the country's New Course. Articles in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, November 13 and *Zemledelsko Zname*, October 24 point up these crop concerns, as does the January 13 *Rabotnichesko Delo*, which gives the general tenor: "Particular attention must be paid to sowing industrial crops such as cotton, tobacco, rice, hemp, flax and other products which constitute the raw materials our industry depends on above all."

The 1953 communique on plan fulfillment contained figures on the progress of Bulgarian agriculture during 1953, with the following reported increases in areas sown: cotton—24.9 percent; tobacco—9.2 percent; fodder—27.8 percent. Despite the reduction of area sown with grain, the report stated that total grain crop production was 24 percent higher than in 1952; sugar beet production was more than twice that of 1952; and sunflower and tobacco production increased 20.6 and 32.8 percent respectively. Increased production of industrial crops is partly the result of extended cultivation, as well as of increased yield. Increase in grain production was attributed to higher average yields. However, the report does not mention that the year used for comparison, 1952, was a below-average agricultural year and hence the touted achievements can be seen in better proportion, and as far less outstanding than the regime would have us believe.

Livestock Production

Although 65 percent of State grain deliveries are supplied by the TKZS* Agricultural Minister Todorov stated (*Zemledelsko Zname*, December 2) that the TKZS own only 22.3 percent of the cattle, 28.8 percent of sheep and goats, and only 13.3 percent of the pigs. He noted:

"... the number of cattle, especially of cows, on the TKZS is increasing very slowly. Productivity in domestic animals is very low. In 1952, the average productivity of a TKZS milk cow was 583 liters of milk, while up to October 1953 the average was only 555 liters. . . . The low livestock productivity is due to faulty and inadequate feeding, and to the general lack of care given animals. The low milk productivity in TKZS is due to the fact that 45 percent of the animals are still used for work. . . . Cattle breeding represents only 17.4 percent of TKZS

* As reported in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, September 9. The sovkhos share is given as 1.5 percent; the independent farmers' share as 33.5 percent.

monetary profit. . . . The main reason for this condition is the poor fodder base. In 1952, only 45 percent of the necessary grain fodder, 35.2 percent of the hay, 18 percent of the roots were produced in the TKZS while 128 percent of the straw was secured there."

The above indicates that the private sector supplies the bulk of the animal products despite the fact that it contains less than one half of the arable land and peasant households. Considering the fact that more than 50 percent of the arable land falls into the "Socialist sector," TKZS should be able to meet their own fodder grain requirements. The fact that they do not throws considerable doubt on the high productivity figures presented by Todorov (intended to show TKZS superiority over the private sector in grain yield) on grain fodder supplied by TKZS. Moreover, the TKZS contain the most fertile land, receive priority in the use of agricultural equipment, seed and fertilizer, and have lower delivery quotas than independent farmers.

Livestock Delivery Schedules

In his now-famous speech of September 8, Bulgarian Prime Minister Chervenkov announced "a new system of meat deliveries was to be put into effect on January 1 . . . a more realistic approach is [also] to be taken in computing quotas for state milk deliveries." Nothing further was said until the December 29 *Izvestia* (Sofia) published Decree 840 (promulgated by the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Communist Party) designed "to improve compulsory state delivery quotas of meat products, to further successful development of animal husbandry, and to unceasingly satisfy the growing needs of the working people with meat, milk and milk products, as well as to improve industrial supplies of raw materials." The principal provisions of Decree 840 are:

1. As of January 1, compulsory state meat deliveries from TKZS and independent farmers are to be based on the amount of agricultural land owned, while quotas for private plots of TKZS members are to be levied by household. Previous delivery quotas were based on the number of cattle owned, a system unique among the Satellites to Bulgaria. Introducing the land basis for computing delivery quotas brings the Bulgarian system into line with the other Soviet bloc countries.*

2. Although Chervenkov (on September 8**) declared that meat norms would be reduced for TKZS to between 40 and 50 percent below those for independent farmers, analysis of the new delivery schedule indicates that in the main TKZS quotas will be less than half those for independent farmers. For example, the average independent

* This basis of quota computation was abandoned by the USSR subsequent to Khrushchev's September speech. It was condemned because it laid down high compulsory delivery quotas for the well-run farms, while letting the badly-run farms off lightly. Material incentives were completely disregarded.

** Because of the differences in computing of these two delivery systems, it is impossible to make meaningful comparisons and ascertain definitely whether or not meat norms were actually reduced.

holding is slightly over three hectares. For at three—to five-hectare holding of first-category land, the annual norm is 4.6 kilos live-weight per decare*, while the quota for TKZS (which remains fixed and does not increase according to acreage held) would be 2 kilos per decare.*

3. Private plot quotas for TKZS members are to be 10 kilos per household, irrespective of type of land held or number of household members. Inasmuch as the maximum amount of land permitted to a kolkhoz member for a private plot is 0.2 hectares, this decree will require TKZS members to deliver higher quotas than independent farmers *provided that there is only one TKZS member in the household* (the quota for independent farmers holding up to one hectare of first category land is 3.4 kilos per decare). However, if there were more than one TKZS member in the household, the private plot area would increase. For example, three members could cultivate 0.6 hectares and so proportionately reduce the quota as compared to the amount of land cultivated. This provision is particularly significant considering that the minimum age for TKZS members had been recently reduced to 16 years of age. This decree is no doubt intended to serve as an incentive to increase TKZS membership.

4. Prices for compulsory meat deliveries remain the same as those previously reported in effect (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 17, 1951).

5. Norms for areas 15 kilometers or less from the frontiers are to be 30 percent less than the established norms, another indication of the difficulties the Satellite regimes are having in repopulating border areas.

6. Local councils have the right to raise or lower prescribed norms by 10 percent according to local conditions that might warrant readjustment. This is an interesting sign of a New Course trend to decentralization in economic controls, and one that will merit continued scrutiny.

7. Compulsory milk quotas are to be based on the number of sheep, cows, goats or water-buffalo owned. For cows' milk, norms for TKZS and independent farmers are the same: 650, 400, 250, 160 and 80 liters of milk annually per cow, according to the butterfat content of the milk. Norms for TKZS members' private plots has been set at one-half that for independent farmers and TKZS. In actuality, these norms are slightly lower than those previously in effect if the farmer has more than one cow. The norm for TKZS is reduced about 20 to 30 percent according to the quality of milk delivered.

8. Norms for water-buffalo are lowered in approximately the same proportion as those for cows. Norms for goat and sheep milk remain the same for independent farmers and TKZS. Deliveries from TKZS private plots, formerly 10 percent below those for independent farmers, are reduced slightly if they own more than five sheep or two goats. The previous schedule of deliveries, computed on the graduated scale, is not set at a fixed rate.

9. Prices for milk deliveries are reduced. For example, price of a liter of cow's milk with 3.8 percent butterfat content is now 1.03 leva while formerly a liter of 4 percent

butterfat was paid for at the rate of 1.40 leva. (*Izvestia*, January 25, 1952).

10. TKZS, TKZS members and independent farmers who fulfill their quarterly milk and meat delivery quotas ahead of schedule will be permitted to sell milk and meat on the free market until the end of that same quarter.

11. Wool delivery quotas are calculated according to the number of sheep owned. For independent farmers, compulsory quotas for those with less than 30 sheep are hereby raised. Inasmuch as few independent farmers have as many as 30 sheep, few will benefit and most of these will be forced to increase deliveries. This is an actual retreat from one of Chervenkov's September 8 pledges that "wool deliveries for private farmers with herds of 15 or more head are to be reduced."

Norms for TKZS members' private plots were subject to the same delivery quotas as independent farmers. Their quotas were computed on a graduated scale of the number of sheep owned. Now, however, the norm is set at a fixed rate per sheep of 0.855 kilos for first category wool, 0.741 for second category, 0.704 for third, and so on. Formerly, the TKZS member was required to deliver 0.902 kilos of first category wool if he owned five sheep, the amount increasing proportionately with the number of sheep owned. Therefore, his quota decreases substantially if he has a large flock and increases if he owns less than five sheep.

TKZS norms are raised rather than reduced six or seven percent, as Chervenkov promised. Now, 1,157 kilos of first category wool per sheep is the quota to be delivered instead of 1,080. Wool purchase prices are slightly raised: price for merino and merino-type wool is now 28.60 and 26 leva per kilo; formerly it was 22 and 20 leva respectively. Prices for other grades of wool remain the same. The price rises apply to merino wool, the only type suitable for export.

The New Livestock Program

On October 13, Radio Sofia announced a new livestock expansion program. Its goals, sponsored and formulated by the Bulgarian Communist Party, as set forth for 1957 (and listed in the following table) are in several cases lower than the actual livestock totals reported for 1947. The major exception is hog production where a considerable increase is projected. If the 1947 and 1948 figures can be relied upon, the cattle population in 1957 will be only slightly more than it was then, and will fall much below the goals set under the 1953 Plan (which was reported successfully fulfilled in December 1952, a year ahead of schedule). The 1957 goals for poultry, sheep and goats is below the 1934 level and those for cattle only slightly above. This further emphasizes the seriousness of the situation, since there has been considerable population increase since 1934 and, even more important, the land area has been expanded by the accession of Dobruja. Obviously, the program is neither as expansive or ambitious as Communist propaganda would have its people and the West believe, and further, the "magnificent" statistical achievements reported in the past are little more than paper accomplishments in this area.

* A hectare is 2.47 acres; a decare is one-tenth of a hectare.

Livestock Census*

	1934	1947	1948	Plan 1953	Plan 1957
cattle	1,873	2,013	2,080	**2,187	2,090
pigs	902	***870	***825	1,650	2,200
sheep and goats	9,753	10,426	—	†—	9,700
poultry	12,773	11,612	—	‡—	8,000

The animal husbandry program, as further announced over Radio Sofia on January 28, calls for increasing average yields for fodder-fed cows to 1,050 liters of milk per year by 1957. If this target were reached, it would mean a 100 percent increase over TKZS milk cows' average yields for October 1953 (see Todorov speech excerpt, p. 15). Although this kind of yield is possible—1950 annual yield per cow in the US was 2,400 liters and in Denmark 3,420 liters—it is extremely unlikely that it will or can be effected in Bulgaria. The program also included proposed wool yields for sheep 1.95 kilos for coarse fleeced sheep, 2.58 kilos for semi-fine fleeced sheep and 3.15 kilos for fine-fleeced sheep.

Patterns and Conclusions

Analysis of the foregoing factors indicate that the regime intends to rely more heavily on the private plots of the TKZS members for livestock production, as revealed in its extensive quota reductions to those members. Uneconomical small livestock holders are either encouraged to increase their herds because of quota reductions to larger livestock holders and increased norms for smaller holdings or be forced to join TKZS. Moreover, TKZS will also be encouraged to expand animal husbandry, and their norms continue to be set below those for independent farmers. However, according to the average TKZS yield, these norms still seem quite high for them.

Collectivization

Although the Communists continually assert that collectivization is proceeding successfully, the available statistical information indicates that the area and number of

* Sources: *Otechestven Front* (Sofia) December 28, 1948; Radio Sofia, October 15, 1953, and January 28, 1954; *Bulgarian Statistical Yearbook 1939*, (Sofia); US Dept. of Commerce *Foreign Commerce Yearbook*, 1949; US Dept. of Agriculture *Yearbook of Statistics, 1951*; *Economic Survey of Europe in 1950* (Geneva), UN Economic Commission for Europe, 1951. Statistics in thousands of head.

** An approximate figure arrived at by taking the average 1938-40 statistics (US Dept. of Agriculture *Yearbook of Statistics 1951*) and adding the 20% increase for 1953 which was anticipated under the Five Year Plan. If the 1948 figure were used and the 11% increase over 1948 called for under the Plan were added to it, the figure would be 2,309.

*** US Dept. of Agriculture *Yearbook of Statistics 1951*. If the figure given in the 1949 edition of the *Foreign Commerce Yearbook* were used, the 1947 amount would be 1,028. If statistics of Economic Commission for Europe in *Economic Survey of Europe in 1950* were used, the 1947 figure would be 1,210. The ECE figure then used to compute the 1953 Plan statistic (a 100% increase over 1948) would amount to 2,420.

† The 1953 Plan called for a 5% increase in sheep and a 20% decrease in goats as compared to 1948. Goat decrease was encouraged because of their damage to forest seedlings.

‡ The 1953 Plan called for the same amount of poultry as in 1948.

household units included in the collective sector have shown little increase since December 1951 and have been at a virtual standstill during 1952. The figures show that the principal period of collectivization was from April to the end of November 1950. The number of TKZS's has not risen since 1951, but this may be attributed to regime plans for consolidating new holdings into existing TKZS units rather than expanding TKZS numerically (See chart below*).

Land in TKZS

	Number of Kolkhozes	Number of Household Units in Kolkhozes	Percent of Total Household Units	Arable Land Collectivized (in hectares)	Percent of Total Arable Land
Dec. 1947	549	44,100	4.0	180,040	3.7
Dec. 1948	1,100	78,900	6.7	292,380	6.0
Dec. 1949	1,607	156,483	14.3	551,572	11.3
April, 1950	1,633	175,000	—	600,000	—
Dec. 1950	2,587	525,628	48.0	2,092,216	43.0
Dec. 1951	2,739	—	51.0	—	47.5
Dec. 1952**	2,739	—	52.07	—	51.04
Dec. 1953	2,747	568,989	52.3	2,512,500	60.5***

On December 3, *Zemedesko Zname* announced important changes in the exemplary statutes for TKZS, consisting of:

1. lowering of annual rent per decare from 30 to 25 percent of the net profit, or one to four workdays for farmland rent instead of one to five, and one to five for vineyards and orchards instead of one to six.
2. members of TKZS households under 16 may now become members. The former minimum age was 18.
3. TKZS may no longer sell their land to another member if they leave voluntarily or are expelled. Henceforth it may be "transferred" but not sold.
4. members' livestock and equipment brought into the TKZS for the "common use" is now to be known as "TKZS property."
5. members of TKZS households can now perform the required work, while previously only the members them-

* Source: *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia)—May 29, 1950, January 1, 1951, October 28, 1951, January 6, 1953; *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia)—Dec. 3, 1952, Dec. 2, 1953.

** The May 16, 1953 *Bulgaria Today* (Sofia) gives the following figures for the number of kolkhozes and the percentage of arable land included at the end of 1952: 2,747 kolkhozes and 60.5 percent of the arable land.


*** This figure is definitely misleading. If the figure given for the total amount of hectareage included in the kolkhozes is correct, then the percent of total arable land included in the kolkhozes should be approximately 51.7 percent. The only other possibility is that the total amount of land classified arable might have been decreased, by a paper transaction. The figures for 1950 and 1949 indicate that the total amount of land classified as arable at that time was approximately 4.87 million hectares. Using the 1953 figure, the total amount of arable land would equal 4.15 million hectares. These figures compare to a total of 4.62 million hectares of arable land for 1946 given in *Statistika* (Sofia) 1948. It is doubtful that the total arable land area has decreased, as the regime is constantly bragging about the achievements of reclaiming land. In all probability this figure was jacked up to conform with the percentage of arable land required to be collectivized under the Five Year Plan (60%)—which was reported to have been completed and successfully fulfilled at the end of 1952, one year ahead of schedule.

The Development of Kolkhozes By Province



Shaded portions indicate percentage of collectivized land.

Source: *Report on Bulgaria*, Institut National d'Etudes et Economiques (Paris), November 1, 1950. Statistics only.



Numbers of TKZS. The law prohibits establishment of more than one TKZS per municipality.

Source: *Za Kooperativno Zemedelie* (Sofia), January 12, 1954. Statistics only.

selves—and not their households—could do so.

6. TKZS members may now own on their private plots two sows with suckling pigs (formerly only one sow) and in the Eastern regions they are permitted to own up to five. In the mountainous regions they may now own five to ten sheep while the previous maximum was three to five sheep and one to two goats.

7. the fund for assisting TKZS members who are unable to work is being increased. Motherhood and pregnancy leaves are to be considerably extended.

These new statutes are generally concessionary but they also indicate that the Bulgarian Communists are moving toward the advanced Soviet-type kolkhoz in the TKZS (see items 3 and 6). The fact that minimum age for membership has been reduced and families of TKZS members allowed to work also indicates that the regime is facing an acute labor shortage in the TKZS.

The Independent Farmer

The October 14 *Rabotnichesko Delo* hailed the independent farm contribution to overall agricultural production.

"The Ministry of Agriculture, the people's councils and Party committees and organizations must not forget that individual farms still represent a large factor in our country and that their neglect is harmful. It is necessary, on the contrary, to give them constant help and attention so that they may equally and actively participate in the fight for higher grain and industrial plant productivity, as well as for higher livestock breeding."

In his December 3 speech, Prime Minister Chervenkov expressed the current regime policy toward independent farmers:

"Let the brother working peasants not yet in the TKZS remember that we have not forgotten them. Nor will we forget them. . . . They are still looking toward

the TKZS but have not yet decided. Nobody will force them to hurry their decision."

And then having pronounced this policy of "watchful waiting," Chervenkov went on to emphasize the advantages of joining the collective farm movement.

Agricultural Concessions

In attempting to bolster farm production by granting concessions to the farmers, the Bulgarian Communists are following more moderate New Course policies than those being applied in the rest of the Soviet orbit. Some of these concessions, designed to encourage livestock breeding consisted of: lower milk and meat delivery quotas for TKZS and TKZS members; lower wool delivery quotas for TKZS, TKZS members and certain independent farmers; reduced irrigation taxes for TKZS, TKZS members and independent farmers; reduced insurance premiums for TKZS and TKZS members; increased financial aid to TKZS for 1953-54; cancellation of certain debt arrears for TKZS, TKZS members and independent farmers, and other such concessions. On the whole the new regulations favored kolkhozes and kolkhoz members and was another regime step to make collective farming more attractive to the independent peasantry.

The new 1954 grain delivery schedule was announced in the December 25 *Izvestia* (Sofia) and had three significant changes in the crop delivery quotas:

1. Compulsory grain deliveries for personal plots of TKZS members were cut an average of 66 percent from the previous delivery requirements. For example, for category I land they are now required to deliver only 12 kilos per decare instead of 34, while for category VI land the compulsory delivery quota is now 2 kilos instead of 7.

2. Compulsory State quotas for TKZS and private farmers are to be cut: 50 percent of the amount paid in

Ez aztán a „minta“-gazdaság!



Title: This Is A True "Model" Farm.

The sign reads: The State Farm of Taktaharkany. From left to right the subtitles are: The rain cloud is satisfied because it is used as an "objective difficulty" by many Chief Agronomists. The wine is satisfied because it is favored by several of the managers. The accountant is satisfied because he never makes a mistake detri-

mental to the management, and is therefore a great favorite. The manager is satisfied too because like a true petty despot, he is his own favorite. Who then are those who are not satisfied? The workers to whom nobody will listen.

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), August 15, 1953

kind to the MTS if all the mechanical work performed on the holding is done by the MTS; 25 percent of the payment in kind if only a harvester and combine are used.

3. Compulsory grain delivery quotas for independent farmers, with less than five hectares of land is raised, according to the amount and quality of land held. For example, compulsory deliveries are now also required for holdings of 5 to 7 decare (the previous minimum was 7). The quota for a holding of 10 decare of category I land is now 18 kilos per decare (instead of 8), while that for 10 decare of category VI land is now 4 kilos per decare (instead of being exempt).

The new schedule is on a sliding scale and effects quota increases on holdings up to five hectares if the land is of poorer quality. The larger the holding and the better the land, the smaller the proportionate increase. For instance, delivery quotas on category I land for holdings over three hectares remain the same, while quotas for category VI (less fertile) land increase up through five hectares.

This crop delivery schedule is further evidence that the collectivization program will be pushed in Bulgaria. Reducing compulsory quotas if MTS aid is granted not only reveals regime intentions to further mechanization of agriculture, but also to increase party influence and control in

TKZS. It is well known that the MTS are centers for Party activists and extending their work will extend regime control of farming. By raising grain quota requirements, for small independent farmers, the regime will either force them to consolidate their small and uneconomical holdings, join the TKZS, or shift their production from grain to vegetables or industrial crops such as tobacco, cotton, oil seeds, flax, crops which the new farm program wishes to emphasize.

The new schedule for potato and hay deliveries was presented along with the new grain delivery schedule. In this schedule, potato norms for independent farmers and TKZS remained the same but hay delivery quotas were raised considerably. The regime went much further to make the TKZS attractive to the independent farmers by entirely exempting the private plots of kolkhoz members from delivery of these fodder crops. This would also tend to reinforce the regime emphasis on livestock production on TKZS private plots.

Present and Current

The salient features of the 1954 Bulgarian State Budget were outlined in the February 4 *Rabotnichesko Delo*. Of a total budgetary expenditure of 9.46 billion leva earmarked for Financing the national economy, 1.76 billion

leva (18.62 percent)* is to be devoted to agriculture: this sum would exceed the 1953 budgetary allocation by 464 million leva. In 1953, 1.3 billion leva was allocated to agriculture, or 12.36 percent of the 10.5 billion leva for financing the national economy. Under the first Five Year Plan, 17.9 percent of all investments were to be devoted to agriculture and forestry**, but it would seem that in recent years the proportion of investment funds devoted to rural economy was appreciably decreased. This policy, common to all the Satellites, was largely responsible for disproportionate advances in Bulgarian industry as compared to agriculture. Current allocations and the sums earmarked for agriculture under the second Five Year Plan (9.2 billion leva, or an average annual expenditure of 1.84 billion leva) indicate that the regime is attempting to narrow the gap between industry and agriculture.

The Bulgarian Radio (January 28 and February 4) announced the planned future course of farming in directives for the Second Five Year Plan. Total area of cultivation in 1953 remained almost the same as that for 1952 although "the land area sown with industrial crops and perennial grasses increased at the expense of areas sown with grain crops." (This is similar to the shift in emphasis in Romania.) By the end of 1957, 700 thousand hectares are

* The report also announced that in addition to the funds allocated to agriculture in the 1954 budget, an additional 581 million leva in long-term credits would be made available for developing stockbreeding and farming.

** Source: *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, UN Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva) 1953.

to be planted with industrial crops, a 100 thousand hectare increase over the areas planned for these crops under the first Five Year Plan. The planned increases in area to be devoted to cotton, sugar beets and tobacco are 42, 31 and 12 percent respectively. 87 thousand hectares are to be allotted to grass and 630 thousand hectares to fodder. Grain fodder crops are scheduled to cover a surface of "not less than" 1.23 million hectares. Fruit orchards are to be increased 86 percent and vineyards 20 percent. By the end of the plan, irrigated land area is to reach 600 thousand hectares.

Percentages for the proposed production increases planned for the end of 1957 were given as: wheat—14 percent; sugar beets—180 percent; cotton—320 percent; oriental tobacco—110 percent. The average yields per decare contemplated for 1957 are (figures in parenthesis are the average 1934-1938 yield where available*): wheat—183 kilos (125 kilos); from irrigated areas—260 Kilos; corn—185 kilos (125 kilos); from irrigated areas—320 kilos; sunflower seeds—140 kilos (85 kilos); from irrigated areas—190 kilos; barley—215 kilos (130 kilos); from irrigated areas—300 kilos; sugar beets—2100 kilos (1640 kilos); from irrigated areas—3200 kilos; oriental tobacco—85 kilos (89 kilos); coarse rice—380 kilos; beans—72 kilos (59 kilos); Potatoes—920 kilos (610 kilos); tomatoes—2850 kilos; alfalfa—500 kilos.

(To be continued)

* Source: *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1951*, published by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN, Rome, 1952.

"We Should Not Put 'Peace' Into Our Mouths . . ."

THE Communist passion for making the word "Peace" a tradename has finally raised a protest from one of their own newspapers. The Hungarian newspaper *Esti Budapest*, October 17, asked "in the name of good taste" that the word "Peace" not be applied to toothpicks.

"A minor matter, but in bad taste," said the article. "We would like to suggest to the manufacturers of 'Peace' toothpicks that there are certain things, ideas and names which ought not to be degraded in this way.

"It is obvious that we should not put 'Peace' into our mouths—whether with a capital P or not—in the form of little pieces of wood. We don't name axle-grease after Beethoven, or face cloths after Aristotle."

Apostles of Discord

"Certain speakers . . . are inventing fictions that in the USSR there is a desire to subordinate the human personality to the State. In the USSR, the relations between the State and the human personality are characterized by harmony. Their interests coincide."

Vyshinsky in Pravda, December 14, 1948



Szpilki (Warsaw), January 3, 1954

THE TERM hooliganism, an expression little known in the East and Central European countries before the war, was originally used to describe juvenile misdemeanors such as vandalism, street fighting and vagrancy. Gradually, over a period of years since the war, it has also and equally become a term of political abuse, applied to youths who adopt exaggerated American styles in clothing, use American slang, and dance to American jazz. These activities are invariably ascribed to a perverse affinity for capitalist culture nurtured by Western propaganda—specifically, Western radio broadcasts—and those who affect these tastes are labelled potential traitors to the regime and candidates for Western espionage and gangsterism.

The Communist Party, perhaps rightly, fears that every youth whose spirit has not been tamed is a potential if not an actual enemy of Communist rule. Since time immemorial, despots have feared those assertive personalities who resist the pressure of imposed authority. By castigating all bizarre forms of adolescent self-expression as ideological lapses, the Communists hope to create in the public mind an identification of youthful folly with political unreliability. The Communist campaign against hooliganism is less a struggle against juvenile delinquency than a struggle against juvenile "deviationism."

Whatever real juvenile delinquency exists in the Satellite countries is partly a legacy of the war years, and indeed of Communism itself. The methods of rebellion and violence necessarily employed by the underground resist-

ance movements, in which Communists played an active role, and the vast dislocations which followed the war, undoubtedly led to a lack of knowledge of and respect for law and order. The Polish newspaper *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), October 29, 1953, approached a realistic if only partial explanation of the problem in an article on the origins of hooliganism: "In the Poland of 1945, the smoke of war was still in the air. A struggle of the new with the old was being carried on in every field of life. The country was going through a tremendous revolutionary upheaval. There was a large-scale shifting of population. And thus the youth, uprooted from their usual surroundings, found themselves on their own in completely unfamiliar circumstances."

But the article neglected to complete this history. After the war, in most of the Satellite countries—notably Poland—the Communists seized political control through the same terrorist methods which had been so widespread during the war. From 1945 to 1948, children and teen-agers saw the headquarters of opposition parties attacked and plundered, meetings dispersed and brawls organized in the streets by young Communist agitators. The Communist Party, turned "respectable" since its capture of open political power, is now reaping the harvest of seeds it has itself sown.

That hooliganism has become a headache to the Communist rulers is apparent from the increased space and intensity given to complaints in the Satellite press in the last

two years. A full statement of the problem as they see it was published in Bulgaria by *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), October 15, 1953:

"In the past nine years [since 1944, date of the Communist seizure of power], under the leadership of the Party and Dimitrov's Union of Youth [DSNM], we have raised many wonderful youths, heroes of Socialist labor, shockworkers, Stakhanovites, innovators—pride of the people and the nation. The Party has educated a whole army of new youth, dedicated to the cause of Socialism, tireless in labor, moved by deep and solemn impulses. But against this bright background, the conduct of certain idle youths, particularly in Sofia and the large cities, is deplorable. We refer to the displays of hooliganism by gangs of rowdies, who arouse the wrath of every honest citizen.

"These displays we cannot and will not tolerate. There is no doubt that behind these hooligan demonstrations lurks the enemy, who is trying to obstruct the building of Socialism by infecting the unstable elements among our youth. We should never forget the fact that the workers' stratum is not separated by a Chinese wall from the influence of bourgeois ideology, that in this period of transition many outdated capitalist ideas persist in the working class consciousness. The propagators of the hostile bourgeois ideology are trying to revive these outdated mental habits. They use all possible means—sensational literature, broadcasting over foreign radio stations, foreign fashions in clothes—to exercise a steady ideological pressure, to praise and spread the illustrious "American way of life" and the wild unbridled morals of the overseas inspirers. The fight against outdated capitalist *mores* among the youth is inseparably connected with the fight to uproot the rotten remnants of bourgeois ideology.

"It is not by accident that the enemy takes youth as its target, not without reason that he seeks position and influence with the students in schools and universities. He not only directs sabotage today—he prepares the ground for future sabotage.

"Ingrates"

"Who spreads this insidious influence? First of all, the sons and daughters of the enemies of the People's Democracy—former manufacturers, landowners, discharged Army officers. It is a known fact that the Party and Government patiently and generously give such youths the opportunity to be re-educated in the collective, to cleanse their souls of the rust of the past, to find their place in the new life. But many of them repay this generosity badly. They enter the universities, the factories and the sports organizations, not to study and work, but to demoralize the others by their bad example. They are the most zealous spreaders of pornographic and crime literature; they drink, loaf, swear in open and public places; they show off in their pipe-stem trousers and unruly haircuts, Americanize their honest Bulgarian names (and even go so far, in talking about their resort vacation, as to rename the ancient Neseber—New Sayber!).

"We can treat these apostles of the hostile ideology only one way: as enemies! To them—the malicious, the incorrigible, who draw their inspiration from their friends across the sea—we shall recall the words of Com-

rade Vulko Chervenkov in his address on the occasion of September Ninth: 'In regard to the enemies inside the country, in regard to their efforts to raise their heads, to cause trouble, let me remind them that we, the Fatherland Bulgarians, have not learned to compromise with our enemies. . . .'

"The real tragedy is that the germ spread skillfully and deliberately by such types finds a feeding ground in some of the more impulsive, frivolous, impressionable but otherwise sound young people, who, because of neglect, have gotten out of the control of family and DSNM. On behalf of these youths we must fight, to incorporate them within the framework of the great movements of our times."

Kind and Degree

In Communist usage, hooliganism breaks down into three forms, or, more accurately, degrees: 1. actual law-breaking—vandalism, street fighting, vagrancy, etc.; 2. outright political activity against the regime, and 3. adoption of Western modes of dress, music, literature and language. Little if any distinction between the first two is made by Communist authorities: offenders in either category are summarily and harshly punished. In October 1951 a Special Commission for Fighting Hooliganism was set up by the Polish regime and was assigned the rights of a court. According to cases published in the press in the last three years, this Commission has handed out thousands of sentences, ranging from three months imprisonment to indefinite terms in forced labor camps. In Czechoslovakia, juvenile criminal offenders and young people guilty of political acts such as attempting to cross the border illegally or distributing anti-Communist literature are indiscriminately herded together in reform schools. As far as is known, there are eight such reformatories in Czechoslovakia, located in Nova Ves and near the Marianka mine in the Jachymov uranium mining district; Racice, Zamsrk and Zacler in Northern Bohemia; and in Kladno, Kuncice and Lnare. A 20 year-old boy gave a detailed account of his experience in the Makarenko Home for Juvenile Delinquents in Zamsrk, to which he was confined before he succeeded in escaping to the West. His description of the Communist system of stratification and psychological pressure recalls the POW camps of the Korean war.

According to this report, the reform school is in a castle on a hill just outside Zamsrk. Adjoining the main building are a number of workshops, barns, a vegetable garden and several athletic fields. The number of inmates averaged 350 boys from 15 to 19 years old, serving sentences of from two to 15 years. Aside from the hard physical labor and the rigid routine, the most unpleasant feature was the program for "re-education," which was undoubtedly the primary purpose of the institution. The boys were divided into three groups which were given highly differentiated treatment. Class I boys were considered "politically mature." They were given self-governing responsibilities, leadership of the clubs and supervision of the other groups. Class II contained inmates believed by the Communists to be re-deemable. The "incorrigibles" were put in Class III. The report continued:

"Upon arrival at the institution, I had first to fill out a number of questionnaires covering every detail of my past. Then I was told I would start in Class II, and was instructed how to make the grade for Class I. It was not easy to make this jump. We were given marks for everything from neatness to political knowledge. To rise from class III to class II it was necessary to receive a "2" in all disciplines. For class I it was necessary to get a "1" in all disciplines and earn the medal for exemplary behavior. Downgrading—dropping a class—was imposed after one single bad mark or penalty.

"There were various privileges held out as incentives to cooperation, small indulgences craved by every boy: the right to have visitors, to write and receive letters, smoke, wear one's own underwear and slippers, own a fountain pen, and keep personal photographs in one's room. To earn these privileges, an inmate had to have a general average of "2" and to request the privileges in a special petition. On the other hand, there was a wide scale of punishments, from revocation of privileges for three months to the so-called full treatment—six days in jail without light, six days of fasting, six days of sleeping on the bare floor. The most severe punishment was two to six months in the penal squad.

"During my stay, ten boys tried to escape. Most of them were new arrivals. All of them were caught, since there was no place to hide within a two-mile radius of the reformatory. They were severely dealt with: their heads were shaved and they were put in solitary confinement for one month. In the evening after roll-call, they were brought into the main hall and the other boys were invited to beat and insult them. In this way the inmates were taught "Bolshevik sternness" and contempt for everyone who did not submit to Communism. These methods succeeded with some, and these inmates were more feared than the guards. Others, of course, reacted with intensified loathing for the Communists. On one occasion, a list of the guards' names was found in the possession of three of the boys, with notes on the retaliation which would be meted out to them after the regime was overthrown. Strangely, the guards did not seem to know how to deal with the culprits, and simply dismissed the incident."

The cult of Western styles in clothes, music and literature, which is now covered in all the Soviet-bloc newspapers by the term hooliganism, is evidently a prevailing fad among the teen-agers, particularly in the cities. It is doubtful whether many of the styles called "Western" or "American" would be recognized as such in the United States. In Czechoslovakia, the teen-agers' idea of American dress is tight trousers with wide cuffs, striped socks, painted ties and shoes with thick crepe soles (see cut). They buy plain ties and hand-paint them or even decorate them with American cigarette labels. There is reportedly a great demand in Prague for *Rodokaps* (cheap editions of thrillers and Westerns) and for chewing gum. Since gum is scarce, the young people chew bits of paraffin as a substitute.

Girls, too, are guilty of flaunting Western styles in defiance of prescribed rules. The Hungarian newspaper *Szabad Ifjusag* (Budapest) May 15, 1953, published an indignant letter from a teacher in a girls' school: "The girls do not appreciate the nice, simple cut of their uniforms. They copy American hair-dos, use lipstick, and even

cut a slit in the skirt of their uniforms in slavish imitation of the clothes shown in American fashion magazines."

Szabad Nep (Budapest), August 23, 1952, directly accused the American Legation in Budapest of spreading hooliganism in Hungary through the distribution of American books:

"The American Legation still finds ways to poison the morals of Hungarian youth. At the Beloiannis factory, some of the younger workers were caught making cigarette cases and other small objects out of factory materials during regular working hours. It was soon discovered where the workers had gotten the inspiration for this immoral behavior. A collection of dime novels was found in the young people's lockers. They had received these books from the library of the American Legation."

The Bulgarian newspaper *Literaturen Front* (Sofia) October 29, 1953, printed an ironic sketch which satirized the "ideological inspirers" of this form of hooliganism:

"Petur changed the spelling of his name to the American 'Peter.' He is 26 years old, with a bored expressionless face, languid gestures and downcast eyes. Peter speaks good English, never loses his self-control while playing bridge, and meets all turns of life with carefully cultivated indifference. Most of Peter's friends are married or divorced, in some cases two or three times. Usually they speak other languages, mainly English,



Dikobraz (Prague), November 8, 1953

which they learned at the American College [Simeonovo, now closed]. . . . Some of these 'smart guys' have even penetrated into the State University, and some are members of the Fatherland Front. They impress the younger hooligans, who consequently begin to practice idleness and loose behavior, copying their manners and adopting their 'experience'. . . .

"When these hooligans visit Peter, they usually play bridge, discuss the newest car models, give their opinions on symphonic or jazz music, tell jokes, and then turn on the victrola and dance to the latest American swing.

"But Peter and his friends are not like these sheep who only temporarily have gone astray. Peter and his friends are the ideological inspiration for the hooligans, the example for imitation. . . . Indoctrinated by their parents with contempt for the working classes, they vegetate in an atmosphere of nostalgic regret for the 'good old days.' These high-life relics have an unshakable conviction that they are fundamentally superior to the common people. They have their own philosophy about the world, which, expressed in their own words, is simply that 'imperialism is the highest form of society.' Animated by this cannibalistic principle, these supermen declare that the road to Socialism is 'drab', the struggle for peace 'conventional'. . . . Peter and his friends are real cosmopolites, admirers of Western culture and the American way of life. They wear shoes, nylon stockings, sweaters and neckties from abroad. These arrogant monkeys, dropped in our midst as if from a foreign zoo, live as Americans and think as Americans. They deny our Socialist achievements, deprecate all creative impulse and ignore every accomplishment of labor. Everything Bulgarian is considered 'peasant.' These 'aristocrats' are ready to convert our country into a giant night club under the American flag, where they will be free to do as they please without interference."

Failings of the Youth Leagues

The Communist Youth Leagues and the schools are the administrative organs through which the Communist regimes seek to control and combat this particular form of hooliganism. In Poland, where admirers of American fashion are called *bikiniarze**, a campaign against *bikiniarze* in the streets of Warsaw was conducted by the Polish Youth Association (ZMP) last summer. This "spontaneous" demonstration—the entire action was filmed for the newsreel—consisted largely of ripping American-style neckties from the collars of passers-by. In one incident described by a Polish refugee, a victim attacked by ZMP members began to protest loudly in a foreign tongue and to put up a fierce battle. A large crowd of interested spectators gathered on the spot. The ZMP youth refused to give up the fight, determined to tear off the victim's tie. After the police intervened, it turned out that the victim was an employee of a South American Consulate. The young man was taken back to his consulate under police escort.

Czechoslovakia adopts the "enlightened" line of trying to rehabilitate these offenders by admitting them into the Youth League, rather than persecuting and ostracizing them. *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), November 20, 1953, declared:

* Derived from Bikini Islands, presumably in connection with the atom bomb.



BIKINIARZ

rys. Baro

Szpilki (Warsaw), January 3, 1954

"It would be a great error to write off these teen-agers. Where but in the League can a young man find the correct path for his entire life? Where will he learn that the glamor of the Westerns cannot compare with the romance of our gigantic building up, that while he wastes his time with frivolous things, foundries and dams are being constructed all around him? The real victory will be won only in the moment when a boy who formerly occupied himself exclusively with loud ties and the samba concerns himself with changing the world. . . ."

But the youth organizations have failed to exercise the influence desired of them in the fight against Western influences, and have lately come in for severe criticism on this score. At the 11th plenary session of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Youth League, which met in Prague November 10-11, the newly elected First Secretary, M. Vecker, deplored the failure of the League to attract the interest of the youth:

"If we pose the question of whether the Czechoslovak Youth League as a whole exercises a real influence on the entire young generation, we find that it by no means does so. The majority of our youth stands apart from the League and its influence is negligible. The feebleness of the League's hold on youth explains why youngsters do not play a sufficiently active role in the Socialism, and why they exhibit unhealthy attitudes in regard to Socialist property, labor discipline and personal conduct. . . . Remnants of the hostile classes, assisted

by the imperialists abroad, attempt to gnaw their way like worms into the souls of the young people."

Vecker went on to admit that the Communist state has so far failed to create a generation "free from other [than Communist] influences." And he characterized the activities of the youth organizations as "uninteresting":

"The activities of our organizations are dull. They do not meet the demands of youth. Young people do not find in the League an organization which satisfies their desire for culture, sports and entertainment. There is not enough merriness in our organizations. Some minor officials, posing as know-it-alls, think that the function of a League organization is merely to deliver political speeches in meetings, carry out education, and impose jobs on the youth. They do not recognize that the members want to play games, sing, dance, and be gay. They seem to think such activities are unbecoming to a League organization, incompatible with their 'dignity.'"

In Poland, *Zycie Warszawy*, December 23, 1953, quoted Stanislaw Dobosiewicz of the Ministry of Education: "A rather large percentage of our youth is under the influence of hooligans. This is why the Ministry of Education calls upon teachers to carry on a constant fight against hooliganism. It must be emphasized that the school considers hooliganism a phenomenon of a negative political nature. In connection with it some incidents have recently taken place in Warsaw schools, incidents which resulted in students being suspended. . . ."

In Bulgaria, *Literaturen Front*, October 15, 1953, charged parents, schools and Dimitrov's Union of Youth (DSNM) with failing to recognize their obligations in stemming the spread of hooliganism:

"The hoodlums and jazz addicts exist only because of our good-heartedness and complacency—this fact should not be concealed! We bear the guilt for their recent rise. Parents, teachers, DSNM, People's Council—all share responsibility for the fulfillment of the goals set by the



"Please, please, Comrades, you're disturbing the Committee conference."

Literaturen Front (Sofia), October 15, 1953

Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party for the patriotic education and re-education of our people, and by the fourth and tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of DSNM for patriotic education and the fight against hooliganism.

"The Communist education of youth is, above all, an education for work. In practice this fact is ignored by many branches of DSNM. Many do not zealously impress upon their members such virtues as love for labor, eagerness for a perfect socialist care of machines or school property, respect for women, a feeling for the collective. . . ."

"The neglect with which some young workers treat socialist property, labor discipline, and the fulfillment of the Plan, sometimes directly damages the national economy, while the DSNM committees find it sufficient merely to rebuke or expell the guilty. Expulsion does not really solve the problem, although in some instances it may be a necessary measure. Unfortunately, in any case of hooliganism, these are ordinarily the only steps taken: the culprit is called by the administrative office of the industrial enterprise, school, or university, and, depending on the nature of the case, is fired or expelled from the organization. Such formal methods of action do not bring about a real result in the fight against bourgeois influences on the young. Very rarely do the leaders of the youth organizations show an interest in the guilty, try to find a common ground with him, and determine the cause of his disorderly conduct. Ordinarily he is simply judged and punished.

"Resistance to the ideological pressure of the enemy in school and university is, in many cases, very weak. For instance, some students of the Music Academy, led by the American "example," stole some racing cars and at present are barred from DSNM. These same youths in the Academy have openly expressed their unwillingness to study Marxism-Leninism. Others have written hostile slogans all over the walls of the school.

"Western bourgeois culture is infiltrating the State Graduate Dramatic School. At a conference held in July 1953, the students openly applauded those statements which attacked or completely rejected the Stanislavsky method. . . ."

"The reluctance to take up professional duties is also a manifestation of bourgeois influence. Led by the desire for an easy life, some university graduates refuse to accept positions as teachers, artists, dentists, agronomists and chemists, etc. By lawful and unlawful means, they try to stay in Sofia. Thus, a group of graduates from the State Dramatic School refused for some time to accept their appointments to the [provincial] Dimitrograd Theatre.

"The work of political education is not conducted satisfactorily in all instances. The entire activity of a number of youth organizations consists of delivering reports and writing out resolutions. Certainly reports are necessary—reports which are vivid, interesting, inspiring. It is also necessary that the political-educational work be combined and varied with literary and musical programs, games, amusements and excursions which would create a happy, friendly, cordial atmosphere. A number of organizations are little more than platforms for dry po-

* A technique of realistic acting developed by the Russian Stanislavsky.

litical discourses. The disregard of how, where, and with whom the young people spend their free time, how they entertain themselves, gives foreign, hostile elements the opportunity to penetrate the schools and influence the students.

"The slang and profanity used by women of the streets still exist as a disgraceful legacy of the past. Obscenity and swearing are a public evil, a shameful manifestation of capitalism.

"The study of the native tongue is a noble task, said M. I. Kalinin. Unfortunately, the study of the language in our schools is seriously handicapped by the fascination of slang, which more and more influences the still uncultivated speech of the students. Very little is being done to awaken in the students love and respect for the pure native tongue, for our rich national culture and its creators.

"Youth has always sought entertainment. There is nothing wrong in this. The evil is that some of the reading rooms in Sofia are becoming conductors of Western culture and of Western 'immorality.' The Probuda reading room in Gorni Lozenetz was, until recently, the gathering place for all the zoot-suiters of the neighboring districts. The DSNM ignored the situation, although perfectly aware that its members were entertaining themselves by drinking and dancing until dawn to the strains of American jazz. Why do our poets and composers take no responsibility for this evil? By failing to produce songs with mass appeal they deprive our youth of the beautiful and inspirational music which could be a powerful weapon against decadent Western jazz. More books are needed for our youth—fantasy and fiction, books which by satisfying their hunger for the new, the unusual and the interesting, could develop in them valuable virtues like courage and cooperativeness, and could protect them from the influence of the destructive crime literature of the West."

The article concluded with an outline of measures to improve the situation: organized entertainment, facilities for sports and recreation, greater interest and control on the part of parents as to how and where their children spend their free time.

Resisting the Mold

Although undoubtedly a good part of hooliganism is juvenile delinquency, some of it is the sheer joy of being alive and the gaiety which young people everywhere feel and which sometimes is manifested in mischief. More germane, however, is the problem of this "delinquent subculture" with relation to the whole of "Communist culture." The avenues of expression for normal needs in young people have been blocked by the rigid maze prescribed by Communists to create their new "Socialist man." And this is resistance on the part of youth—the segment of the population the Communists most wish to win to their side, and must win—to the tyrannical stress and strain of Satellite living. Hooliganism in the captive countries is surely a manifestation of certain patterns of resistance to the attempt at totalitarian control of life in East Europe. It is an obvious refusal, for instance, to relinquish a relationship to the West, even if it means an adherence to aspects of Western culture such as handpainted ties and chewing gum. And such adherence is an internal pro-Western propaganda which militates against the regime anti-West propaganda. In the universal pattern of adolescent behavior everywhere, youth will continue to protest against regimentation and monotony, and in so doing, they are pointing out that even totalitarian Communism cannot *absolutely capture and mold* a culture. This relationship between personality outbreaks and social structure cannot be ignored and is one further evidence that there are serious morale problems in the Soviet structure. And it is unlikely that standard remedies, even combined with the full-scale propaganda campaign, will succeed in bringing captive youth into line.

There is an ironic political and sociological comment to be made on a system which has enshrined "Revolt" and yet is unable to cope with the problems of adolescent resistance and nonconformism. Certainly, as Vecker admitted in his speech to the Czechoslovak Youth League, the Communists have "not yet succeeded in raising a generation free from other than Communist influences."

Way Out

The Council of Ministers in Communist Hungary summoned an old philosopher and asked his advice on how to solve the most urgent problems of the Hungarian "People's Democracy": the housing shortage and the food situation.

Said the philosopher: "The housing problem can be solved very easily by opening the borders to the West."

"And what about the food shortage?" he was asked.

"That can be solved by closing the borders to the East."



A resourceful girl at a summer resort.

"... Manci, have you gone crazy? reading two books at one time?"

"... Of course! To the novel, *The Stakhanovite Woman*, by Paul Insipid, I must add love from *Anna Karenina*.

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), October 2, 1953

The Lineup

by Vaclav Rezac

MANY Communist novelists have dreamed of making their mark on the world by writing a book which would become an exhibition piece of the new literature—a book which would safely skirt the dangerous reefs imposed by "Socialist realism" and still retain literary merit. In 1945 Vaclav Rezac entered the ranks of Communist hopefuls: inflamed with the ambition of becoming the Czech Sholokhov (an author often used to demonstrate the possibilities of such success), he planned writing a novel which, like *Quiet Flows The Don*, would deal panoramically with the transition from the "old" to the "new" life. By setting his story in the recent past, Rezac probably hoped to transcend the limited bounds of works dealing strictly with the contemporary scene: Party literati naturally insist upon the distortion of historical fact but they cannot insist that the characters in historical fiction be acquainted with the latest Party decree and government line. Thus, hoping to partially escape the strait jacket on literary creation, Rezac embarked on a three-volume work describing the 1945 transfer of Sudeten Germans from the Czechoslovak border territories and the subsequent development of these areas. The first volume, *Lineup*, published by *Gesky Spisovatel* (Prague), appeared in 1952, and was immediately acclaimed the best novel in present-day Czech literature. It was awarded the State prize, used as the basis of a film and translated into Russian, Polish, German and other languages.

Satellite Bookshelf

This is the final section of two articles devoted to recent and widely read Satellite novels unavailable in English translation. They are rendered in considerable detail here in the belief that greater familiarity with the actual works of Communist-dominated writers will give the reader further insight into totalitarian control of literature.

The previous installment reviewed novels from Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. The following article presents novels from Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

Lost and Found

Lineup differs radically from Rezac's earlier works, which gained him the reputation of a gifted writer of psychological novels about the lost and distorted. Born in 1902, Rezac made his literary debut in 1936 with a novel on World War I called *Sowed by the Wind*, which contained echoes of Dostoevsky and the German romantic, E.T.A. Hoffmann. This was followed by *Dead End Street* (1939), *The Black Light* (1940), *Witness* (1942) and *The Boundary* (1945)—all written during the Nazi occupation and bearing the familiar stamp of escape novels. The hero of *The Black Light* is a man who makes the lie his only companion in life; the hero of *Witness* is a mysterious stranger endowed with the gift of reading men's minds; and the main character in *The Boundary* is a writer who confuses his own life with the novel he is writing about himself, blending both into a new, half-real, half-imaginary existence.

Rezac's major works are miles away not only from "Socialist realism" but from all concern with social problems. During the Second World War, Rezac studied English so as to be able to read in the original such authors as Sherwood Anderson, Steinbeck, Hemingway, Dreiser and Dos Passos, but his interest was centered in their style rather than in their themes. When he started work on *Lineup*, after joining the Communist Party in 1945, Rezac aimed at combining the collective portraits of Dreiser with the vivid naturalism of Sholokhov. Explaining his purpose to journalists interviewing him after he was awarded the

State Prize, the new, "socially-conscious" Rezac said:

"I wanted to show the deep changes in and the development of a Czech individual who discovers new, positive qualities in himself and hitherto untested capacities when he carries out Socialism in our country. My novel is a document on the immense transformation of our border territories. The plot . . . centers primarily on the individual—the bearer of the new social order. Before actually starting to write . . . I collected material on the border district of the Krusnohor [mountainous area in the northwest] where I had the opportunity to study the changes in the people and the life . . . the settlement of the Czech element in agriculture as well as in industry. I wanted to describe the historic process of settlement in the border districts in these two sectors."

Villains and Heroes

Like Dos Passos' *USA*, *Lineup* lacks a central hero: the book deals with a number of principal characters, such as Jiri Bagar, a fervent Communist worker and trade unionist who is the personification of the ideal Party member. Arrested by the Nazis in 1944, Bagar is liberated by the Soviet Army and goes to the border territory, where he starts to build a new life. Other "positive heroes" include a smallholder, a railroad employee and numerous workers. The element of suspense in the book is provided by Elsa Mager, a beautiful Nazi who cannot reconcile herself to Hitler's defeat and who dreams of a revival of the Wehrmacht. She mingles with the "Socialist builders" and incites many of them to sabotage. Her hideout is the home of a municipal clerk, Tietze, who secretly serves the surviving Nazis. Involved with them are the renegade Smola and

Elsa's faithful servant, who commits murder on her orders. The novel also includes "good Germans," such as Palme, Bagar's faithful follower, who exposes Elsa as a spy and considers his transfer to Czechoslovakia something of a distinction. In contrast, the "bad Germans" seek revenge for their resettlement, although the author claims they have not suffered by it. *Lineup's* gallery of characters also includes a portrait of the "new Soviet man" in the person of Matvei Gromov, a Red officer who sets an example for Bagar and becomes his adviser. The heroes of the novel have no character defects, no moments of doubt, and are always devoted adherents of the Party. Similarly, the villains are lacking in all virtue and, as a consequence, have little resemblance to human beings.

Apart from the spy intrigue there is no major conflict in *Lineup* (which takes the reader up to Spring 1947); for tension, Rezac relies on small incidents, such as the foundation of a local Party organization. As a whole, the book lacks dramatic value, and is dogmatic and unconvincing in its false optimism and implausible circumstance. The tone of the book is epitomized by the following brief exchange between Bagar and his fellow worker, Galcik. Bagar asks: "Will you settle here for good?" Galcik answers: "How can I tell? I shall go wherever the Party sends me. We are going to build a new world all over the country."


Presumably author Rezac will write whatever the Party tells him in order to build the "new literature." What he has written in *Lineup* coincides with the Zhdanov line, dealing as it does with "typical problems of the class struggle" and "heroic Socialist builders," but as a novel, *Lineup* is far inferior to Sholokhov's *Quiet Flows The Don* and of far less interest than Rezac's own earlier works.

The Stonemasons

by Ferenc Karinthy

"Never in her life, in her twenty-four years, had she had such infinite faith in anyone or anything; the Party seemed to her a rock in the heaving seas, the only solid point, the only smooth path which would help her avoid traps, quicksands and dangers . . . a ray of light in the darkness and twilight of this confused world. She had realized during past years that the Party was not an abstraction . . . but a living force, a shield and spear, the backbone of life and work. Yet she felt it always above her as a force drawing her to great heights. She felt that the Party was her mother."

These neurotic sentiments are ascribed to the heroine of *The Stonemasons*, Agnes Balazs, an exemplary Communist female who apparently finds the source of her being in the Party and fulfillment as personnel director at the construction site of a tractor factory. Agnes does, however, find room for romance and in good proletarian fashion gives



You've read so much about construction; this is the paper hero. But a paper man cannot build a house.

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), September 15, 1952

courage and strength to her "politically bashful" young engineer who only recently has joined the Party. The "socialist relationship" between Zoltan Konkoly and Agnes is only one of *The Stonemasons'* many themes; in the 188 pages of his novel, Ferenc Karinthy manages to deal with a wide variety of other Communist activities at the Hungarian building project.


Bricks and Bad Men

Among the numerous persons working with Agnes and Zoltan are the cold engineering expert, Holics, the sympathetic and pragmatic Party secretary, Bela Bezeredi, and the construction manager, Knurr who, although a good Communist, lacks the necessary training for his job and therefore makes errors which enable the enemy to carry out effective sabotage.


The Stonemasons deals extensively with the problems of Stakhanovism, worker sabotage and inefficiency, and shows how shortcomings are effectively revealed at a Party session which abounds in criticism and self-criticism. The novel reaches its climax when manager Knurr buys new drying plates for stone slabs at a cost of 100,000 forints (about \$8,583) because he assumes that these have caused the bricks to come out defective. The truth of the matter is that anti-Communists have ruined the bricks after they have emerged from the drying plates. The events that follow this discovery deal with Communist efforts to track down the criminals. Knurr is replaced by top Party member, Zsigmond Torok, who, with the help of Zoltan and Agnes, goes over the construction plans and unmasks the enemy. The villain—as was expected—turns out to be Engineer Holics. He has received orders from a former bourgeois Undersecretary of State to pour hydrochloric acid

A Communist Plot

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>Chapter 1 Bagar and Trnec, two Communist comrades, arrive in their battered car at the abandoned border area in northwest Bohemia to work and live. They meet Soviet soldiers there and make enthusiastic friends with them. It is June 1945.</p> <p>Chapter 2 The chairman of the Kadan local national committee, one Galcik, assigns the newcomers tasks. Bagar and others are told to start operations at a textile plant in Gruenbach and at a ball bearing plant nearby.</p> <p>Chapter 3 Describes the abandoned town of Gruenbach where a group of frightened Germans live in an atmosphere of complete disorganization.</p> <p>Chapter 4 Bagar meets some of the inhabitants and realizes the difficulties he will face in his building efforts. The Czech and German "class enemies" will try to hamper his plans.</p> <p>Chapters 5-8 The fervent Communist German, Palme, is introduced. He is threatened by the few remaining Germans. There are night skirmishes between the new settlers and the remaining Germans. (All Germans who resist the Communists are labelled "Nazis"; all Czechs who resist "Social Democrats.") Palme becomes devoted to the Czech Communist Bagar.</p> <p>Chapters 8-10 Bagar's reconstruction work is hindered by disorganization and sabotage. There are more fights and gun battles.</p> <p>Chapters 11-12 The new arrivals in Gruenbach are continually attacked and must go about armed. They have to fight the Germans for everything, and they also have difficulties with former tradesmen and prosperous farmers. At a critical moment, Bagar's besieged group is saved by Red Army soldiers still stationed at the borders.</p> | <p>Chapters 13-19 New work heroes appear on the scene and the new arrivals achieve their first success. Thanks to Bagar's efforts, a Communist and fellow-traveller administration takes office in the town. The author describes the townspeople: the "earnest," "conscientious" ones and those still under the influence of "bourgeois prejudice."</p> <p>Chapters 20-22 Tietze, municipal secretary in Gruenbach, moves into the limelight. He is in the service of the "Nazis" and maintains liaison with them across the border. Bagar and his Communist friends suspect that he is hiding someone in his house but their investigations are fruitless.</p> <p>Chapters 23-25 The author gives a random sampling of work, love and friendship among the new settlers. Focus in on the Czech "renegade" Smola, a railroad employee who maintains close contact with Tietze. By shadowing Smola, the German Communist Palme discovers that Tietze is hiding the dangerous "spy" Elsa Mager in his house.</p> <p>Chapters 26-30 Elsa Mager uses blackmail and threats to intimidate the local German population. Thanks to Palme, she, Smola and Tietze are finally arrested.</p> <p>Chapters 31-38 Communist "good and truth" prevail. Construction proceeds feverishly and Bagar receives the general approval of the new settlers and becomes their leader. The novel ends on the note of celebration and triumph. The Red Army, its tasks fulfilled, returns to the Soviet Union. The people hail the Soviet soldiers: "Goodbye dear friends. You have planted the new era and nothing can disturb its growth." It is Spring, 1947.</p> |
|--|--|



The "new course" of love does not run smoothly. "Beloved Emily, I adore you. If you permit me, I would like to propose to you."



"I admit self-critically that I have not created a sufficient channel for the solution of the extra-economic relations between us. In order to eliminate the shortcomings I shall have to deal with this problem more thoroughly."

Svet Prace (Prague), January 28, 1954

on the bricks. The Undersecretary in turn receives his instructions from the "imperialists" through Belgrade.

Torok sees that all the criminals (one of whom is a right-wing Social Democrat) are arrested and the book draws to a close with a celebration of Stalin's seventieth birthday. In honor of the occasion Stakhanovite workers overfulfill the plan by 1,000 percent—an incredible figure which the author has evidently dreamed up in his unbridled devotion to "the Cause." The valiant Agnes is appointed ministerial department chief and bids farewell to Zoltan with whom, the author implies, she will be reunited in the near future.

Worship and Woes

Within the framework of this fatuous plot the author finds ample space to eulogize the Party and expose the heinous activities of those opposed to the "People's Republic." He portrays Communism as "the new religion" and the Party as the spiritual home of all "progressive humanity." For instance, the workers' attitude towards Party secretary, Bela Bezeredi, is summed up as follows: "The people all brought their desires, complaints and secret hopes to the Party secretary; like a precious gift, they brought the better half of their souls, and placed in the secretary's hands many suggestions, innovations and ideas which sprang from their hearts. . . . The children placed their faith in him."

Other passages are drenched in the same cultist mist:

"The Party is you—the Party rests in you. Everything that is good, brave, beautiful and human in you strengthens the Party, and all that is wrong, weak and cowardly affects the Party adversely. There is no greater glory than to be among the best of the working class. The life of a Communist is full of struggle, and yet there is no life more beautiful than ours: always among the people, with the people and before the people."

Opposition to the Party is naturally depicted in the darkest of colors and the devil of this ineffectual melodrama assumes various forms: *clerical reaction, monarchism, social democracy and bourgeois imperialism*. Among the

various offenders is a woman who not only obstructs work but who commits the further crime of inducing her co-workers to go to church, and even delivers a lecture on the virtues of Cardinal Mindszenty. More serious dangers also threaten the Communists. Manager Knurr, who may be lacking in practical ability but is well-schooled in Party theory, warns about the evil of the West:

"Truman has sent over his agents. 'Lie low,' he has told them. 'Pretend to be friends, then set about destruction quietly. Hide in rat holes where you can gnaw at the foundation of the house. You are our vanguard. We will follow you, and together we will obliterate their factories, destroy their mines, devour their meat, bread and sugar, and move into their homes.'"

Saboteur Holics characteristically has a dog called Harry—presumably a sign of esteem for the former US President. However, Holics cannot withstand the pressure of espionage work and, when he senses that his exposure is imminent, attempts to withdraw from the gang. This is impossible because each member of the gang threatens other members with blackmail if they refuse to continue their sabotage. In an effort to comfort Holics, the former Undersecretary of State tells him: "You only have to carry on until the atom bomb comes. Then the bomb will take over."

On What Foundations

Author Karinty inevitably makes the Party-required contrasts between the United States and the Soviet Union. He claims, for example, that one of his characters, a former war prisoner, had been in both countries: in the United States he had been put to work building a palace for Henry Ford, while in the Soviet Union he had had the good luck to help build a "democratic" dam. Similarly, one young worker in the novel is so impressed by a Soviet literary hero that he emulates him for days on end. Author Karinty also describes a scene in which the construction workers picnic on a kolkhoz; they arrive at a fortunate moment—the kolkhoz is starting its pig-breeding project with the aid of a pig shipped from the Ukraine. Karinty's characters also sing the glories of Soviet recon-

struction, and get lost in admiration for their rebuilt Budapest.

Since *The Stonemasons* is redolent with praise of Communism, it has in turn received Communist praise. Put out in 1950 by the Athenaeum Publishing Company, it was probably a commissioned work designed to popularize the Five Year Plan and the Stakhanovite system. That it fulfilled the prerequisites is indicated by the fact that the regime has ordered it included in every library and book store. Further, Soviet critic, V. Bajkov, has listed Karinthy among the best Hungarian novelists and in his *Literature in Free Hungary* commended *The Stonemasons* as follows:

"[The author] is inspired by the momentous spirit of socialist building. . . . The title of the work is symbolic.

The stonemasons are not only the builders of the factory described in the novel—they symbolize the Hungarian people laying the foundation of the future socialist society. . . . In this work the difficult and glorious task of re-educating the people falls on the Communists."

It is doubtful that the Party's admiration for such an inferior work is shared by the captive reader. However, the Communists never give up trying to palm off propaganda as art, and Karinthy's latest work, *Spring in Budapest*, has been published in serial form by *Magyar Nemzet*, the Party newspaper. If it reads anything like *The Stonemasons* it is safe to assume that Karinthy can consider his reputation as a Party hack relatively secure.

Karinthy's Confessions

Even Communist authors have second thoughts about their books, especially after the Party line on literature takes a new zig or a new zag. Below is Karinthy's apology for having written "The Stonemasons" and committing the newly declared literary heresies.

THE READERS expected and the Party and State supported . . . a young literature dealing with new topics. It was to be expected that works dealing with factories and workmen would attract more attention. And this was as it should be. . . . But the mistake was that many of us—myself no exception . . . began to misinterpret this support. We did not do so intentionally or in bad faith, but in practice we did it nonetheless. I began to think that the public was not so much interested in the new literature about the working class . . . as in me; my role as a literary 'pioneer' began to blind me. Almost everything I wrote was published; my short stories and reports were discussed at factory meetings; I received numerous invitations. I was frequently sent abroad as the representative of Hungarian literary life. I started to become a 'fashionable' writer. . . .

"Gradually . . . a certain superficiality became prevalent in my work. . . . It was at this time that I started writing my novel, *The Stonemasons*. I began work on it not because I felt an irresistible urge to write about my building experience, but because I thought a novel of this kind was 'needed.' In this I was right. . . . But the need itself—as I later realized—does not create a good book if the author lacks personal experience, passion and a sense of responsibility.

"I do not have the courage to confess how brief was my stay at the construction site. . . . After a few hasty impressions, I hurried back to Budapest. . . . I got a few books on construction and then I wrote rapidly . . . my publisher was pressing me. . . . I had become a sort of devil-may-care criminal. . . . My intentions were good. . . . The trouble was that I became the victim of the artificial spell of my creative work. I got the false idea . . . that everything I wrote had to become a living force simply because I wrote it. . . . I thought what I wrote was good because it 'contained everything' it should. As a result, *The Stonemasons* hardly contained anything really human or convincing. Sham people won sham victories over sham difficulties. . . . In the beginning I argued, I defended my novel, I referred to the importance of the topic, to the fact that I was trail-blazing. . . . But all the while I felt I was defending a poor cause.

" . . . It was a bad book . . . but not as bad as [some people] said it was. . . . Few have tried to produce anything better in this field, and even these few have been unable to overcome difficulties in a convincing manner.

"For months after this, I was unable to write anything but short articles. I was confused. I was desperate. I came to see—perhaps in too dark a light—why my novel was bad."

Csillag (Budapest), December, 1953

The Party Is Work

THE JOB of governing the country is carried out in Poland, as in all other Communist-ruled countries, along two parallel lines: one of them consisting of the administrative organs of the Communist Party, the other the organs of the State. Thus, at the rural township (commune) level, there is a local National Council supposed to be elected by the local inhabitants, and there is also a Party Commune Committee composed of local members of the Party. The same dual structure is found at the district level, at the provincial level, and at the center of government, in the capital. (The Politbureau is the highest body in the Communist Party, and the Council of Ministers is the highest organ of the State.)

How "democratically" this system functions in Poland, as well as its bureaucratic inadequacies, is shown by an article in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), January 12:

"There are Party committees which view their men as chess pieces, moving them around—up and down—with-out regard for their qualifications or capabilities. What does this kind of cadre policy lead to? It leads to this: that instead of selecting the right man for the right job, they 'fill in the holes' with anyone who is on their hands. The result is that the cadres, unprepared for their jobs, become demoralized and deteriorate. It leads to imposing upon the Party or State organs (in obvious violation of democratic principles) 'administrators' whose moral and political deficiencies have disqualified them as political activists.

"Below we give an illustration of one such case which is far from being an exception to the rule.

"One day the following conversation took place in a Party District Committee office at Ostow Mazowiecka:

"—Comrade Ogródowczyk, you are being sent to the commune of Boguta, where you will take over the post of commune committee secretary.

"—But I know nothing about Party work in the village, the activist Ogródowczyk protested.

"—That makes no difference at all. We'll help you.

"Ogródowczyk went to the commune of Boguta. There he was not always able to manage his job of commune committee secretary. It soon turned out that he was a rather weak character; having learned about Ogródowczyk's Achilles heel, certain persons in the township soon found their way to his heart through drink. And when a little later it turned out that Comrade Ogródowczyk had spent more time in the inn than in his office—which naturally contributed little to his prestige in the village—his comrades from the District Committee remembered their promise.

"—We must help him, they said. He has lost his standing in Boguta so we'll transfer him to Andrzejewo. "Ogródowczyk went there. After a brief survey of his new surroundings, Ogródowczyk began a new stage of his drinking career. . . . It soon became so bad that Ogródowczyk had to be recalled from his Party post.

"—It is our fault, his comrades from the District Committee admitted. We neglected him. We must now assign him to some more suitable post.

"—The post of chairman of a rural township National Council has become vacant recently, said the chairman

of the District National Council. The place, Wasewo, is quite far from Andrzejewo, some 40 kilometers, so its inhabitants won't have heard about Ogródowczyk's past doings.

"There arose, however, some unexpected difficulties in the case. At a session of the National Council at Wasewo, the councillors looked rather dubiously at their prospective chairman who—as if in a suitcase—was brought in by the vice-chairman of the District National Council to the meeting.

"—We don't know the man, one of the councillors said. And besides, we think that out of 12,000 inhabitants of our township we can select one who would be able to take care of our own local matters. Others agreed with the speaker.

"It further turned out that, despite the long distance between Andrzejewo and Wasewo, the councillors knew about Ogródowczyk's drinking accomplishments, and this—one can hardly wonder—contributed greatly to their rather unfriendly attitude toward their new chairman. As a result Ogródowczyk was not confirmed in his office. He was, however, in spite of the councillors' objections, left at Wasewo as acting chairman of the National Council. Several days later Ogródowczyk received official confirmation of his position from the District National Council. One month later, the chairman of the District National Council himself came to Wasewo, where, at a meeting attended by one half of the councillors, he helped Ogródowczyk to be elected to the post (which Ogródowczyk had held for some time now, anyhow). Five councillors voted against the new chairman.

"History repeated itself for the third time. The local inhabitants began telling a joke about how the new chairman hated kulaks so much that he wanted to finish them off by drinking away their money. Ogródowczyk's drunkenness and immoral life, and his son's hooliganism (tolerated by his father) soon had a bad effect on the whole council's work and resulted in the slackening of labor discipline.

"Wasewo's bitter inhabitants, after their complaints to the District National Council had remained unanswered for four months, decided to write a letter to the Council of Ministers in Warsaw. And it was only then that an end was put to the scandalous situation in the Wasewo National Council. An investigation by the Provincial National Council fully confirmed the charges against Ogródowczyk, who was finally released from his post to the great satisfaction of the councillors.

"It would appear that Ogródowczyk's case would serve as a lesson to the Party Committee and the committee of the District National Council. But a conversation with the comrades, who thought the matter insignificant, fills one with serious doubts. And it is indeed a pity. For if the comrades from the Party Committee thought more about this case, and their whole system of managing the cadres, they would doubtless find the reasons for the turnover of personnel in their district cadres. They would perhaps understand why 9 out of 12 secretaries of Party Commune Committees were recalled from their posts in only one year, and why in such communes as Poreba, Branszczyk or Nur, three consecutive changes in the secretary's post were made during that time. . . ."

The Big Loudspeaker



Szpilki (Warsaw) October 18, 1952

An analysis of the new patterns of Communist foreign broadcasting, this article points out the major political target areas, the inter-bloc coordination of transmission and the restrictive measures taken against free world broadcasts to the Soviet sphere.

THE IMMENSE sums and energy expended by the Communist regimes in recent years on their foreign broadcasting networks reflects the importance they attach to radio as a propaganda instrument. During the past two years, the pattern of foreign broadcasting has changed. Emphasis on the sheer volume of broadcasts is being replaced by an increasing expansion of foreign radio operations. To improve their efficiency, there seems to be a greater effort towards integrating the radio network of the Soviet orbit and towards a larger use of more powerful transmitters located, where possible, closer to the target areas.

Between 1948 and 1952 Soviet bloc foreign broadcasting, including that of Communist China, increased steadily in volume—by 158 percent. In 1951, however, the rate of increase began to decline. In 1953, there was an actual drop in the total Soviet bloc radio output to other countries as a result of sharp drops in the output of the USSR and to a lesser extent Communist China, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Albania. The USSR now beams 16 percent fewer hours abroad than in 1952.

The decline in Soviet broadcasting has been partially offset, however, by an increase in Satellite and clandestine broadcasting effort and by a parallel trend toward using European transmitters located closer to the target areas. Since 1948, Satellite broadcasts abroad have increased by 178 percent as against a 74 percent increase for Soviet broadcasts. In 1953 the volume of Satellite broadcasting increased 11.8 percent over 1952 and the Satellite share of Soviet bloc broadcasting rose from 41.9 percent to 49.9 percent of the total bloc effort.

The Satellite increase was due largely to expansion of the Polish schedule over 1952 by 72 hours and 7 minutes, for a total of 316 hours, 16 minutes weekly, or 22 percent of the total bloc effort. Since 1948, Poland has increased its broadcasts sixfold and has risen from *thirty-eighth to third place on the list of world broadcasters*. Not only have the Satellites increased their broadcasting effort, but since March 1951 the USSR has moved its own broadcasts closer to the target areas by using relay transmitters in Eastern Europe.

The Principal Target

In terms of area of concentration, the chief Soviet bloc target is Western Europe, to which more broadcasts are beamed than to all other areas combined. The Satellites account for two-thirds of these broadcasts. The next most important target area is the Middle East, with the USSR carrying the greatest load and the Satellites broadcasting only to Greece, Israel and Turkey. To the Far East, the USSR and Communist China broadcast an equal amount to non-Communist countries; the European Satellites do not broadcast to this area, and Communist China confines its broadcasts to this area alone. Satellite broadcasts predominate in the bloc output to North America, while Czechoslovakia and Hungary are the only Satellites to broadcast to Latin America. In recent years, the block has beamed more broadcasts to Yugoslavia and to the US than to any other single countries.

Communist Bloc International Broadcasting, Selected Periods

Country	August 1948	Sept. 1950	October 1952	October 1953
USSR	334 hrs.	516 hrs.	693 hrs. 16 mins.	603 hrs. 36 mins.
Poland	50 hrs.	115 hrs.	237 hrs. 14 mins.	316 hrs. 16 mins.
Czechoslovakia	59 hrs.	112 hrs.	115 hrs. 30 mins.	103 hrs. 11 mins.
Hungary	75 hrs.	75 hrs.	93 hrs. 52 mins.	74 hrs. 59 mins.
Bulgaria	24 hrs.	45 hrs.	68 hrs. 25 mins.	73 hrs.
Rumania	24 hrs.	30 hrs.	47 hrs.	72 hrs. 15 mins.
Albania	21 hrs.	26 hrs.	48 hrs. 45 mins.	43 hrs. 30 mins.
Communist China	16 hrs.	46 hrs.	84 hrs.	84 hrs.
Total*	528 hrs.	965 hrs.	1,388 hrs. 02 mins.	1,370 hrs. 47 mins.

The volume of bloc broadcasts to specific areas may give some indication of the Kremlin's concern with or interest in those areas. For example, it is noteworthy that bloc broadcasts have increased to countries on the Soviet periphery.

* There are three kinds of radio hours (per day, week, month, etc.). They are 1. original programs, 2. original programs and repeats and 3. transmission hours. The figures above are for original programs and repeats.

phery. For Greece and Turkey, the conclusion in 1953 of the Balkan Pact may have been a contributing factor. The drop in broadcasts to Yugoslavia, which nevertheless still heads the target list, could reflect the decline in political warfare since Stalin's death and the ostensible efforts to "normalize relations" with that country. The same would hold true for Iran, where the calls for revolution by the clandestine Azerbaidzhan radio ceased when it went off the air in July.

The increase in broadcasting to Scandinavia (with the exception of Norway) would seem designed to offset Western influence in a sensitive area. Recent bloc attention to France is undoubtedly connected with the campaign to prevent ratification of EDC and to split the Western alliance. The US-Spanish agreement on air bases may explain the increased attention to Spain. The increase in broadcasts to the US and India is traceable to their vital roles in world affairs.

Particular areas have been periodically made the focus of short-term attention. A case in point was the June 1953 Italian elections, when there was not only an increase in commentaries but also a shift in the pattern of broadcasting. In May, the volume of Soviet broadcasts to Italy rose from 23 hours, 20 minutes per week to 38 hours, 30 minutes. To compensate for this heightened effort, Moscow cut its broadcasts to all the Satellites except Albania. The clandestine transmission to Italy was increased in May from 21 hours a week to 29 hours, 45 minutes and for two weeks prior to the election totaled 35 hours, 45 minutes a week. The effectiveness of these clandestine broadcasts to Italy as well as to France is enhanced by the fact that they are unidentified and appear to be of local origin.

Intra-Bloc Radio Coordination

Agreements for "cooperation" in the radio field signed by the USSR in 1949 and 1950, following a tour of Eastern Europe by the head of the All-Union Radio Committee, A. A. Puzin, provide the legal basis for Soviet intervention in the management of the Soviet bloc radio. The existence of land lines between Moscow and the Satellites (at least in the case of Czechoslovakia), the announced presence of personnel with experience at Radio Moscow, and the whole apparatus of policy coordination evolved by Moscow go far to ensure an integrated radio effort in Eastern Europe.

Moscow apparently hoped in 1946 to dominate international broadcasting by making the International Radio Broadcasting Organization (OIR)—in which it obtained votes for eight of its union republics—the recognized agency for international broadcasting. However, with the formation of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in 1947, OIR was reduced to the status of a regional European radio agency. In 1949, all of the Western members walked out of the OIR, restricting its competence to Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia and Syria were expelled in 1951 and Finland, the only remaining non-Communist member, has been inactive. This development enhanced rather than lessened the organization's value to the Kremlin, which then began to use it to integrate the orbit radio network. With the adherence of Communist China in

1951 and of Eastern Germany in 1952, OIR became an important instrument for coordinating the total Communist bloc radio effort. New agreements concluded in the late summer of 1953 between Moscow, Peiping and the European Satellites were also apparently designed to increase the effectiveness of intra-orbit broadcasting.

The USSR and Eastern Europe

In 1953, the Soviet Union signed supplementary radio protocols with Bulgaria (August 22), Hungary (August 28), Czechoslovakia (September 2) and Poland (September 6). These protocols provide for an exchange of radio programs dealing with the life and culture of each country. As a result, the USSR cut back its broadcasts to all the Satellites except Bulgaria. At the same time the potential audience in the Satellites was greatly expanded, since Satellite home service transmitters now relay at least one half-hour of Soviet transmission daily (two in the case of Czechoslovakia). The reception of these broadcasts is clearer, and there are *no alternative programs available* at the time the Soviet programs are on the air. Radio Moscow reciprocates by carrying half-hour transmissions in Russian prepared by the Satellites, but only once a week.

In early 1951, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria ceased broadcasting to each other and to Hungary, which had never carried programs to the other Satellites. The immediate effect of this move was to release transmitters for broadcasts to Western Europe and, in particular, for new relays of Soviet broadcasts.

Soviet Bloc Restrictive Measures

The intensification of the cold war has accelerated Communist efforts to hamper reception by the Soviet bloc peoples of Western radio transmission. This jamming effort has required a high degree of coordination among the bloc radio networks. Soviet jamming of Czech and German broadcasts before World War II and of Spanish and Vatican transmission beginning in 1946, was on a small scale. Intensive jamming began 1949. But the Communist jamming network is strained by the need to block broadcasts from 15 countries, including the United States, Great Britain, the Vatican, Spain, Greece, Yugoslavia, Iran, the Philippines, Formosa, Ecuador, Canada, Israel, Turkey, and France. These are further reinforced by United Nations Radio and Radio Free Europe broadcasts.

It is known that Soviet jamming networks employ thousands of scarce technicians and cost more to run than the total cost of US broadcasts to the orbit. Notwithstanding those great expenses, the USSR has continued to rely primarily on these indirect methods to prevent listening. In no Soviet bloc country have radio receivers been withdrawn, nor is listening to foreign broadcasts directly forbidden by law. Listening to such broadcasts has, however, been made increasingly difficult.*

To discourage the spreading of information carried in

* The introduction of "wired radio" is one of the major means of controlling what the captive audience hears. This is radio piped from a central receiver to household sets via telephone wires, thus permitting Communist governments to control the central receiver and the programs tuned in.

Western media, the laws in "defense of peace" passed by the Soviet orbit countries in 1950 and 1951 provide heavy penalties for spreading "tendentious or invented" news. In Czechoslovakia it is also illegal to listen to foreign broadcasts with people other than members of one's family. In Albania and Bulgaria, the electric current has been reported cut off during the peak listening hours.

Another device to prevent listening is the Communist decrease of short wave set production. Short wave sets produced for civilians declined 21 percent from 1948 to 1951, notwithstanding a 50 percent increase in the production of civilian-type radios. The licensing of all sets also provides a potential means of control over their use and over the sale of spare parts.

In their campaign to eliminate Western influence among the Soviet bloc peoples, the Communist leadership had a choice, in the case of radio, either of jamming Western broadcasts or confiscating all private radio receivers. They were probably reluctant to adopt the less costly and more direct action for a variety of reasons: to do so would have been an open admission of weakness and lack of confidence in their people. It might also have alarmed the Soviet peoples, since the last and only time this step was taken was during wartime. Further, it would have reduced the effectiveness of Kremlin efforts to propagandize its own peoples in areas where other means of propaganda are limited or non-existent.

"Big Brother"

A FIFTY-TWO-year-old department chief in the Communist East German Communications Office, who escaped to the West last September 7, reported that 150,000 specially-constructed radio-television sets had been sent from the Soviet zone to the USSR. These sets, made to Russian specifications under the name "Lenin-grad," are equipped with a device confining reception to Communist broadcasting frequencies.

The escapee, who also served as liaison engineer between the Communications Office and the "Sachsenwerk" in Radeberg, which has been assembling the radio sets since 1951, stated that when they are shipped to Russia they are adjusted to a testing frequency only. Tuning to the actual Communist radio stations are made in the USSR, apparently because the Soviets do not wish it known which wavelengths will be used. Although the sets can be altered to pick up all stations, this can be done only by an expert with the aid of a converter. The sole East German identification on the sets is a small, easily removable shield bearing the name "Sachsenwerk." Should any of them be resold to other countries in the orbit, they will almost certainly be sold as Russian-made merchandise.

The component parts for the special sets are made in various East German factories, assembled at "Sachsenwerk," then delivered directly to Moscow in sealed freight cars, where the Soviet control center unpacks them. The factory cost of the completed set is 1,325 East Marks. The Russians, however, pay only 675 East Marks per set, the balance being met by the East German government.

Furthermore, the Soviets reserve the right to deduct from 25 to 90 percent of this price if a set is faulty or damaged. Since inspections are made at the Moscow import control center, with no East German representative present, the Soviets can declare a set "damaged" if there is so much as a scratch on the chassis. In this way, according to the escapee, at least 50 percent was deducted from the price of the 1953 deliveries.

The "Sachsenwerk" operates on a round-the-clock schedule, with three separate shifts. The factory has a heavy security guard of Vopos (East German police) and militia, and can be entered only with a special permit issued by the Central Radio Administration. Visitors are escorted to the office they wish to visit under a police guard. Even factory officials are forbidden to take papers referring to their work from the building without a permit from the Ministry of Posts and Communications.

Typical, the USSR has tried to kill a number of Satellite birds with the same Soviet stone: to control what its captive populations will see and hear; to take Russian credit for what East German industry has produced; and to do both through a rigged economic arrangement which bleeds the puppet state and fills the Kremlin's coffers.



Tonight, in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, men, women and children will gather around radios tuned to the voices of their countrymen in the West, bringing them the news of the free world, the knowledge that they are not forgotten, and the hope of their future liberation. Radio Free Europe, operating as a home service from abroad, broadcasts over a network of 22 transmitters to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, competing directly with all Satellite Communist stations.

This Is the Voice of Free Bulgaria . . .

Deeds and Titles

In April 1952, a Bulgarian farmer by the name of Todor Tzenov committed suicide in his native village of Gagalnitz. Todor Tzenov was known as a quiet and honest man. He owned about 30 *decares* [7 acres] of land and worked hard to support his wife and two children. In March of that year, the management of the village kolkhoz took his fertile fields, and gave him in return 30 *decares* of wasteland. The management further expropriated his ten bee-hives, thus depriving Todor Tzenov and his family of their only source of cash income. Todor Tzenov worked valiantly to turn the wasteland into a field, but all his efforts were in vain. Finally, he gave up. He could not bear to watch his wife and children starve, so one day, in a moment of weakness and despondency, he slit his throat. . . .

Peasants of the collective farms: the story of Todor Tzenov, who committed suicide as a result of the poverty brought on him by the Communists, is not unique. Hundreds of thousands of Bulgarian farmers were robbed of their rich lands in the same way. Their property was absorbed into the village kolkhozes, and the former owners and their families were plunged into misery, privation and despair. . . .

Regardless of all other objections to the present form of the collective farms, the fact that they were formed on the basis of illegal seizure of land, and a well-planned impoverishment of the village population for the benefit of a few Communist officials, makes their existence intolerable. They will be dissolved immediately after liberation.


No one should deceive himself about disposing of prop-

erty, houses, or lands which do not belong to him. Everything that belonged to the peasants legally will be returned to them! After the collectives are dissolved, each one of you will resume ownership of your land, your cattle and machine inventory taken by the kolkhozes. The land taken from the independent farmers in the same manner will also be returned to its former owners. Having resumed their ownership, the peasants will have full freedom to decide how they will cultivate the land in the future: on a cooperative basis, or privately.

In view of this, you, peasants of the kolkhozes, as well as all independent farmers, should keep a firm grip on all documents proving your former ownership of land, livestock, and the inventory. Keep the title deeds and every paper in your possession showing that your land, cattle and inventory have been included in the village collective farm. Make copies of them and hide them carefully. Be sure you re-

member well the number, the date and the office that issued them, because one day you will need them!

According to information from towns and villages, some Communists are building houses on property which belongs to other people by right, but has been seized by the Communist regime. Such builders should remember that according to the law the house will belong to the owner of the lot! For instance, Zhelyu Dimitrov Georgiev recently built a house in the village of General Toshevo. The lot was given to him by the municipality, which had confiscated it from an independent farmer. Thus, Zhelyu Georgiev has built his house on a lot belonging to someone else, and the latter's ownership will some day be restored. What is Zhelyu going to do? His explanation that the lot was given to him by the municipality will do him no good!



This is not the only such case. And that is why we wish to warn you once again not to risk building houses on lots which have been confiscated from your fellow citizens! Those who build on other people's property are building on sand, because a day will come when all presents given by the Communists will not be recognized, but will be returned to their former owners. . . .

This Is the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia . . .

A Creed for Today

Among the news items we get from our homeland, we find this: somewhere in the eastern part of our republic, prisoners of the regime were being transported from one place to another—in freight cars, the doors of which were secured by barbed wire. The train halted at a station and from the car could be heard cries for water. The townspeople came running with glasses, pitchers and pails filled with water. The armed SNB police opposed the throng approaching the wagon, the people got angry, and a woman struck one policeman's cheek; thereupon the police withdrew, and the prisoners got their drink.

I do not speak about this blow in the face; perhaps this should not be done. But to give a drink to the thirsty—that is a good deed. A "good deed"—two old-fashioned words, forgotten in the confusion of the present, but when heard again after all these years in which nothing has been heard but political agitation, they make you feel as if you came to a warm stove from the icy frost outside. The New Year has started, and people make resolutions. We pause to ask if it would be possible for everybody to resolve to follow this principle: 'do a good deed every single day! It may be small, clandestine, unobtrusive, and yet a good deed. I do not want to urge you, back home, to good deeds that could imperil your safety. But there are enough opportunities when nobody is looking on, when you are by yourselves. There are situations, rather frequent ones, I think, when one can choose between helping or not helping a suffering man. Should you find yourselves at such a crossroads, then do, we beg of you, help.

There is so much obduracy in the world now, that somebody may ask: why should I do good? This question equals the one about whether humanity should go upward or sink downward. Who, seeing somebody about to drown in a river, will be so unnatural as to remain standing by? But the people who, in wirebound wagons, are borne to unknown destinations and suffer from thirst—they too are drowning people, what else? To open the wagons, to tear off the barbed wire—this is for a greater force to accomplish than that of the individual. But in so far as the individual Frantisek Novotny, the individual Tomas Cerny is concerned, no more is at stake than a glass of water—either proffered or left unproffered.

While I was still in the home country, the Communist national committee decreed that an old woman had no claim to a milk allowance—because she was old. To place a bottle of milk at her door—that is a good deed. While I was still back home, I saw young and hefty men carting

Spot

Much talking is being done in Czechoslovakia. One group would like to talk but is not able to. The second group could say a great deal, but refuses to do so. Therefore group C, those who have nothing to say, keep talking. . . . The Soviet Association for scientific progress found that there are no more bald persons in prisons than there are in concentration camps. . . .

a truck of coal to an octogenarian and his wife. They unloaded the coal on the sidewalk and left. The old man and the old woman stood helplessly in front of the heap. They took up a shovel; it shook in their hands. They stood there until night. Thereupon, I asked the Communist writers how old people should be treated. The Communist writers thought even then that the government had doomed old people to annihilation, and they therefore dodged the question. Since they already resembled Pavlov's dogs, with the new reflexes in which the government trained them, they did not command the old human reflex which says with assurance: take up a shovel and help the old people.

Even if a man happens to be a prison guard, I still think he has some opportunity for compassionate action. Sometimes, when the prisoners work in the fields, the good deed will consist in the guard's not taking up his binoculars to spy on them. Since we dare not counsel any deeds to you, we do not even dare to suggest in what your good deeds should consist. You know best the conditions in which you live: all we do is pose the basic question of whether or not the opportunity for a good deed should be used.

To be capable of a good deed, one paramount condition must be met: man must know what is good and what is evil. Though the government now teaches that the soul is nothing more than a superficial collection of impressions evoked by material surroundings, I believe that man is endowed with an inner voice, which it is sufficient to heed. Pause and think, pause and indulge in sentiment—that is the most reliable road to a good deed. The inner voice, best heard in silence and solitude, has preserved every ancient commandment of human nature. And so we say from here: listen in to yourselves. If you succeed in that, it is impossible for the number of good deeds not to grow.

This Is the Voice of Free Bulgaria . . .

The Political Psychology of America

"It is easy to determine the attitude of any given government toward Communism. It is more difficult to know what the citizens, particularly those who have had no direct experience of Communism, feel about it. The question in my mind is: What is the attitude of the American masses toward Communism and toward the plight of subjugated nations like our own?"

This is an excerpt from the letter of a listener of ours in Plovdiv [Bulgaria]. The question is one which is both very difficult and very easy to answer. There isn't the slightest doubt in anybody's mind about the strong mistrust, resentment and rejection of Communism in the United States. But this does not tell us exactly *how* and *why* the American people abhor Communism. For this reason, before we answer our listener's question, we should first say a few words about the traditional political atmosphere in the United States. This will help us to answer the question, and it will also help us to better understand why the people of the United States think, feel and behave as they do.

We will start by pointing out facts which are already well known. For example, popular resistance to strong centralized authority and mistrust of Big Government constitute one of the main trends in the history of the American nation. The United States is a federal republic, composed of 48 states, for precisely this reason. Every man and woman really has the conviction that, from local authorities up to the Federal Government, all officials are in no way different from anyone else. The American people do not understand the awe with which people in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the Orient, regard the man in authority. The older among our listeners will remember how they used to feel toward men in high position: it is a ridiculous but undeniable fact that power created an aura around the men who wielded it. Not so in the United States.

From the President, who is often referred to by his first name—two years ago it was "Harry," now it is "Ike"—through Senators and Congressmen down to the mayor of the smallest community, no American would for a moment feel that there is any real difference between himself and the man in power. Political hero-worship has always been one of the adjuncts of totalitarianism. The political history of the whole world, except for the United States, is shot through and through with the greatest variety of romantic illusions and delusions. The imposition of militarism or political despotism has very often, indeed always, gone with

some kind of perverted romanticism. The example of Hitler is fresh in our mind. So is Mussolini, Czar Nicholas, and Stalin. The United States mistrusts militarism and any kind of political fanaticism.

Along with the refusal of the American people to differentiate politically between the first and last of the citizens, there goes a complete absence of class consciousness. Social classes have existed in Europe for centuries. The existence of social classes always carries feelings of inferiority on one side and on the other feelings of superiority. Americans do not know this kind of class stratification. They respect a man who has risen through energy and ability, but they know that with the same energy and ability they could achieve the same prestige. Here again, we have in America a lack of social romanticism.

The absence of class consciousness in the United States goes with a lack of fanaticism and romanticism about national differences. There are cases in which likes or dislikes for a particular people are violently expressed; but this country, which has absorbed people from all parts of the world, cannot conceive of the nationalistic romanticism and mysticism which went into the making of Hitlerism and which has poisoned so much of European history. The Communists are now trying to exploit this kind of nationalistic romanticism for securing the allegiance of people who still think along these old lines.

We are well aware of the fact that, for many of our listeners who have never been abroad, it will be difficult to realize exactly how Americans think and feel. But it is obvious that every characteristic we have mentioned is in direct conflict with the things Communism is trying to impose. In rejecting Communism, the American people do not care much about the theory behind it. What they reject, and would reject no matter what name it bore, is political fanaticism, intolerance, monopoly, dogmatism and militarism. The American people react to Communism just as they reacted to Hitlerism, without regard for the "subtle" differences which the apologists of either may point to.

This Is the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia . . .

Death of a Writer

We had waited for a long time; darkness was beyond the windows—and at last, at 6.30 in the evening, they came to tell us that the end had come. Fifteen years ago, on December 25, Karel Capek died. They asked me to go upstairs. I stood for a long time, gazing at the rigid body with its mouth half open. The nurse came in, straightened the body, and swiftly, expertly, bound up the chin. This was the end of a splendid life, the end of a spiritual force, the end of a friendship. I thought it best to leave. We drove through the city, festively illuminated for Yuletide, but life around us was festering. Two months before, Hitler had occupied large parts of our country, and what remained we knew to be a chicken around which the fox was prowling. A new and uglier life was in ascendance, in which violence would be decisive.

I should say that Karel Capek died as much of spiritual

Spot

From Prague: The Ministry of Social Welfare had an opening for a scrubwoman. The wage was to be three crowns. 250 applicants arrived. Each was recommended by a State prize winner or laureate. The one who was hired promised to work on Sundays also, and to return the three crowns at the end of each month. . . . From Brno: The bricklayers' brigade built a three-story house. However, the second floor was omitted. . . . At Barandov they are making a movie about the Korean war, with Russians playing the parts of North Koreans and Chinese. Entered Zapotocky, and the cashier asked him: what part do you play in the picture? "I don't play any part any more," was his sad answer. . . .

Spot

Report from Moscow says that in 1918 the Soviet Union founded Czechoslovakia, then it founded the Egyptian pyramids and later the U Fleku Inn in Prague. . . . Lacina said in Prague: We are leading our children to a happy future. We teach them to report to their teachers about their parents, their janitors, their relatives; then they are taught to conjugate: I am a spy, you are a spy, he is a spy. . . . In a Hungarian tractor repair shop, the inspector found many part of tractors and other machinery untouched, and several workers playing cards. When he tried to frighten them and pulled the alarm signal, a man came from a nearby canteen bringing several bottles of beer. . . .

causes as of physical. I remember the day he caught his cold; there was a flood, and we had had to wade ankle-deep in water. Even so, a broken heart caused his death just as much. We had our treaty with France, but when the Munich crisis came, the treaty was not honored. Karel Capek sat among us, repeating in a monotone, "How is it possible that treaties are not abided by? That is the end of civilization. . . ." Beads of perspiration were on his forehead then. Throughout all his mature life he had humbly served democracy and humanism. Now—for a time—the things he used to term in his books Robots, Newts, the White Plague, marched on victoriously. It was a dismal night on which he died, and many other dismal nights were yet to come. Dear friends, we still have not reached the end of that road.

Nowadays we cannot be sure what our young people, who for years have been under either Nazi or Communist schooling, know or do not know. At times it is therefore better to start at the beginning. Karel Capek was the writer who, more than any other, made our name famous in the world. In his library he had a small section with translations of his books into Asiatic languages, printed in intricate, incomprehensible Oriental alphabets. Capek invented the word "robot," now a household word the world over. . . .

After Hitler occupied Prague, two men in black uniforms came to arrest Capek. It took a long time to convince them that Capek was dead.

In May 1945, the war ended; the Communists, under the protection of the Red Army, seized most of the power, and now they, in their turn, hastened to announce what they liked and what they disliked. Only two weeks after the end of the war, the then and present Minister Vaclav Kopecky called an urgent meeting at which he announced that the era of Karel Capek in literature was over forever. After 1948, when the Communists were able to do as they pleased, Capek's books began to disappear from the libraries. Every Communist literary green-horn initiated his career by a savage attack upon Karel Capek, to please

the government, which liked that kind of thing. There the matter would have rested were it not for two events. In faraway Moscow a critic, named Nikolsky, stirred, and for some reason or other wrote a study of Capek, declaring him a good writer. Prague's Communists were electrified. Overnight, the frozen scowl of Mr. Kopecky, the Minister, thawed to a smile, and some of Capek's books began to move back to the libraries. The Russian Communists had dedicated Karel Capek to the Czech Communists, to be exhumed.

There was another, a more complex event—the growing sense of impotence in the artistic field. Although the Communists excel in self-deception, they could not deceive themselves in one matter: that by their system of orders and prohibitions, of terror used against free inspiration, of subordination of the writer to the political secretary—they have destroyed Czech literature. They publish books and produce plays, but they have never yet elicited any human reaction other than a yawn. They began to view with embarrassment the desolation they had wrought. But every time a Communist thinks for five minutes, he always arrives at the conclusion that force must be used. The living are locked into concentration camps, there to work for the government. Why shouldn't dead writers, locked in their graves, work for the government as well? Tyl, Neruda, Jirasek, Karel Capek, men who have been dead for a hundred, for fifty or fifteen years, are to serve as proof that literature flourishes under Communism. In consequence, some of Capek's books are again published—especially those about dogs, cats and gardening, not the ones dealing with human problems. It is a stolen literature. To succeed in this, it is naturally essential that nobody be familiar with the life stories of these deceased writers. In Russia they have already announced that it is useless for the reader to know the life stories of the classic authors, so none will be published. It would be truly difficult for the Communist government to publish Jirasek's or Capek's biography and at the same time invoke their authority. Since it will not disclose Capek's life story to you, I will do so, briefly.

From his youth, Capek was afflicted by oppressive visions of the world succumbing to crude, dehumanized forces, to the onslaught of brutes who have usurped weapons and machines, to an offensive by trends opposed to any humanistic tradition. These visions formed the theme of sev-

Spot

In Plzen, one comrade said to the other: "Thank God that we are well off after all!" . . . "What do you mean?" replied the other. "We have nothing and we can't buy anything." "You can't, because you are looking in your wallet. Look at the newspapers instead, and you will see how well off we are." . . . Radio Prague reports a snowfall on the Boubin mountain. It also commented that the snowfall was caused by the treacherous emigration. . .

eral of his books and plays: *R.U.R.*, *The Life of Insects*, *The Newts*, *The White Plague*, *The Mother*. The obsession was irrepressible, recurrent. Capek's sensitivity was that of a poet and he used to lie awake at night, perspiring out of sheer terror. We hoped he was wrong, that he was a victim of his nerves. Unfortunately, he was not wrong. He tried to warn, he wrote book upon book—but what is the power of one warning voice? To him, the Communists and the Fascists were the representatives of this new, evil, dehumanized course—the Communists first, since they came first. The robots are newts, the newts are robots. Communism and Fascism have their Supreme Newt, and when in the drama *The White Plague* the Marshal raves—does it matter which marshal, which generalissimo? The Communists hated Capek all his life and organized one attack after another on him. In 1925 he wrote his political creed,

under the title: "Why I Am No Communist." Just try to obtain it from the secret recesses of the libraries. His most widely-read book was *Conversations with T. G. Masaryk*. Where is it—which of you has seen it lately? . . .

We [in exile] look anxiously toward the homeland and seek evidence that the ideals and emotions which moved us still live on in elderly people, and again are generated in the souls of the younger people. In Capek's drama *R.U.R.*, the last people who flee before the attack of the robots to the last room, anxiously watch the electric light bulb. It is the proof that the power plant has survived the attack. They sigh with relief: it still glows. So we too, looking toward home, sigh hopefully: *it still glows*. If this lasts, if this light continues to shine from the homeland, we shall restore everything.

"Isms" Fathered by Communism

Self-criticism within the Communist Party following the June riots in Czechoslovakia and East Germany has enriched the vocabulary of ideological abuse with a number of new "thought crimes." Studies of the Communist press since June have disclosed eleven new heresies against the Party line, plus new applications for the old-time errors of Bourgeois Deviationism, Opportunism, Social Democracy, Bureaucratism, etc.

The new heresies include the following:

Capitulationism	Dogmatism
Flagellantism	Tadmudism
Sectism	Dilettantism
Fractionalism	Jubilantism

Bourgeois Deviationist is the epithet most commonly applied to Communist Party members who adopted a "wait and see" attitude toward the events of June and the development of the New Course. Included in this group are members who "lost confidence in the Party" and stopped wearing their membership buttons, and persons who refrained from actively resisting the rioters or even assisted them. In a more special sense, it applies to members who doubted that the government leaders would survive the manifestations of national disapproval and therefore hesitated to support them.

Guilty of the related sin of *Capitulationism* were those Party members who succumbed to the view, expressed most dramatically in the riots themselves, that the regime had made a mess of things and should clear out. But those who were too abject in public lamentations over failings of regime and Party have been branded *Flagellants*.

Sectism and *Fractionalism* sound similar but mean different things. The *Sectists* submerged themselves in Party administrative work and "failed to keep attuned to the masses," or, in other words, were unaware of the rise of popular antagonism. The *Fractionalists*, on the other hand,

formed opposition groups within the highest Party organs with the aim of preventing the leaders from dragging the Party further into damaging policies.

Dogmatism and *Tadmudism* are closely related. Both are applied to persons who "place too literal interpretation" on the teachings of Marx and Lenin and are thus unable to make a speedy adjustment to the changes in Party tactics. In this context they are used against persons who oppose the New Course because they believed what they were told at last year's Party conferences, or who are unable to reconcile demands for intensified class struggle against private property with the new concessions to private business and independent farmers.

Dilettantism describes persons not clearly guilty of one of the other deviations but whose reactions during or after the June riots raised doubts as to their willingness to follow the Party through thick and thin. Persons who, in the period before the New Course, extravagantly praised the successes of the now discredited program of heavy industrialization—that is, were unable to see that these successes were really failures—are guilty of *Jubilantism*. A large number of agitators and propagandists, including Party press and radio officials, are charged with this "crime."

The never-ending discovery of new "thought crimes" of which Communist Party members may be guilty is obviously intended to discourage any attempt at independent thought by Party members. At the same time, however, it greatly hinders the individual members in their efforts to do their assigned tasks. A person who must constantly ask himself if his mistakes may turn out to be crimes is obviously reluctant to take on new responsibilities. The tendency to sidestep responsibility, to "pass the buck," is probably the major actual weakness of Communist Party workers in the Soviet-dominated countries at this stage.

Current Developments

Communist Party elections coming up in Hungary, a National Committee referendum in Czechoslovakia, new Party rules in Bulgaria and cadre recruiting policies in Romania all indicate Satellite regime concern with eliminating Party bureaucrats who lacked the will or flexibility to work within the New Course provisions. Further attempts have also been made to rouse the captive peoples from their defensive apathy, blunt their resistance and, if possible, enlist at least their passive cooperation. New material "incentives" include salary increases for textile workers in Romania, improvement of wages and working conditions on sovkhoses in Poland, and concessions to independent craftsmen in Bulgaria. On close inspection, these "concessions" as well as the "free elections" and "substantial increases in living standards" turn out to be minor if at all real. However, unless their scope is broadened enormously, and their implementation immensely improved, the New Course remains too little, too late.

Hungary

On October 31, 1953, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party decided that the Third Party Congress would be held on April 18, 1954. As disclosed by *Szabad Nep* (Budapest) of January 10, the agenda of the Congress will include: 1. a report from the Central Committee from its First Secretary, Matyas Rakosi, dealing with the tasks of the Hungarian Workers' Party; 2. a discussion by Prime Minister Imre Nagy on the tasks of the State administration and of the councils; 3. a report on the work of the Control Committee to be delivered by its chairman, Karoly Kiss; 4. a speech by Lajos Acs, member of the Party Secretariat, on amendments to laws governing the organization of the Party.

Elections of leaders of basic (lower) organizations, of committee members and Congress delegates, will take place between February 1 and April 17. The last elections of the Party leadership were held after the Second Party Congress of February 1951. It is significant that in the present in-

stance the elections are to precede—rather than follow—the meeting of the Congress; outwardly at least, the procedure is somewhat more democratic.

In the intervening three years since elections were last held, a mass replacement of Party leaders has taken place through liquidations, arrests and arbitrary removals. In several Party organizations there has been a 100 per cent turnover in top personnel; in some units, vacant posts have remained unfilled. Since, in many cases, wholesale removal of leaders was decreed from higher quarters without consulting the membership, these elections were urgently needed to restore some measure of order in the ranks.

A novel aspect of these proceedings is the promise that the elections will be secret. According to *Szabad Nep* of January 14, the procedure will entail the secret election of all candidates by each Party unit in the following manner:

"... The list of persons recommended ... will be drawn up by the Nominating Committees in the course of the membership meeting. ... Independently of the recommendation of the Nominating Committee, every member and candidate member has the right to recommend candidates. ... When the debate over a candidate is closed, the members present will decide, by majority vote, whether or not the name of the candidate is to be included in the list. ... The procedure is as follows: each Party member entitled to vote leaves on the list the names of the candidates chosen by him ... and strikes out the rest of the names, [then adding as many personal choices as were deleted] ... persons who receive the largest number of votes will be considered elected. The membership will elect the leaders of Party organizations, but will not decide on the function to be performed by each elected person."

The catch to this seemingly democratic process lies in the manner of electing the crucial temporary committees (charged with supervising the elections) and the Nominating Committees of each Party unit. These bodies will be chosen by "open vote"—that is, under the full supervision of Party stalwarts who, by controlling the committees conducting the elections, will be able to influence (and probably influence decisively) the election results.

Furthermore, the Party has erected a second line of defence. If, in the first place, members should elect a certain number of people who were not inscribed on the lists by the "safe" Nominating Committees, the function of these "popular" candidates will not be determined by the voters. That is, the Party can then assign them to lesser jobs, thus keeping intact the monolithic control of basic organizations.

The fundamental fact is that members of the Party leadership will be nominated by higher agencies. An article in the January 18 *Szabad Nep* gives the following example: "The secretary of basic organization No. 4, at the Matyas Rakosi Machine Tool Factory said that the Party Committee had informed him as to the names of persons who were to become members of the leadership. Thus all that remained for him to do was to conduct the membership meeting."

The party hierarchy has gone even further: it has given precise descriptions of the types of "comrades" who may or may not be elected. The eligible prototype is defined as follows in *Szabad Nep* of January 15, 1954:

"Party Committees must make members understand that . . . it is up to them to elect good Communists as leaders of basic organizations, leaders who know and understand Party policy and have given evidence of their ability to fight enthusiastically for the implementation of that policy. . . . Comrades who respect members' rights and promote Party democracy. . . . Comrades who endeavor to carry out Party policy by supporting members and non-members who have distinguished themselves in implementing the Central Committee June and October [1953] resolutions [on the New Course]. . . . In the rural areas, especially those Comrades who have waged an unyielding and active struggle for the protection and consolidation of kolkhozes. . . . The village Party organizations will be able to grow strong and to increase their influence over the middle peasantry only if they also elect independently working peasant members into the new leadership. . . . It is important that several Comrades who participate directly in production be elected."

Three days later, on January 18, *Szabad Nep* added other categories of eligible leaders. After advising the Party rank and file to "put aside old, harmful distrust," the paper recommended the election of members of the intelligentsia—engineers, agronomists, and, in particular, teachers. On the whole, the trend seems to be toward a liberalization in the selection of candidates. The emphasis appears to be on choosing the type of Party member who will be able to interpret the new policies intelligently: who will understand that some concessions are to be made, but that these are of a temporary nature and should not violate the long-run aims of the Party. Hence the reference to "new blood" is coupled with a reminder that the kolkhozes are here to stay. The January 15 *Szabad Nep* article states that "members must prevent persons with a dubious past or unsteady or careerist elements from being elected to the leadership." Then the paper pointedly reminds its readers: "It must be stressed that tactful and sympathetic treatment of members does not signify indulgence; vigilance on the part of members is not to be slackened in the slightest."

Thus, despite the show of "secret" elections, in reality only those persons who happen to conform to the requirements of the moment will be elected. It is interesting to note, however, that in advertising the "democratic" side of the procedure, the Communist press has to admit that, in the past, elections were not free. "We must particularly emphasize," states *Szabad Nep* on January 15, "the fact that our Party's basic organizations will elect their leaders by secret ballot for the first time since the liberation."

The timing of the voting is also significant, in that it reveals a lack of flexibility among Party leaders. Elections now have to be held to eliminate the great number of Party functionaries who hesitated to switch their line in conformity with decrees from above. For years these people preached the virtues of rapid industrialization in disregard of the human price involved. The New Course must have caught them by surprise; many of them obviously preferred to wait and see, refusing to commit themselves to a "softer" line for which they could be blamed in the future. The elections are therefore intended to put an end to this paralyzing hesitation.

Stalinists Toe the New Course Line

With the introduction of the New Course in June 1953, many orthodox Stalinists suddenly found themselves out of step. Those who were unable or unwilling to change pace overnight were quickly dropped from leading policy-making posts. Erno Gero, for example, until then second highest dignitary in the Communist hierarchy and formerly the country's economic boss, was transferred to head a weakened Ministry of Internal Affairs which, at that time, was deprived of its jurisdiction over the Councils (Soviets). With the creation, on January 21, 1954, of a City and Town Economic Ministry for the management of these councils, Gero became Minister of Public Safety. Thus, the one-time Moscow favorite and expert in forced industrialization was deprived of his functions as economic planner, and since the inauguration of the New Course program, his name has seldom been mentioned by the Communist press. This silence was broken on January 22, when *Szabad Nep* (Budapest) carried the text of a Gero speech delivered on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of Lenin's death. The speech is significant in that it marks the end of Gero's disassociation from the new policies.

Admitting that in the past the regime had "made mistakes," Gero attributed these errors to a failure to "comprehend adequately the Leninist spirit." This "spirit," according to Gero, should have taught Communists that Marxism "is not a dogma, but a guidance for action." In that context, the stress on Lenin seems to imply a repudiation of Stalinist policies. The about-face is even clearer in the following remarks:

" . . . we acted against Marxist-Leninist teachings when, placing too much stress on the policy of Socialist industrialization, we treated the problem of Socialist building separately from the problem of constantly raising the workers' standard of living. We also violated Leninist principles by neglecting the proportionate development of agriculture, thereby breaking the law of

proportionate development of the people's economy. At the same time we overlooked Lenin's teaching that Socialist building in agriculture is bound to be much slower than in industry."

For this recantation and self-criticism, Gero could refer to the example set by Jozsef Revai who, in an article in the October-November issue of *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), had similarly found it necessary to show both the necessity of the new economic policy and his adherence to it. Revai was one of the key men of the pre-New Course era; he was, in fact, the third most influential figure in the Party, topped only by Rakosi and Gero. After the announcement of the new line in June 1953, he was left out of the Politbureau, as well as of the government. Kicked upstairs, he became Deputy Chairman of the Presidium; then he, like Gero, was relegated to comparative obscurity by all propaganda organs.

For months Revai stuck to his ideological position, unwilling to deviate from the straight Stalinist line. The change came some time in the fall, when Revai was made editor-in-chief of *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Social Review), the Party's most important ideological periodical. Though referring in his article to the erroneous views of others, it is obvious that the Communist theoretician is primarily listing his own sins:

"... Conservatism, a clinging to accustomed ways, stiff bureaucracy, official convenience and fear of the new... were causes of procrastination. There are Comrades who have accepted as normal the fast rhythm of industrialization and the stepped-up tempo of the last few years, and consider a slowed-down and more secure way of production 'abnormal'..."

"After the forced advance of the first four years of our Five Year Plan and the high speed of industrialization, we must pause to take stock of the situation, correct mistakes and consolidate the Socialist positions already achieved in industry and agriculture..."

In justifying the new policies, Revai points out that the tempo of Hungarian industrialization had been faster than the Soviet Union's. In the latter country, according to the writer, only 49.1 percent of total investment was devoted to industry during the first Five Year Plan, while in Hungary this investment amounted to 51.7 percent. Further, in the Soviet Union only 85.7 percent of total industrial investments was used for heavy industry, while in Hungary the corresponding percentage was 92.1. Revai laments the fact that for many years the regime had "neglected quality," and that, in recent years, "agricultural production hardly achieved the prewar rate and... the output of consumer goods remained at an unsatisfactory level." He then reveals that in the years 1950-52, depreciation of industrial equipment amounted to 6.1 percent, while only 3.2 percent was allocated for replacements. He admits that in 1952, only 1.9 billion *forints* had been used to balance an industrial depreciation amounting to 3.5 billion *forints*.

Having thus expounded on the folly of past policies, Revai makes it clear that he considers the present situation

a mere tactical retreat. A breather has been decreed—for a limited period only. "... Our aim remains laying the foundations for the building of Socialism. The economic policy of the new phase... undoubtedly requires changing some of our plans, slowing-down industrialization, postponing deadlines. However, we shall do all this not because we intend to deviate in the slightest degree from the path of Socialist building, but only because the pace and the deadlines proved to be unreal..."

Orthodox Stalinists such as Gero and Revai, therefore, are prepared to follow the example of their more flexible Comrades in helping to implement the new policies—as long as it is understood that the present comparative leniency is to be temporary.

Treatment of Cadre Members

An article written by Karoly Kiss, Chairman of the Control Committee of the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party, which appeared in the December 25, 1953, issue of the Budapest daily *Szabad Nep*, sheds light on past and present conditions within the Party. Entitled "The Cadres—Living Men," the article is an outspoken indictment of the wholesale guilt by association, social status and past conduct—all of which have so far been an integral part of the regime-fostered class struggle. As a result of this arbitrary discrimination, the Party is now filled with bureaucratic automatons incapable of carrying out the more flexible New Course policies. These Party hacks apparently are also incapable of grasping the import of the new directives. Hence the following admonishment by the exasperated Kiss:

"The cold and inhuman 'search for ancestors,' the often unjustified digging up of the past, which was the practice of many Party organizations prior to the June resolution of the Central Committee, still frequently occurs. People often get into trouble for things they cannot help... In many cases, basically honest persons who have been deprived of their Party functions... for minor or major mistakes, find it hard to obtain employment, since no one dares to hire them. Such comrades are often out of a job or deprived of earnings for months on end.

"... The practice of investigating the occupation of distant relatives is truly an abuse of vigilance. Young people are called to task because they failed to report that some distant relatives or in-laws had emigrated to escape unemployment—often 40 to 50 years ago..."

"Frequently someone's past or family background is investigated to furnish an excuse for prosecution stemming from personal revenge. Persons who have written letters of criticism to higher authorities or to newspapers are still sometimes persecuted..."

"... It is evident, however, that what is happening amounts to intimidation under the cloak of vigilance. Our Party organizations must take firm action against such practices... The excessive investigation of the lives and attitudes of grandfathers, uncles, brothers-in-law, distant relatives and acquaintances (a practice that has been adopted in many Party organizations, ministries and concerns) proves that the method of work is incorrect..."

This confession of errors is startling in its frankness. The methods so meticulously described in the article are of course well-known. Until now, however, the regime has tried to carefully camouflage these practices under the euphemism of "maintaining vigilance." It is doubtful whether the temporary relaxation in class vindictiveness will attract many new members to the Party of the type now needed.

Changes in Socialist Competition

Szabad Nep (Budapest) of January 17, 1954, carried the text of a resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the National Council of Trade Unions on changes to be introduced in the organization of "Socialist competition." The measure, effective immediately, includes the provision that henceforth qualifications for the title of "Stakhanovite" will be determined locally—at the factory or workshop level. Norms will no longer be set uniformly by the various ministries in disregard of actual conditions in individual plants: "The terms and conditions regulating the award of the Stakhanovite title must be fixed separately for every workshop. In fixing the requirements for norm fulfillment, the specific circumstances of the workshop concerned must be taken into account every month."

Another important provision of the resolution stipulates that norms will be reduced to a level only slightly higher than the average production standard of each plant. It is hoped, as a result, that "a larger number of workers will receive these titles in the future." The decision also stipulates that those Stakhanovites who have continually fulfilled higher norms for a whole year must be awarded the title of "Outstanding Worker of the Trade." On the other hand, workers who fail to fulfill these conditions for one or two months will be allowed to wear previously-earned decorations, but not entitled to use the designation of Stakhanovite.

Commenting on the new measure, *Szabad Nep* forecasts that, through the "liquidation of all bureaucratic excesses and formality," workers will henceforth be able to express their initiative in a "free way." As of now, according to the paper, "Development of competition is uneven; planning does not keep pace with the enthusiasm and zeal of the workers. . . . New methods must be developed, and basic principles must be changed." Budapest's *Nepszava* of the same day is much franker; far from speaking of "zeal," the paper admits that "Labor competitions for winning the titles of Stakhanovite and Outstanding Worker are declining."

On paper, the remedy now introduced seems to favor the workers. Norms will be set more realistically in that they will be based on specific circumstances; moreover, standards will be lower and therefore easier to reach. In practice, however, basic changes are not expected to take place. "Socialist competition" remains a device to spur the worker on to greater efforts of productivity, a device that benefits the few at the expense of the many. That greater output is at the bottom of the new regulations is freely

admitted in the *Szabad Nep* editorial. "A new phase has started in the building of Socialism, which means the setting of immense tasks for the workers of Hungary," the paper states. And it adds: "Certain branches of industry have to increase their output, the more so as the general speed of industrial production has been slackening." It is possible that, in the long run, norms determined locally every month will prove to be more coercive than those previously set by the ministries.

Economic Situation Reviewed

Speaking at a meeting of the National Assembly on January 23, 1954, Prime Minister Imre Nagy gave a review of the country's economic situation for the six months following the announcement of the New Course program. The Minister attempted to show that significant changes had taken place in industrial production to the benefit of light and food industries, that the agricultural workers' financial situation had been considerably improved and that, in general there had been a substantial rise in the population's standard of living. To support these statements, Nagy gave out the following figures:

"In 1953, Socialist industry fulfilled its yearly Plan [the targets having been reduced in the summer] by 101.3 percent, thus exceeding the 1952 output by 11.8 percent. . . . While in the second half of 1953 heavy industry investments exceeded those of the first half of the year by 35.5 percent, investments in light industry increased by 169.9 percent and those in the food industry by 203.5 percent. . . . As far as manufactured goods are concerned, in the second half of 1953 we produced 40.2 percent more flannel, 16.3 percent more men's shirts, 17.9 percent more heavy boots than in the first half of the year; in foodstuffs the increase was 10.1 percent for raw meat, 22.4 percent for lard and bacon, 28.5 percent for butter and 75.2 percent for candy. . . . In the second half of 1953, the turnover in Socialist retail trade was 27 percent larger than in the first half of the year. . . . In November 1953, market prices on the average were 13.3 percent below the 1952 level; this fact had a favorable effect on the population's food supply."

These figures may be more or less exact. They do not, however, present a fair or complete picture of the situation. Instead of comparing the second half of 1953 with the corresponding part of the previous year, Nagy carefully restricted his comparison to 1953, neglecting to mention that the country experienced very trying times in the first six months of that year. Food supplies were exceedingly scarce at that time and powdered eggs had to be imported from China while lard was provided by Denmark. Since the 1953 crop was comparatively good in Hungary, vegetables and flour were obtainable at lower prices. However, meat, lard, bacon and eggs—the substantial foodstuffs—maintained their exorbitant prices and were beyond the means of the majority of the people throughout the year. Indications are that the surplus food produced was exported, particularly to strife-torn East Germany. Genuine leather boots with leather soles are so

highly priced that only a few privileged Communists can afford them; the bulk of them go to the various armies of the "People's Democracies." Thus, a pair of ready-made, average-quality men's shoes cost 400-700 *forints* and if made to order from good leather and sold on the black market, cost as much as 1,200 *forints*. The average industrial worker earns about 750-800 *forints* a month.

The situation is similar with respect to textiles. While the output has been good, the greater part of these goods was sent abroad. The majority of the people can only afford the most essential pieces of clothing, and then only at the expense of their food supply. In July and September 1953, prices were cut and as a result sales did improve; the situation, however, is still far from normal. Nagy shrewdly quoted November prices and restricted himself to a description of the market at that time. In so doing, he chose the time when the effects of a good harvest are most evident—in certain respects. He failed to mention that with the coming winter the population would suffer from lack of heating and lighting.

The economic plan for 1954 was presented to the National assembly by Bela Szalai, Chairman of the National Planning Bureau, at its January 22 session. According to Szalai, "of the total national revenue, the consumption rate will be raised from 75 to 82 percent. . . . The part used for the building up of reserves will be cut from 25 to 18 percent." As a result of the slow-down in industrialization, "the production rate of Socialist industry in 1954 will increase by 4.5 percent above the 1953 rate." Szalai pointed out that while the output of heavy industry would be two percent *below* the 1953 figure, the production of consumer goods would exceed the 1953 level by 16 percent. In home handicraft industry a 21 percent increase is foreseen. As for agriculture, on the basis of average production over the last five years, the anticipated increase ought to amount to eight percent, based on a percentage investment about twice as large as last year's.

According to the Planning Bureau head, 24 percent of a total investment of 14 billion *forints* will be devoted to agriculture. This figure—amounting to 3.3-3.6 billion *forints*—includes, of course, funds for the production of agricultural machinery and fertilizers. The 14 billion *forints* allotted for investment this year represent a cut of about 3 billion *forints* as compared to the 1953 program; the amount is supposed to include an increase in "health and labor-protection investments," but no detailed figures for these categories were given, probably because the increase will be far from spectacular. A similar haziness shrouds data on a promised stress on investments in the "educational, scientific and cultural fields."

That long-range goals have not been abandoned is clearly indicated in the renewed emphasis placed on the development of "basic" materials. Szalai promised that in the current year coal production would increase 6.4 percent, power 10.7 percent and rolled steel 5.9 percent. At the same time, the machine industry's production will be cut slightly: "The machine factories will produce a large quantity of consumer goods and agricultural equipment." The consumer ought to benefit as follows:

"Production of wool fabrics will increase by 27 percent, shoes by 27 percent, knitted goods by 16 percent. The total production of the food industry will increase by nine percent. In 1954 we shall start the systematic production of certain household machines; we shall undertake the experimental production of vacuum cleaners and nylon fabrics, etc. . . . We must see to it that heavy industry should also produce consumer goods.

. . . The production of 4,000 tractors, 5,500 tractor plows, 1,000 threshing machines and the various other machines called for under the plan will greatly test the capacity of our industry. . . . We must bring order into the production of agricultural machine parts. . . . In 1954, production will start in the Stalin Iron Works, the largest investment of the regime. . . ."

All in all, the 1954 prospects are for a moderate increase in consumer goods and an equally moderate decrease in stress on heavy industrialization. It should be noted that in reviewing the first phase of the New Course, Szalai admitted that, although industry produced more consumer goods than the reduced plan called for, "the manufacturing industry fell short of the 1953 plan in some agricultural items and consumer goods." In Imre Nagy's speech there is also a reference to the fact that the 100 million *forints* earmarked for social services in the second half of the year went unused, "out of negligence and carelessness." Similarly, Nagy admitted that, though another 100 million *forints* were appropriated for the restoration of apartment and tenement houses, the program had not been carried out in its entirety by the end of the year. The fact, therefore, that the government has earmarked twice as much for housing in 1954 than in the previous year, may mean that a great deal of the effort will be spent in making up for past shortcomings. In this respect, as in others, the country seems to be in an economic era of transition marked more by confusion than by achievement.

To rally as many people as possible to the new program, some economic concessions were promised. To the industrial workers Nagy pledged raises totalling 617 million *forints* (a minor concession, considering that the 1953 budget amounted to 52 billion *forints*); he also promised 316 million *forints* for workmen's compensation and 328 million for social investments. To the general consumer, the Prime Minister offered a ten percent cut in the price of meat and fats, effective in March. Nagy also had kind words for the middle peasants and artisans, the latter being promised more licenses and other facilities to ply their trade. With favorable weather to meet the agricultural goals and a decrease in the export of consumer goods, the figures for the current year may spell a slight rise in the standard of living of the population.

Romania

Three noteworthy political meetings have lately taken place in Romania. They are: 1. a session of the Grand National Assembly, December 28-30; 2. a plenary session of the Central Council of Trade Unions which opened on

January 13 and closed the following day; and 3. meetings of the newly-elected regional People's Councils which took place on January 10.

The present session of the Grand National Assembly (Parliament) was its second get-together since "elected" on November 30, 1952, the first meeting having taken place January 23-28, 1953. In the present instance, as in the past, the Grand National Assembly was grand in name only—the business it transacted was petty, a matter of clerical formality. Significantly, on the eve of the opening meeting, as reported by *Scanteia* of December 31, the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' (Communist) Party was convened to stamp its approval on bills the government had decided should be "passed" by (that is, railroaded through) Parliament. Equally pertinent is the fact that the first item on the Grand National Assembly's agenda entailed ratification of decrees issued by the Presidium in the interval between the two sessions. The members rose up to the occasion and dutifully approved all such measures. Thus, the Family Code and the ministerial reorganization (both discussed below), as well as a law on cattle breeding (see page 18) were taken up.

The plenary session of the Trade Unions Central Council concerned itself, according to *Scanteia* of January 14, 1954, with the following topics: an analysis of the way contractual commitments undertaken in 1953 had been fulfilled; instructions for the drafting of similar agreements (entailing worker-management contracts for meeting production quotas and having nothing to do with worker rights) for 1954; tasks assigned to the Unions by the cattle breeding bill and problems on Trade Union elections—regional and local—in plants and institutions, which have to be carried out between January 15 and March 15.

Political Meetings and New Course

When each of the 18 regional People's Councils plus the People's Council of the city of Bucharest met, the business transacted (according to *Romania Libera* of January 12) dealt, in the main, with agricultural and food supply questions. A lengthy article in *Scanteia* of January 8, 1954, had dwelt on the tasks facing the Councils, prescribed their duties and described in great detail the methods to be used. The main points of the article were as follows:

"To implement the economic [New Course] program adopted by the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party held in August 1953, the activities of the People's Councils have been enlarged to include the supply of food to the population, [the supervision of] an intensification in village-town exchanges, collecting agricultural produce and taxes and the carrying out of plan provisions on stimulating purchases. . . . In the past, many People's Councils have lacked initiative . . . in setting up local supply centers and in extending the area of soil suitable for growing vegetables. . . . The task that lies ahead for the Councils entails the establishment of local supply centers based on the development of local produce. Every town and industrial plant must have its own supply center for potatoes, vegetables, meat, fat, milk, eggs and other products. . . . *They must not expect everything from headquarters.* . . . People's Councils . . . should pay more

attention to cattle breeding . . . the 4,000 collective farms and agricultural associations must feel the Councils' constant support. . . . *They must promote as much as they can the creation of new associations and collective farms,* though they must see to it that the free consent of working peasants be taken into consideration. Increased support should also be given to small and medium individual farmers. . . . They [the Councils] must continue with perseverance the policy of limiting kulaks and defending working peasants against exploitation by them. . . . People's Councils must prevent any act of sabotage committed by certain kulak elements. . . ." (Italics added)

This directive is revealing in that it presents in a nutshell an up-to-date review of the main New Course features. It shows that the regime is not prepared to introduce thoroughgoing reforms. For instance, collectives are here to stay and their further development is encouraged. Further, the kulak remains the *bete noire* he always was, though instead of being eliminated he is, for the moment at least, to be "contained." It is clear, on the other hand, that the government is worried about the rickety organization on lower levels. Hence the recent elections and the attempts to improve the quality in personnel.

The above quote does show that the regime seems anxious to adopt measures (such as raising food production, etc.) which, if carried out, would benefit the consumer. The question is, can these measures bear fruit, even if the right people are found to direct the program? Economically speaking, is the announced minor reduction in the tempo of industrialization sufficient to enable the regime to make good on its pledges? As of now, the answer appears to be no. It is significant, for instance, that local organizations are told to shift for themselves, that the government seems reluctant to allocate extensive funds, manpower etc., to help them out.

It is doubtful whether the small and medium individual farmer will feel secure enough in the "new deal" to exert greater efforts. He has no assurance that if he does well he will not be considered a "kulak" at some future date—(now "contained", later hanged) for the very effort he is at present encouraged to put up.

The Family

Following adoption on December 29, 1953, of a new Family Code by the Great National Assembly, Romanian papers have given considerable space to a discussion of the family's status under the New Order. As expected, this new "status" was defined, not by what it represented in and of itself, but in terms of contrast to the state of affairs prevalent in "decadent" capitalist countries. According to *Scanteia* (Bucharest) of December 30, 1953, in discussing the new legislation, Minister of Justice Tatu-Jianu availed himself of this opportunity to pontificate on the subject in the following terms: ". . . in the capitalist order, the family is dominated by the most brutally materialistic criteria. The bourgeois family is founded on selfish interests of exploitation, on fast-won prosperity and on an idle life." The Communist boss then presented an ecstatic—and largely meaningless—appraisal of supposedly blissful

domestic relations under the New Order: "The family in the democratic people's state is governed by principles which mirror the revolutionary changes which took place in our country; in accordance with these principles, the family must become a basic element in the building of Socialism."

While on the surface the new code appears to conform to the softer New Course policy (in that it pays lip service to the concept of a strengthened family unit), the underlying intent of this legislative revision and its expected application in practice most probably will turn out to be (if not immediately, then in the long run) yet another disguised tightening of state control over the individual. On January 6, 1954 Radio Bucharest commented that "The family code places particular emphasis on the protection of children and establishes the rights and duties of parents toward their children. The father and mother have the same rights and duties toward their children as long as the latter are under age, whether they are born of married or unmarried parents, or are adopted. Parental rights are exerted only in the interests of the children." In fact, however, according to *Scanteia* the code gives 14-year-olds the opportunity (previously available only to 18-year-olds) to "exercise rights and obligations." Though this "emancipation" can be achieved only with the parent's permission, the new regulation stipulates that a supervisory section operating under the Communist-run People's Councils will henceforth be in charge of such "free" adolescents. It is obvious that, in future, parents could be intimidated into severing relations with their children, if the latter—indoctrinated at school or elsewhere—chose to "invoke" the protection of the new boards.

Further, although the new code contains a provision that the minimum age for marriage will be 18 for men and 16 for women, it is significant that, as explained by Radio Bucharest on January 6, the following provision has been added: "In exceptional cases, a woman is allowed to marry at the age of 15 with the approval of the executive committee of the Bucharest People's Council or the Regional People's Council in the area of her residence." Here again, what is relevant is not the age stipulated, but the fact that the long arm of the State is being stretched even further.

The new code lays considerable stress on adoption procedures. According to *Scanteia*, it contains the following provision: "Adoption rights can be granted only in cases where evidence exists that the adopter can provide a normal physical and moral development for the adoptee, and only as long as the adoption is not undertaken for the purpose of exploiting the adoptee. . . ." These regulations, long extant in most civilized countries, suggest that their present enactment by the Communists reflects the progressive lowering of moral standards over the last few years. Equally superfluous is a reference to the fact that, "The fatherly care of the democratic people's state . . . is mirrored in a series of articles which specify that parents are bound to take care of the child, and raise him while keeping in mind his health and physical growth, his education and his professional training . . . to make him a useful

member of the community." Such enjoinders to parents are, at best, much ado about nothing, signifying that the regime now feels obliged to assume a fatherly role in an outwardly benign manner.

But these rules could also spell further interference by the State, particularly since State and family may disagree as to what makes an adolescent a future "useful" member of Communist society. Implicit in this regulation is the threat that the regime will have the last word on the subject. In this connection an ominous pronouncement was made by Assemblyman Ilie Dinescu, who, according to the same *Scanteia* article, warned that parents, in educating their children and in "equipping them with the means to earn a living," must try to "alter the minor's personality."

Another measure directed at the family, this time an "improvement" in the organization of nurseries, was explained in a *Scanteia* editorial of December 17, 1953. Without mentioning an exact date, the paper states that the Cabinet Council had "recently" issued a decision which specified that "Ministers and central organizations" have been ordered to provide for the establishment of new nurseries both in their work programs and in their budgets for 1954-55. "In accordance with the new law, new industrial building projects must include the construction of new nurseries." The Cabinet decree also stipulates that executive committees of the People's Councils will be obliged to establish nurseries in various sections of towns.

The decision includes the provision that nurseries at present located on factory or other industrial grounds will be moved to other sites, presumably to residential areas. If actually carried out, this particular measure would no doubt bring about an improvement in the sanitary conditions of these establishments. On the other hand, in view of the fact that specific instructions were issued with reference to the use of "local resources and internal facilities," funds allocated by the government can be expected to be negligible and the whole program is likely to bog down before long for lack of means to carry it out. These "local facilities" will have to go (as they have in the past) toward increasing production—and not worker welfare. That the running of nurseries has not been smooth in the past is indicated by the advice, given by *Scanteia* to the Department of Internal Commerce, that it should "insure the regular supply of food and industrial products to . . . nurseries." In future, nurseries with a capacity of less than 70 will be managed by health service teams and those exceeding this capacity will be supervised by doctors. It appears that heretofore such supervision was haphazardly organized.

This campaign, aimed at reassuring the family as to its rights and privileges, was further marked by a January 5 Radio Bucharest broadcast extolling the virtues of the labor code, which, according to this source, "assures working mothers of free medical assistance and hospitalization, of full pay maternity leave before and after the birth, and maternity and nursing time allowances." The broadcast claimed that, in 1953, 75 million *lei* had been granted as State aid to mothers of large families. It was also alleged that the number of beds in maternity homes had been doubled since 1948. All these figures sound impressive if

taken at face value. Actually, these statistics hide the fact that a number of privately-run medical schemes and private facilities, available in the past, have been confiscated by the State, which now takes credit for their existence. The commentator's claims as to maternity homes in the countryside ("Whereas no maternity home existed in the countryside before 1944, some 1,300 such institutions operate today"), even if true, conveniently ignore the harsh reality that the best medical services (such as they are) are only available to urban union members, and that the abject misery to which peasants have been reduced deprives them of the opportunity to use such private medical services as still exist.

The broadcaster waxed lyrical over the fact that "the working people's children fully enjoy the beauties of their homeland. Over 118,000 children spent wonderful days this year in the colonies and camps organized in various health resorts. . . ." Considering that the population of Romania exceeds the 16 million mark, that resorts are mainly indoctrination centers, and that most people cannot afford to send their children elsewhere, the "privilege" of these favored few is hardly worth boasting about. But perhaps the most blatant illustration of the shallowness of the present campaign is a claim made in the broadcast that "the respect paid by . . . the people's democratic state to the mother is also exemplified by the title of 'Heroine Mother of the Order of Maternal Glory.'" That 25,000 mothers have been so graced—complete with Maternal Medal—will not alleviate the hard lot of the great majority of Romanian families.

Personnel

All through the fall of 1953, a series of changes took place in the composition of the Romanian government. Ministries were merged and new ones created. Though nothing was said about the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security as such, personnel switches gleaned from indirect references in the press indicated that a reorganization was afoot. On October 15, 1953, for instance, *Scanteia* casually mentioned that General Stefan Pavel, up to then Minister of Internal Affairs, had become one of the Deputy Ministers of Armed Forces; on November 29, the same paper disclosed that Lt. General Alexandru Draghici, formerly Minister of State Security, was heading the Ministry of Internal Affairs; finally, on December 9, the former Deputy Minister of State Security, Major General Ion Vinte, suddenly appeared in *Scanteia* as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. The enigma was solved on December 31, when all papers announced that, at its second session, the Grand National Assembly had adopted a modification of article 50 of the constitution (which refers to the organization of the Council of Ministers). In publishing a list of the Ministries, the papers failed to mention the Ministry of State Security; in other words, it had been eliminated.

This reshuffle of ministries closely follows the Soviet post-Beria pattern. As in the U.S.S.R., the dreaded secret police no longer enjoy a semi-autonomous status. This move may reflect the regime's uneasiness with respect to

the control of forces that threatened to become too powerful and too independent. As a corollary, it can be assumed that this clipping of political wings was mainly directed at Beria's followers whose loyalty, following the abrupt demise of their Soviet benefactor, had become suspect.

The present composition of the Ministry of Internal Affairs—as far as can be judged from intermittent press allusions to individual Communist functionaries—is as follows: Minister of Internal Affairs: Lt. General Alexandru Draghici; Deputy Ministers: Major General Ion Vinte, Major General Ladislau Ady, Lt. General Gheorghe Pintilie, Major General Mihail Burca, Alexandru Muresan, Stelian Tanasescu and Alexandru Ion. The Ministry is made up of the following departments (information as to who is the head of what has not been given): State Security, People's militia, Political Direction, Troops, Administration, Prisons and (Labor) Camps, and Command of Rear Areas.

Other changes have taken place lately in the higher echelons of the government, but, here again, no official announcements appeared in the press. Thus, it became clear for the first time on January 9, 1954, that a Deputy Minister had been assigned to the newly-created Ministry of Culture when, on that day, *Scanteia* disclosed that a Romanian "cultural" delegation under the chairmanship of one Nicolae Bellu had left Bucharest for Warsaw. Bellu, the new Deputy, is a member of the Grand National Assembly from the Bucharest region. He was "elected" on December 3, 1952, and had been Chairman of the Motion Pictures Committee until October 30, 1953, when this committee was integrated into the Ministry of Culture, which was formed at that time. On January 9, *Scanteia* further disclosed that Constantin Paunica had been appointed to head the new section of "Director of Theaters" within the new Ministry of Culture.

Other new names that have lately cropped up in the Romanian press are: Constantin Teodoru, Deputy Minister of Food Industry; Mihail Vieru and Vasile Oprescu, Assistant Ministers for Telecommunications; Ion Raab, Assistant Minister for Construction; Mihail Rosianu, Stan Arsene, Pavel Tugui, Jack Podoleanu, all Assistant Ministers for Culture; Elena Eremia, Assistant Minister for Light Industry; Ion Motrenea, Assistant Minister for Education; George Vidrascu (formerly Vice-Premier, removed from office in September 1953) now appointed member of the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly and Chairman of the Bucharest People's Council.

Disclosure of other appointments came in the wake of sessions held by the newly elected regional People's Councils (see February issue, page 52). At these meetings the deputies elected an Executive Committee and 11 permanent committees, one for each of the country's regions. On this occasion (January 10), though the papers once again refrained from disclosing the names of the majority of persons "elected," reference was made to the new members of the Executive Committee of the Bucharest People's Council. Among the 19 persons named by *Scanteia*, the more prominent are the following: Filip Aurel, Colonel of the Army; Pompiliu Macovei, Architect-in-Chief of

Bucharest; Gheorghe Necula, First Secretary of the Bucharest Party Committee; the above-mentioned Gheorghe Vidrascu and, finally, most important of all, Constantin Doncea.

This is the first time in two years that the old-time Party member, once Deputy Mayor of Bucharest and then Mayor of the city (1945-49), appears in the political limelight. Reputed to be a first-class organizer and devoted Party member, Doncea was appointed Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces some time in 1950. His troubles started in March 1952, when five officers of the 17th Aviation Regiment of Brasov escaped to Yugoslavia. One of them, a Captain Ghinea, happened to be the head of the political division. True to form, the regime purged the Army of all executive personnel even remotely connected with these defections, and the former Mayor disappeared into the limbo of the politically damned. That Doncea has now been reinstated as an administrator of the capital is indicative of how urgent it is for the regime at this juncture to enlist the help of capable men.

Salary Revisions

A lengthy editorial in *Scanteia* (Bucharest) of December 25, 1953, dealt with "improvement of the workers' and foremen's salary system in the textile industry." After mentioning that "a few days ago" the Council of Ministers had drawn up a new salary system for several categories of workers and foremen in the industry, the paper discusses the modifications, which became effective on December 1, 1953. As an example of the over-all effect of the new regulations, the paper declares that certain types of weavers on the piece-work system will be able to increase their salaries by 21.3 percent in December, compared with their earnings in the previous month. The most important change will consist in "the adoption of wage scales based on the worker's type of job. . . ." This does away with wage tables, which, in the past, set specific rates for specific worker qualifications. Henceforth, wage scales will indicate daily earnings corresponding to each type of job for all salaries—whether derived from fixed pay or based on the piece-work system. The object of this innovation is said to be to correct "the lack of sufficient differentiation for specialized functions."

The article also refers to a ten percent salary increase for all workers in the industry who make a living on a piece-work basis. According to *Scanteia*, this includes 83-85 percent of all textile workers. An eight percent increase in salary was also decreed for workers who perform their duties under conditions harmful to their health. Furthermore, the new measure provides for an improvement in the bonus system, "in order to encourage workers, foremen and engineers fighting for the fulfillment and over-fulfillment of the plan." These bonuses, according to the paper, will be computed on "the quantity of first-class quality products turned out by the workers over their set quotas. . . ." While in the past workers received bonuses only when the entire enterprise in which they were employed had surpassed set quotas, the new regulation stipulates that rewards will now be determined on the strength

of individual output in specific plants. Thus, for example, a cotton-weaver will receive a seven percent bonus if he overfulfills his quota by five percent. The accent on individual performance is also reflected in the new stress on individual thrift. In accordance with the new regulations, a worker will be entitled to half the value of the materials that he has saved. And in future, workers will be encouraged to qualify as foremen: "the granting of the titles Foreman 1st and 2nd Class entitles the receiver to a salary raise." The amount of this raise is not specified.

The intent of these modifications is obviously to increase production. In fact, *Scanteia* concludes its article with the reminder that "the safest way to enlarge production capacity is to organize ever more active competitions in enterprises." Inasmuch as wages will no longer be paid on the basis of qualifications and technical training but solely in proportion to actual output, the total amount paid to textile workers may decrease. Moreover, by stressing efforts based on the piecework system, the regime is further tightening its control over individual output; opposition in the form of slowdowns will now be harder than ever. Harder work remains the price for individual survival.

Bulgaria

The Sixth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party opened on February 25, 1954. According to a December 8, 1953, Radio Sofia broadcast, the following are the main topics on the agenda: 1. a political report by Prime Minister Vulko Chervenkov; 2. a report on the economic situation with a discussion of directives for the Five Year Plan (1953-57); 3. new Party rules; 4. election of the Central Organs of the Party. The January 12 issue of *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) official organ of the Central Committee, disclosed the terms of the new preamble to the latest rules. It reads as follows:

"The main tasks of the Bulgarian Communist Party at the present moment are the following: the definite liquidation of capitalism; the abolition of all forms of exploitation of man by man and the creation of a Socialist community; the constant improvement of the material and cultural level of the working people; the education of the working people in the spirit of Socialist patriotism and internationalism; [the strengthening of] fraternal ties with the working people of all countries; the strengthening of Bulgarian-Soviet friendship, the fundamental force behind our socialist development; the utmost strengthening of the Motherland's active defense against the aggressive activities of its enemies."

In some respects, the rules themselves differ from the old ones. Thus, the "moral duties" of Party members are stressed more specifically. Also, the primary Party organizations will no longer have the task of fighting "bureaucratism." Henceforth this task will be reserved for the Central Control Committee. The primary Party organizations, however, will have the right to control the activities of the administration and to fight against the "inactive and formal attitude of Party decisions." Further, the Orgbureau will be abolished. Thus the supreme organs of the Party will now

consist of: The Central Committee, the Politbureau, the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Party Control Committee.

Another new element emerges from provision 26, which states: "The election [of Party officials] is to be by secret ballot." The old rule (Section 21) stipulates: "The election of Party officials takes place by open ballot." It must be borne in mind, however, that, since the Party Control Commission keeps a close watch on the activities and decisions of local Party organizations, this change does not amount to much in practice.

These innovations—minor in import and few in number—have evoked the following comments in the regime press: *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), January 12—"The draft is a document of historic significance . . . ;" from the same paper on January 18—"The workers in our country are more and more convinced of the national character of the Party policy. . . . Now the policy of the Party and government is to further improve the material and cultural standard of the workers . . . and to develop further our agriculture. This obliges the Party organizations to perfect their political and organizational work . . . ;" on January 25—"The Party management is a collective management and all members of Party bureaus or committees must actively participate in the discussions and solutions of problems . . . the draft plan for amendments to Party rules stresses the necessity for strictly observing collectivity in management . . . ;" *Rabotnichesko Delo* of January 29, 1954—"Everything will depend upon our ability to distribute leading cadres in such a manner as to insure the placement of capable leaders in all branches of public and economic life that are of decisive importance. . . . Very frequently persons lacking ability and who have not been checked are appointed to important positions."

These criticisms and pious hopes reveal that all has not been well within the Party. They also show that the Soviet model is being aped, particularly with reference to collective leadership. Some aspects, such as, for instance, the reference to the "national character" of the Party can only be understood against the background of the trials and tribulations of the Party in the last few years. Such a review also suggests why the Congress was held at this time. Since the Fifth Congress took place in December 1948, and since Party rules stipulated that a Party Congress should be convened every second year, the present meeting should have occurred three years ago. That it has not, can be ascribed to the following reasons:

1. *Party Rift*: During the wartime exile of the late Communist leader Georgi Dimitrov, former Vice Premier and Party Secretary General Traicho Kostov became the de facto Party boss. Not having undergone Soviet schooling, Kostov resisted grafting the Soviet political and economic pattern on Bulgaria following the *coup*. Much like Tito, he resented the national exploitation inherent in that policy. And so Kostov became the spokesman for a nationalistic brand of Communism. On December 16, 1949, he was sent to the gallows, accused of having "conspired to overthrow the Bulgarian government" and of having engaged in "espionage activities on behalf of the U.S. and

Yugoslavia." Thus a deep rift split in the Party in 1949. The struggle continued for a long time, marked by a thorough purge of the rank and file adherents of the executed leader. These Party convulsions engulfed persons as prominent as Dobri Turpeshev, Politbureau member, two members of the government and nine other high ranking government officials who were sentenced to life imprisonment, nine members of the Central Committee and many local Party leaders. As late as 1952, Trunsky, the most popular of wartime guerrilla leaders, was liquidated for "Titoism." Thus 1953 was the first year of inner-Party truce. That the effects of the purge are still being felt is indicated by the reference to the present "nationalist" fervor of the Party; the Congress is apparently regarded by the Communist bosses as a platform from which slogans of Party unity can conveniently be broadcast.

2. *Economic chaos*: Nationalization of industry started in 1947. The process was relatively slow and the economy, burdened with an over-rapid industrialization, is even now far from containing the means with which to give the people the improvement in the standard of living that has been promised them. Agriculture, too, has been in a turmoil. Collectivization, which has now absorbed 60 percent of all arable land (according to a Chervenkov estimate of December 3, 1953), has had a disruptive effect. Hitherto, therefore, the Party could show little improvement in the people's welfare. At the moment, though there is still relatively little to boast of in that direction, at least the Party can discourse at great length on the New Course measures.

3. *Lack of popularity*: Nine years of Communist brutality have completely alienated the Communist hierarchy from the people. Though the present concessions are not spectacular, the regime seems to have come to the realization that it was sitting on a powder keg. On the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the Communist *coup* (September 9, 1953), many persons sentenced for political reasons were either freed or had their sentences reduced. The Congress could therefore meet in a somewhat "freer" political climate.

4. *Post-Stalin New Course*: The post-Stalin tactical changes within the Soviet bloc have apparently necessitated the convocation of Party Congresses throughout the area (see February issue, page 56). The new line required new people and the whole Party apparatus had to be given explicit instructions.

Diplomatic Activity

For some months now Bulgaria has been attempting to improve relations with her immediate neighbors, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia (see November issue, pages 44-45 and December issue, page 48). Talks have been taking place in Paris aimed at a resumption of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Greece, severed since March 1941. A railway transportation agreement with Greece and Turkey has now been followed by the signing, on December 26, 1953, of a similar agreement with Yugoslavia. The document deals with transit service for passengers and contains regulations for the handling of baggage and freight

traffic. This important commercial rail link had hitherto been only partially regulated; the new measures will now introduce reciprocal rules on sanitary services and veterinary supervision. The agreement also provides that the Yugoslav border-station at Dimitrovgrad (Tsaribrod) be transferred to Gradina, nearer to the frontier, thus increasing the efficiency of the line. The official communique of the Bulgarian press agency stresses that "the agreement settles all complex transportation matters for the benefit of both countries."

For Bulgaria, the new understanding will facilitate a rapid and direct flow of goods on one of the most important and convenient trade channels with the West. This particular show of good will on the part of the regime may therefore reflect the intention to increase Western trade within the framework of its New Course program. As for Yugoslavia, the practical effects of the agreement will probably entail closer economic ties with Turkey in the future.

Another important step in the current Greco-Bulgarian negotiations was taken on December 30, 1953, with the signing at Salonika of the final protocol completing the demarcation of the common frontier. This successful ending of the mixed boundary commission's work, which was started last August, eliminates what has been a major source of friction between the two countries for many years.

The text of the protocol was not made public, but Greek Foreign Minister Stephan Stephanopoulos issued a statement in Athens on December 31, in which he declared that the protocol "brings to an end the unsettled state of affairs which for so long has had so many unpleasant consequences on the Greek-Bulgarian frontier." He added that the delegates of both countries worked in a spirit of "mutual understanding" during the summer and autumn, and finally reached an agreement satisfactory to both countries, "especially to Greece." The Minister appraised the results in the following words:

"The agreement reached fully vindicated the Greek view and ensures for us a substantial territory in the disputed Evros islets. Under this agreement, Greek sovereignty has been acknowledged on all the islets or their parts, which hitherto had been claimed in vain by different Greek governments. . . .

"Apart from the positive gains for Greece and the beneficial psychological repercussion, the agreement has also had satisfactory results from the diplomatic point of view, since it has . . . enabled the opening of negotiations for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries."

The tactical change in Bulgaria's foreign policy was discussed by the Party organ *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) on January 9, 1954. The paper stated that "the Bulgarian government is ready to normalize relations with neighboring capitalist countries and to remove all hindrances in achieving this goal. . . ." The paper then reviewed the recent developments in the following manner:

"The dispute over the Maritsa River border has recently been settled, and so, too, has the dispute over border markings along the Greek-Bulgarian border.

. . . A trade agreement has been signed between the two countries. Negotiations concerning the resumption of diplomatic relations . . . are continuing in the interest of both countries and peace in the Balkans.

"Our relations with Yugoslavia are gradually coming back to normal. Ambassadors have been exchanged . . . relations between the two countries have been improved. Following a Bulgarian suggestion, the Yugoslav side accepted a proposal for a resumption of activities on the part of mixed border committees, and our side is prepared to accept a Yugoslav proposal aimed at setting up a common mixed commission, which will discuss and settle misunderstandings. . . . Obviously it is possible to continue these efforts designed to normalize our relations with Yugoslavia in the interest of both countries and peace in the Balkans."

In general terms, this tactical reorientation in Bulgarian foreign policy can be seen as constituting an integral part of the post-Stalinist "peace offensive." Certain factors—such as Bulgaria's geographical position and present internal conditions—seem to indicate, however, that the new tactics also derive from purely national needs. For instance, on September 18, 1953, *Ostechestven Front* (Sofia) stated that: "If the main care of the Communist Party and the government in the realm of domestic policy is to be directed toward a further uplift of the people's economy and to a sharp increase in the material and cultural level of the workers, then the main problem in the sphere of foreign policy is the guaranteeing of peaceful labor to the Bulgarian people." In other words, flanked as she is by anti-Cominform countries, Bulgaria needs a detente from the outside to accomplish her plans on the inside. The Communist regime requires stability and some measure of cooperation—however passive—from the population; it knows that in the past nine years it has become ever more unpopular and that the belated minor concessions will not change this feeling overnight. To avoid uprisings, the Communists now apparently feel that all their energies ought to be concentrated on internal affairs. At the same time, the disruption of the Balkan Pact and, in particular, the isolation of Yugoslavia, remains a major objective of Cominform-inspired policy.

Insurance Remittances

On December 25, 1953, *Izvestia* (Sofia) of the Presidium of the National Assembly published a decree on the remittance of insurance fees, fines, interests and dues owed to the State. According to the measure, insurance dues, interest on unpaid dues and fines imposed for non-payment are cancelled if they were owed to the State (or to private concerns later taken over by the State) prior to December 31, 1941. The regulation also remits unpaid accident insurance fees owed by former industrialists (who had to insure all their workers) in the period between January 1, 1942 and December 31, 1948.

Not many such industrialists, however, are likely to profit from this "concession." The decree lists numerous categories of persons to whom the new measure does not apply. Among these are persons who supposedly "dragged Bulgaria into the World War," people who allegedly obtained

property illegally or engaged in speculation, citizens sentenced under the supply-and-prices decree-law, individuals affected by the "Law for the Nationalization of Private Industrial and Mining Enterprises," and many others—in fact, anybody who at any time or in any manner or form did not fit into the Communist order. More specifically, the decree stipulates that "owners of industrial enterprises, businessmen and kulaks" will not be allowed to profit from the new measure.

The granting of remittances to insolvent persons after a lapse of five years had been an old tradition in pre-Communist Bulgaria. The present "concession" is therefore not new, though it is in line with promises made by Prime Minister Vukko Chervenkov in his September 8, 1953 speech, in which he pledged an improvement of the people's economic lot. In this instance—as in many other cases—the concession is minor while the real substance of the measure is to be found in its propaganda value. On the whole, the decree merely acknowledges and legalizes the fact that certain payments, long overdue the State, are unrecoverable.

Private Craftsmen

Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia) of February 2, 1954, announced that the Council of Ministers had recently discussed the problem of "facilitating the activities of the toiling private craftsman and of the travelling artisan." The paper first refers to the fact that these persons ought to enter craftsmen collectives and that the government intends to go on giving "great help" to these institutions. At the same time, however, assistance is also to be extended to private artisans, "particularly in places where the craftsmen collectives and the industrial combines have not yet spread their network."

The decree by the Council of Ministers contains instructions to various administrative organs (the Ministry of Communal Economy and Public Works, the Ministry of Internal Trade, the Central Union of the Labor-Producing Craftsmen Cooperatives, the Central Cooperative Union and the District County) to "facilitate the craftsmen's activities . . . particularly in places where the public sector network is insufficient and where the population feels the need for consumer goods and craftsmen's services. The local People's Councils and cooperatives are advised that they should help craftsmen with waste, raw materials, equipment, transportation, etc." It is further pointed out that private craftsmen should be helped in obtaining materials, particularly those in artistic trades and in trades having to do with the repair of small agricultural equipment. The decree stipulates that the "Ministry of Communal Economy and Public Works must earmark the necessary materials in its plan."

It must be noted that the present policy with respect to private craftsmen does not entail a fundamental reversal of regime policy. The collectives are not to be disbanded; on the contrary, as the article stresses, they will be expanded as fast as is practicable. In the meantime, private craftsmen are to contribute to the latest regime efforts

to remedy the lack of consumer goods; to encourage them, their forcible inclusion into collectives has been slowed down and some help will be given them. It must be recognized that the majority of the 100,000 craftsmen who owned shops in prewar Bulgaria have been made to join collectives in the last nine years. Those still on their own are mainly to be found in villages where their number is too small to make it possible for them to form a collective. All the same, their function continues to be vital to the economy as is shown in the following extract from *Vechni Novini* (Sofia) of October 17, 1953: "In the Sofia region alone there are five industrial combines with 5,000 workers and 211 collectives with 18,000 members. Production percentages are as follows: 25 percent from the combines, 65 from the collectives and 10 percent from private craftsmen. Yet there is a great need for such household articles as buckets, coal shovels, stove pipes, spoons and forks, lockers, etc. Out of 166 kinds of goods included in this list, only 106 are produced by combines and collectives."

Czechoslovakia

Last January 9, Radio Prague broadcast the text of a government proclamation submitting to nationwide "discussion" two draft bills on the reorganization of national committees. The intent of the bills, according to the government proclamation, is to "strengthen the principle of union between national committees and the people, to give expression to democratic rights and privileges of the working people . . . and to create conditions for the widest participation of the population in the administration of the State." The bills lay down principles on the structure, tasks, and working methods of national committees.

The committees are defined as "local organs of State power of the Czechoslovak working people which . . . shall rely on the alliance of workers, farmers and working intelligentsia in discharging their tasks in regions, districts and communities." The constitutional draft bill stipulates that national committees shall be elected by the "working people" of the region, district, town or village for a period of three years, and that suffrage "shall be universal, equal, and direct." Balloting, it is promised, will be secret. Moreover, on paper at least, "All members of national committees may be recalled at any time, if the electors so decide." The tasks of the committees are to "direct and control the work of their councils, departments, and other organs." They will also have to implement orders and decisions of the government and will be supposed to "protect the rights of citizens and direct local economic and cultural construction." The bills also contain provisions defining the chain of command: "National committees shall be directed by the government, national committees of lower order being directed by, and responsible to, national committees of higher order."

An article in Bratislava *Pravda* of January 10 summarizes the main points of the bills. According to the paper, national committees so far have not sufficiently rep-

resented the central government on a local level. To remedy the shortcomings, two major devices will now be introduced: 1. elected members will be liable to recall if they do not fulfill their duties satisfactorily; 2. the "collective decision" principle will be applied—that is, "The present system of splitting up the work among officials according to its nature will be abolished. . . ." At present, an individual member of a committee council (the council is the executive arm of the entire committee) is directly and singly responsible for a particular department (interior, agriculture, education, etc.). Under the new set-up, the council as a whole will be supposed to take decisions on matters affecting all departments within the jurisdiction of the committee.

As is always the case with Communist political circuses, the advance billing bears little resemblance to actual performance. Elections, of course, will not be free. Speaking at the December session of the Party's Central Committee, Premier Viliam Siroky referred to the "election campaign" in these words: "It is probable that hostile elements will attempt to propose their own candidates. It is up to the Party to display the political agility, the wisdom and prudence . . . to unmask the real intentions of reactionary elements. . . ." In other words, under the cloak of the National Front, the Party will ease in reliable persons and will see to it that they obtain the expected 99 percent of the vote. It is interesting to note that the much-stressed right of the population to recall an elected member of a national committee is nowhere defined—neither in the two draft bills, nor in the explanatory memoranda. If this right should be defined in the future, it is unlikely that in practice it will amount to little more than the right of the Party to remove persons incapable of carrying out its decisions.

Despite the fine words on "collective leadership," a wide gap is bound to open between the promises and their fulfillment. A body of laymen will not be able to tackle all the intricate problems of public administration. Compared to the recent past, the new procedure might do away with some of the petty despotism and incompetence inherent in the single-department-head system. On the other hand, wider discussion, if seriously carried out, might also slow down the administrative procedure and lead to chaos.

A similarly spurious show of democratic procedure will attend the "public discussion" of the two draft bills. The nature of these proceedings was described in a January 17 *Rude Pravo* editorial:

"In villages and towns, the discussions . . . will be arranged by the national committees; in plants, offices and higher schools etc.; [they will be arranged by] the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement and the Czechoslovak Youth League. It is important to stress that the discussion is expected to strengthen the National Front, and consequently all components of the National Front must participate in it. . . ."

To "direct" these discussions, the government has set up a commission consisting of the following persons: Chairman: Premier Viliam Siroky; Members: Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Party's Central Committee; Vaclav Kopecky, Deputy Premier and Minister of Culture; Joseph

Plojhar, Minister of Health; Emanuel Slechta, Minister of Building Industry; Joseph Kysely, Minister of Local Economy; Secretary: Vaclav Skoda, Minister of Justice. These members of the hierarchy will be the final "interpreters" of the popular will.

On January 21, Radio Prague proudly reported that "national committees are busily discussing the draft bills . . . and have already formulated their first observations and critical comments." The "critical" comment turns out to be in line with the advertised "collective decision" principle. That is, it is suggested that instead of having four-member councils of local national committees in places with a population under 2,000, five-member councils would be preferable. The increase would insure that councils operate with a minimum of three members present.

The same broadcast mentions that henceforth, "Committees on all levels will work publicly . . . and will no longer be allowed to consider their deliberations as confidential and the participation of the population as undesirable."

Taken in conjunction with the original government statement that "National Committees must, above all, insure the best possible satisfaction of the current material needs of the workers," what emerges is a belated attempt on the part of the regime to recruit functionaries with closer ties to the population. It is clear, however, that despite the "reorganization" and the so-called nationwide discussion, the committees will not become organs of popular expression.

Housing Shortage

One of the major planks of the regime's New Course program when it was first launched consisted in grandiose promises to erect extensive housing projects as part of a drive to raise the population's standard of living. Thus, the government announced on September 15 that 5,000 family houses would be built in the remaining months of 1953. Commenting on the fate of this plan, Frantisek Zupka, head of the Slovak Trade Unions, wrote in the December issue of *Odborar* (Bratislava) that "workers received the government's decision with great enthusiasm." And then he adds: "They got the loans [from the government] but the work did not start. According to up-to-date reports from individual plants it is clear that the building of family houses has, practically speaking, not been started."

Reasons for this failure were given in an article which appeared in the November 13 issue of *Prace* (Prague). According to the paper, by November, the Ministry of Building had completed only 79 per cent of the living space required under the plan. The power industry had fared even worse: it had met the housing plan by only 20 percent. The article gave the following example of ineptitude: "At the Stalingrad coal mine of Most, new bath installations are being built at great expense, even though the old unit is quite satisfactory. At the same time, however, no water supply has been provided for the new unit, so that it will be unusable. . . . Similarly, at the Zarubek coal mine in Ostrava an expensive communal bath was built, but its capacity is for only 25 men."

The source of the trouble is attributed by the regime press

to a great variety of ills, including a lack of technical know-how, lack of coordination between supervisors and workers, waste of materials and the use of antiquated construction tools. On November 11, *Rude Pravo* (Prague) complained that workers are irresponsible and "employees are being paid unearned wages." To illustrate the sore state of affairs in the construction industry the paper quoted shock-worker Vebr's philosophical apathy: "Well," said Vebr, "that's the type of planning we get. First we have no materials, then no labor."

In spite of this dismal failure in the first six months of the new program, Jozef Pucik, Chairman of the State Planning Office, announced on January 20 that the 1954 plan called for a 37 percent increase in housing construction as compared to the previous year. According to this statement, the investment plan entails "the construction of 40,000 apartment units and 10,000 individual small family houses." These figures are fantastically high in view of the fact that, as revealed in *Prace* of August 8, 1953, only 22,016 apartment units were built in 1950, 23,000 in 1951 and 25,000 one year later. No figures are available for 1953, but the flurry of self-criticism referred to above does not seem to indicate that a substantial rise took place. Executive orders and elaborate paper planning are not likely to alter this situation in the months to come.

Culture and Kopecky

Vaclav Kopecky, a one-time Minister of Information and Enlightenment, now Minister of Culture, cannot be accused of rigidity in matters cultural. If the Minister lacks insight, taste and sensibility, he is nonetheless endowed with a rare ability to change his mind (or have it changed for him) with grace, speed and the supreme assurance that he must be right. As a cultural oracle, his pronouncements flow from an immense range of perception: he can see black as white, white as black, and still remain quite a solid Red.

As explained in *Rude Pravo* (Prague) of December 13, Kopecky's latest (and highly authoritative) views on art amounted to the following: "To combat all utterances of schematism, vulgarism, superficiality and grayness which still appear in literary creative art and in other creative artistic productions." Kopecky lamented that in the country of Jaroslav Hasek (author of the hilarious *The Good Soldier Schweik*), in a country "whose people are famous for humor, joy and gaiety," a peculiar type of "kulturnik" has sprung up. The Minister explained the term with reference to the Soviet variety of the same phenomenon known there under the name of "Suchar" or "Dry Guy." On this particular topic, Kopecky expatiated in near-lyrical fashion: "The so-called *suchars* think that the advent of Socialism means that the people cease to be people with normal human joys, longings, passions, predilections and claims on life, and that they become mere mechanisms, which can be wound up at liberty so that they will stand any amount of theses, formulae, stereotype phrases, etc. . . ."

The Minister was in fact so carried away by his new concept of art, man and the universe that he forgot that he too was once a "dry guy." But that was a few years ago, when Andrei A. Zhdanov's theories were still the *dernier cri* in Communist inspiration. As can be expected of a man like Kopecky, he was even then an outspoken member of the artistic avant-garde. In May 1949, at the Communist Party Congress, he expressed his profound distaste for the type of art which "avoids reality and truth and which, in a neutral mood, evades taking up views towards the problems of life, the problems of the class struggle, etc." Kopecky stressed that the Party consistently defended "Socialist realism," the kind formulated "in the fundamental pronouncements of Comrade Zhdanov." As late as October 1953, *Rude Pravo* was still endorsing this orthodox view and deplored the fact that the Czechoslovak humor magazine *Dikobraz* had articles which aimed at producing laughter at any price." In a serious mood—one befitting an organ of "Socialist realism"—the paper pointed out that, to indulge in humor for humor's sake "results in a lack of ideological content." "Socialist builders," in other words, were expected to betake themselves to the mines, collectives, farms and other "working places" and use these as background for panegyrics on the regime's accomplishment. That was art, serious art and the only recognized form of "art."

Then came the "revolt." It was spearheaded by Khataturian's now famous article in the November issue of *Soviet Music*. The musician's platitudes were soon taken up by the versatile Ilya Ehrenburg whose *Znamya* article, reprinted in *Literarni Noviny* of November 7, 1953, assailed restrictions on creative literature and attacked the simplification and idealization of heroes. After that, others joined the "new movement" and in an interview on December 30, 1953, Dmitri Shostakovich spoke out in defense of Western music.

Kopecky therefore knew what he was talking about—at least he knew what he was supposed to say. In his advice to be merry, he recommended that pleasant operas, ballets and music hall performances should be staged; he commented that films, plays, and novels portraying family situations and describing the facts and fiction of love were not necessarily anti-social. He apparently took his listeners by surprise for on December 26, *Svet V Obrazech* (Prague) had to reassure its readers that the new orientation was real. "It will dispel," commented the paper, "the embarrassment with which many of our writers, film producers and theater people and also many of our mass organizations faced the clamor . . . of the working people . . . for good entertainment."

Despite these assurances and reassurances, it is too early to tell whether Kopecky will not be otherwise inspired in the near future. An ominous note was sounded by *Pravda* (Moscow) on January 6, 1954, when this paper called for stricter Party control over artists. The new order to make merry may therefore prove to be short-lived and, in true Communist style, tragic for the people concerned.

Poland

On January 13, 1954, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) reported that the Presidium of the government had recently adopted a decision on the improvement of working conditions and wages on State farms. The resolution, the paper stated, comes into force on March 1, 1954.

A reform of the State farm wage system had been anticipated following a discussion of the matter at the 9th Plenum of the Communist Party held October 29-30, 1953. At that time, Chelchowski, Minister of State farms, explained that "A serious handicap in raising productivity on State farms . . . has been caused by a wage system that is incorrect and cannot encourage the people to work. . . ." This admonition was followed by a lengthy article by Zygmunt Zason in the January issue of *Przegląd Zagadnień Socjalnych* (Warsaw), entitled "The Problem of Improvement in the Standard of Living of State Farm Employees." The intent of the resolution, implicit in the article, is threefold: 1. to assure a steady flow of manpower into the State farms; 2. to raise individual production; 3. to increase the worker's responsibility for the quality of his produce.

To achieve these aims—amounting to more and better farm production—the government decision provides for the introduction of a wage system based on piecework, that is, on production results. As far as possible, flat daily wages will be eliminated and granting of special bonuses for exceeding quotas will be stressed. Furthermore, to encourage higher production rates, employees will now share in the profits derived from such extra efforts.

Revision of the wage system will be particularly advantageous to workers in animal husbandry. Hitherto these persons have had to work in gruelling conditions, including a 7-day week with only one day off every three weeks. Permanent employees of State farms therefore shunned such work and production suffered accordingly. On January 12, Radio Warsaw commented in this connection that "the new wage system introduced by the decision of the Presidium of the government provides for higher wages for workers employed both in animal and vegetable production." No further details were given, but in his article Zason suggested various remedies, which apparently have now been adopted. They include a lowering of norms for people in these categories, the introduction of one day off duty per week, the employment of a night worker in the larger stables and pig sties and, most important, a wage raise that would include a higher fixed basic rate and an extension of the bonus scheme for overfulfillment of production and delivery plans.

Wages and salaries of executive and specialist staffs will also be increased and differentiated according to education and experience in State farm work. Moreover, according to the Warsaw broadcast, to help employees settle on State farms, the decision "provides for a number of privileges, including facilities for buying cows on credit. Regular workers who express the desire to build their own houses," the commentator added, "will receive help in the form of allocation of a building site, credits and materials."

In a January 27, 1954 broadcast, Radio Warsaw gave out excerpts from a speech on the new measures by Antoni Kuligowski, Vice-Minister of State farms. In describing how the new system will work in practice, the official stated that, in future, a field brigade will receive eight *zlotys* for every quintal (220 lbs.) of potatoes produced in excess of planned production, 10 *zlotys* for every such quintal of wheat, rye, and barley; and 12 *zlotys* for each quintal of sugar beets above the foreseen quota. Bonuses for overfulfillment of grain, potatoes and fodder will be paid in kind if so requested by workers and in cash in all other cases. Turning to the question of dairy farming, the official stressed that the resolutions introduce the following changes: ". . . up to now a milkmaid has received 12 *groszs* for one liter of milk; this sum has now been raised to 19 *groszs*. For each liter in excess of the monthly quota she has been receiving a five *grosz* bonus—this will be increased to 19 *groszs* per liter. For each liter of milk produced above the yearly plan she will be entitled to a 10 *grosz* bonus."

Other figures mentioned were: while 47 *groszs* have hitherto been paid per kg. of meat, this sum will now be increased to 1.3 *zlotys*. Moreover, the worker will be paid 2.10 *zlotys* a month if he maintains a constant number of cattle. To promote efficiency, a 10 percent increase in piecework pay will be granted for any job completed on time. For managers and specialists, the added incentive comes in the form of basic raises which, it is promised, might amount to as much as 80 percent of their salaries. The added higher bonuses promised will further swell their pay by from eight to 10 percent. For example, a team leader with a good education and three years of experience might find that his basic salary will jump from 1,003 to 1,700 *zlotys* a month (the average industrial worker earns 700 *zlotys* a month).

These measures, if carried out, will probably result in what they intend to accomplish—a gain in production. The Communists have had innumerable occasions to learn that when taking the pride of ownership away from farmers, other incentives had to be provided. Whether the measures will accomplish all that is hoped for by the regime, remains to be seen. The increased remuneration in any case does not make the average State farm hand prosperous; his misery is now being decreased somewhat—if he agrees to work harder.

Trial and Berlin Conference

Refugee reports indicate that for weeks preceding the Berlin Conference, a jittery Polish regime tightened its control of all means of communications with the West. These measures included a strict watch along the Oder-Neisse Polish-German border line and a close censorship of all letters addressed to Germany. This particular step was probably deemed necessary to prevent a leakage of information on Polish conditions that could be relayed to Berlin. According to these reports, at the request of the Polish regime, the Soviet Security Police organized a special censorship office in East Berlin. Letters from Poland ad-

dressed to West Berlin and Germany are now being sifted in a post office in Frankfurt/Oder and then, if necessary, conveyed to the censorship office in East Berlin.

Inside the country, the Communists staged yet another of their perennial show-and-lecture trials. They timed it to coincide with the opening of the Berlin Conference and tailored the indictment according to the political demands of the day. According to *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) of January 29, 1954, five defendants were hauled before the district military court of Opole (a town in Silesia near the German border), charged with having been members of "Adenauer's espionage organization." The same day, PAP, the regime press agency, stated that two of the defendants, Alfred Pietruszka and Henryk Koj, were neo-Nazis who had "organized a spy network under the patronage and with the help of U. S. imperialistic circles." The other three men in the dock were accused of having been agents recruited by the aforementioned "infiltrators." Radio Warsaw described the alleged set-up in the following terms:

"It is stated in the indictment that neo-Nazis . . . are organizing . . . widely developed espionage networks and subversion groups, the activities of which are directed against the GDR, the Soviet Union, the People's Democracies and particularly against Poland.

"One such subversion and intelligence center has been set up in Western Germany. The subversion and espionage outpost in West Berlin, directed by a certain Kaiser . . . is smuggling specially trained armed agents into Poland to carry out espionage activities and political subversion. The West German revisionists [meaning revision of the Oder-Neisse Frontier which has not been fixed by treaty] base themselves in their work on neo-Nazi and criminal elements, and it is from such elements that the defendants have been recruited."

The whole trial, in fact, was staged not so much in a courtroom as in the arena of international politics. Relying on a deep-seated Polish fear of German militarization, the Communist leaders are using this feeling to justify present Soviet policy as enunciated at the Berlin Conference (see January issue, page 49). More concretely, as far as Poland is concerned, Soviet tactics in Berlin are translated as benevolent attempts on the part of the USSR to keep the German wolves at bay. Hence they made repeated reference during the trial to the Oder-Neisse line—the implication being that the West is encouraging a "revisionist" policy which would deprive Poland of some of its territories (while nothing of course is said of the Eastern lands incorporated into Russia) by the unleashing of power-mad neo-Nazis against the country.

In true Communist style, a subtle presentation of insidious falsehood was not enough. The trial had to show by implication not only that Germany, if reunited along Western lines, would bring a new hell of suffering to the Polish people; the Prosecutor also had to make it plain that Poles were now living in "heavenly bliss." "The people's rule," Radio Warsaw commented on January 29, "is based on a broad popular movement and enjoys the respect of the people; they trust its concern for man. Every simple and honest man from Opole is a supporter of the government's rule and an enemy of the fascist spies. . . . The people's government has thus liquidated Adenauer's gang of spies because of its [the regime's] strength, which is based on the support of the whole nation."

In the present instance, this "concern for man" was expressed in death sentences for Pietruszka and Koj and prison sentences ranging from 10 to 15 years for the others.

Where to Get Off

After the death of Stalin, the Communists changed the name of the old Polish city of Katowice to Stalinogrod. A joke brought out from behind the Iron Curtain by refugees tells how an old Polish peasant woman traveling by train to Katowice fell asleep and slept through the train's arrival there. She woke a few hours later to find the train empty and the conductor cleaning up the cars. She looked out the window and, not recognizing the place, asked, "Have we arrived at Katowice yet?"

"No," said the conductor sadly, "not yet. We are still in Stalinogrod."

Recent and Related

The Great Powers and Eastern Europe, by John A. Lukacs (*American Book: \$7.50*). A study of political events since 1917, based on the author's conviction that "the tragedy of Europe in the three most fateful phases of its recent past was due to . . . Western underestimation of central-eastern Europe's international importance." The text is derived from documents and material from primary sources in seven languages, much of which has not been previously collected in book form.

Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change, by Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis & Harold H. Kelley (*Yale: \$4.50*). Report of a Yale Communication Research Program concerned with basic research on the ways in which words and symbols influence people. The problems of mass communication, and the modification of attitudes and beliefs through persuasion—whether in the form of advertising campaigns or ideological propaganda—are tested through precise controlled experiments in the three principal areas of the field of persuasion: the communicator, the communication, and the audience.

Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary Between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, by Stephen D. Kertesz (*Notre Dame: \$4.75*). The trends of Hungarian foreign policy since World War I, showing the dilemmas caused by Hungary's geographical position and how external forces have repeatedly used the conflicting national aspirations of small East European nations for their own purposes. With maps and a documentary appendix.

Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951; by Max Beloff (*Oxford: \$4.00*). An analysis of the patterns of Russia's policy in the Far East, from the Yalta Conference and the China revolution to the Korean War. A chapter contributed by J. Frankel covers Soviet policy in Southeast Asia, where Communist guerrilla warfare in Malaya, Indonesia and Viet Nam has raged almost uninterruptedly since the end of the war. The author's conclusions: the USSR, wherever possible, plays the part of a disinterested observer while actively fomenting internal dissension in the areas she wishes to bring under her control.

Capitalism and the Historians, edited by F. A. Hayek (*Chicago: \$3.00*). A series of essays with the bold intent of demonstrating that capitalism, as a social force, has been unjustly reviled at the hands of historians and intellectuals. The authors, arguing from actual case studies of the English worker in the 19th century, challenge the prevailing view that the Industrial Revolution brought nothing but social misery and evil.

Soviet Empire—The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism, by Olaf Caroe (*St. Martin's Press: \$5.00*). A valuable study of the methods of forcible assimilation of one people by another, which, in the author's own words, amounts to "a picture of something which can only be described by the new term, genocide." But the author, with confidence in and sympathy for the vitality of the Turkish races, believes that Central Asia may prove to be Russia's Waterloo.

History of Russian Philosophy, by V. V. Zenkovsky; translated by George L. Kline, consultant on Soviet philosophy for the Research Program on the USSR at Columbia (*Columbia: \$15.00, 2 vols.*). This is the first complete history of Russian philosophy in English. . . . **Soviet Economic Growth**, edited by Abram Bergson (*Row, Peterson: \$6.00*). A collection of papers based on the proceedings of the Arden House conference of May 23-25, 1952, at which 31 American scholars presented the results of intensive research into the Soviet economy. . . . **The Political Philosophy of Bakunin: Scientific Anarchism**, edited by G. P. Maximoff (*Free Press: \$6.00*). These selections from Bakunin's prolific writings provide a complete and coherent statement of this Russian revolutionary's political theory of libertarian socialism and anarchism. . . . **War, Communism and World Religions**, by Charles S. Braden (*Harper: \$3.00*). An informal inquiry into the degree of receptivity—or hostility—to the doctrine of Communism presently held by the followers of the traditional Eastern religions. Although the results are inevitably inconclusive, this study reveals much about contemporary Asian mentality. It is based on personal interviews held by the author.



THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE was founded in 1949 by a group of private American citizens who joined together for direct action aimed at the eventual liberation of the peoples of the Iron Curtain countries. With the help of endowments and public contributions to the Crusade for Freedom, the Committee has set up, among other activities, Radio Free Europe. The Committee's efforts are focused on the captive countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In these efforts the Committee counts among its active allies the democratic leaders—scholars, journalists, political and economic experts, and men of letters—who have escaped from the Communist enslavement of their native lands.

National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.

110 WEST 57TH STREET • NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

Return Postage Guaranteed

